openssl: patch to fix zlib bug
Closes Homebrew/homebrew#17702. Fixes Homebrew/homebrew#17696. Signed-off-by: Jack Nagel <jacknagel@gmail.com>
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@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ class Openssl < Formula
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keg_only :provided_by_osx,
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"The OpenSSL provided by OS X is too old for some software."
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# Patch to fix regression that manifests in zlib integration
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# test failures; from upstream git repository, remove at next release.
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def patches; DATA; end
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def install
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args = %W[./Configure
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--prefix=#{prefix}
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@ -26,3 +30,74 @@ class Openssl < Formula
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system "make", "install", "MANDIR=#{man}", "MANSUFFIX=ssl"
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end
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end
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__END__
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From 32cc2479b473c49ce869e57fded7e9a77b695c0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <steve@openssl.org>
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Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 21:06:37 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix IV check and padding removal.
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Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
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after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)
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For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)
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---
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ssl/s3_cbc.c | 33 ++++++++++++---------------------
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
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index ce77acd..0f60507 100644
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--- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c
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+++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
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@@ -139,31 +139,22 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
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unsigned mac_size)
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{
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unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
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- const char has_explicit_iv =
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- s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
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- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ +
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- mac_size +
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- (has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0);
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-
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- /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
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- * time. */
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- if (overhead > rec->length)
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- return 0;
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-
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- /* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning
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- * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the
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- * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in
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- * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the
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- * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is
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- * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least
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- * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe
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- * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */
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- if (has_explicit_iv)
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+ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
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+ /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
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+ if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
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{
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+ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
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+ * non-constant time.
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+ */
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+ if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
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+ return 0;
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+ /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
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rec->data += block_size;
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rec->input += block_size;
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rec->length -= block_size;
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}
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+ else if (overhead > rec->length)
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+ return 0;
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padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
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@@ -190,7 +181,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
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if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
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{
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/* padding is already verified */
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- rec->length -= padding_length;
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+ rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
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return 1;
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}
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