From 4b5aed4e5af4c7aab621662f50a289e99b8ac393 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brian Coca <bcoca@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 21:06:01 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] prevent templating of passwords from prompt (#59246) (#59554)

* prevent templating of passwords from prompt (#59246)

* prevent templating of passwords from prompt

  fixes CVE-2019-10206

(cherry picked from commit e9a37f8e3171105941892a86a1587de18126ec5b)

* Improve performane of UnsafeProxy __new__

This adds an early return to the __new__ method of the UnsafeProxy object
which avoids creating the unsafe object if the incoming object is already
unsafe.

(cherry picked from commit c1e23c22a9fedafaaa88c2119b26dc123ff1392e)
(cherry picked from commit 490f17c7f959ce153765c1f033fdc30becf0faf7)
---
 .../dont_template_passwords_from_prompt.yml       |  2 ++
 lib/ansible/cli/__init__.py                       |  8 ++++++++
 lib/ansible/utils/unsafe_proxy.py                 | 15 ++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 changelogs/fragments/dont_template_passwords_from_prompt.yml

diff --git a/changelogs/fragments/dont_template_passwords_from_prompt.yml b/changelogs/fragments/dont_template_passwords_from_prompt.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..86a0e6122f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelogs/fragments/dont_template_passwords_from_prompt.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+bugfixes:
+    - resolves CVE-2019-10206, by avoiding templating passwords from prompt as it is probable they have special characters.
diff --git a/lib/ansible/cli/__init__.py b/lib/ansible/cli/__init__.py
index 380ddc4e2a..76d652f7c8 100644
--- a/lib/ansible/cli/__init__.py
+++ b/lib/ansible/cli/__init__.py
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ from ansible.parsing.dataloader import DataLoader
 from ansible.release import __version__
 from ansible.utils.path import unfrackpath
 from ansible.utils.vars import load_extra_vars, load_options_vars
+from ansible.utils.unsafe_proxy import AnsibleUnsafeBytes
 from ansible.vars.manager import VariableManager
 from ansible.parsing.vault import PromptVaultSecret, get_file_vault_secret
 
@@ -342,6 +343,13 @@ class CLI(with_metaclass(ABCMeta, object)):
         except EOFError:
             pass
 
+        # we 'wrap' the passwords to prevent templating as
+        # they can contain special chars and trigger it incorrectly
+        if sshpass:
+            sshpass = AnsibleUnsafeBytes(sshpass)
+        if becomepass:
+            becomepass = AnsibleUnsafeBytes(becomepass)
+
         return (sshpass, becomepass)
 
     def normalize_become_options(self):
diff --git a/lib/ansible/utils/unsafe_proxy.py b/lib/ansible/utils/unsafe_proxy.py
index 963798a087..6221e73393 100644
--- a/lib/ansible/utils/unsafe_proxy.py
+++ b/lib/ansible/utils/unsafe_proxy.py
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ __metaclass__ = type
 
 from collections import Mapping, MutableSequence, Set
 
-from ansible.module_utils.six import string_types, text_type
+from ansible.module_utils.six import string_types, text_type, binary_type
 from ansible.module_utils._text import to_text
 
 
@@ -70,15 +70,24 @@ class AnsibleUnsafeText(text_type, AnsibleUnsafe):
     pass
 
 
+class AnsibleUnsafeBytes(binary_type, AnsibleUnsafe):
+    pass
+
+
 class UnsafeProxy(object):
     def __new__(cls, obj, *args, **kwargs):
+        if isinstance(obj, AnsibleUnsafe):
+            # Already marked unsafe
+            return obj
+
         # In our usage we should only receive unicode strings.
         # This conditional and conversion exists to sanity check the values
         # we're given but we may want to take it out for testing and sanitize
         # our input instead.
+        # Note that this does the wrong thing if we're *intentionall* passing a byte string to this
+        # function.
         if isinstance(obj, string_types):
-            obj = to_text(obj, errors='surrogate_or_strict')
-            return AnsibleUnsafeText(obj)
+            obj = AnsibleUnsafeText(to_text(obj, errors='surrogate_or_strict'))
         return obj