openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c

3326 lines
97 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions.
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
*/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
2001-04-08 13:47:51 +00:00
#ifdef REF_CHECK
# include <assert.h>
2001-04-08 13:47:51 +00:00
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
/*
* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
* bug
*/
(int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *))
ssl_undefined_function,
0, /* finish_mac_length */
(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
NULL, /* client_finished_label */
0, /* client_finished_label_len */
NULL, /* server_finished_label */
0, /* server_finished_label_len */
(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
};
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
{
if (s->method == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
return (0);
}
if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
}
2002-02-27 11:23:05 +00:00
s->error = 0;
s->hit = 0;
s->shutdown = 0;
#if 0
/*
* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
* needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation)
*/
/*
* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-)
*/
if (s->renegotiate)
return (1);
2000-02-21 17:09:54 +00:00
#else
if (s->renegotiate) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#endif
s->type = 0;
s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT);
s->version = s->method->version;
s->client_version = s->version;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
#if 0
s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead;
#endif
if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
s->first_packet = 0;
#if 1
/*
* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
* back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
*/
if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL)
&& (s->method != s->ctx->method)) {
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method = s->ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
return (0);
} else
#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
ctx->method = meth;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
meth->version ==
SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" :
SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,
SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
SSL *s;
if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
return (NULL);
}
if (ctx->method == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
return (NULL);
}
s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL));
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
s->options = ctx->options;
s->mode = ctx->mode;
s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
s->references = 1;
if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
/*
* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
* its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
* copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
* the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
* indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
* used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
* SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
*/
s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (s->cert == NULL)
goto err;
} else
s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead;
s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
#if 0
s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
#endif
s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!s->param)
goto err;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
#if 0
s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
s->trust = ctx->trust;
#endif
s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->ctx = ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s->initial_ctx = ctx;
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
# endif
#endif
s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
s->method = ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
SSL_clear(s);
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
#endif
return (s);
err:
if (s != NULL)
SSL_free(s);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
1999-03-22 12:22:14 +00:00
return 1;
}
1999-03-22 12:22:14 +00:00
int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
return 1;
}
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
unsigned int id_len)
{
/*
* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
* find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
* by this SSL.
*/
SSL_SESSION r, *p;
if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
return 0;
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
r.session_id_length = id_len;
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
/*
* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
* callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
* must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
* converted to when the callback has finished choosing it.
*/
if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
}
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return (p != NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
}
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
{
int i;
if (s == NULL)
return;
1999-01-07 19:15:59 +00:00
i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL", s);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
if (s->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
if (s->bbio != NULL) {
/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
}
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio = NULL;
}
if (s->rbio != NULL)
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
/* add extra stuff */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
/* Make the next call work :-) */
if (s->session != NULL) {
ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
if (s->cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
/* Free up if allocated */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (s->initial_ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
#endif
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
if (s->method != NULL)
s->method->ssl_free(s);
if (s->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (s->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
#endif
2011-11-15 23:02:16 +00:00
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
{
/*
* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
*/
if (s->bbio != NULL) {
if (s->wbio == s->bbio) {
s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio;
s->bbio->next_bio = NULL;
}
}
if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
s->rbio = rbio;
s->wbio = wbio;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->rbio);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->wbio);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
{
return (SSL_get_rfd(s));
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret = -1;
BIO *b, *r;
b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
return (ret);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret = -1;
BIO *b, *r;
b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
return (ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
int ret = 0;
BIO *bio = NULL;
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
int ret = 0;
BIO *bio = NULL;
if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) {
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio);
} else
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s));
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
int ret = 0;
BIO *bio = NULL;
if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s));
} else
SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s));
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
#endif
/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL) {
ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL) {
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->verify_mode);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
}
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
return (s->verify_callback);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (ctx->verify_mode);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
return (ctx->default_verify_callback);
}
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
{
s->verify_mode = mode;
if (callback != NULL)
s->verify_callback = callback;
}
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
}
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
{
s->read_ahead = yes;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->read_ahead);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
{
/*
* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
* (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
* impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
* observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
* often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
*/
return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
X509 *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
r = NULL;
else
r = s->session->peer;
if (r == NULL)
return (r);
CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return (r);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)
|| (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
r = NULL;
else
r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
/*
* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
* we are a server, it does not.
*/
return (r);
}
/*
* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
* modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled
*/
void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
{
CERT *tmp;
/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f));
/*
* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa
*/
if (t->method != f->method) {
t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
t->method = f->method; /* change method */
t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
}
tmp = t->cert;
if (f->cert != NULL) {
CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
t->cert = f->cert;
} else
t->cert = NULL;
if (tmp != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(tmp);
SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length);
}
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if ((ctx == NULL) ||
(ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
return (X509_check_private_key
(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
{
if (ssl == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (0);
}
if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return (0);
}
return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_accept_state(s);
return (s->method->ssl_accept(s));
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0)
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_connect_state(s);
return (s->method->ssl_connect(s));
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->method->get_timeout());
}
int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (0);
}
return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num));
}
int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
return (0);
}
return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num));
}
int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
{
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return (-1);
}
return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num));
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
/*
* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
* expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
* calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
* (see ssl3_shutdown).
*/
if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
else
return (1);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate = 1;
2010-08-27 12:10:12 +00:00
s->new_session = 1;
2010-08-27 12:10:12 +00:00
return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
2010-08-27 12:10:12 +00:00
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
{
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate = 1;
2011-09-05 13:36:55 +00:00
s->new_session = 0;
2011-09-05 13:36:55 +00:00
return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
}
2010-08-27 12:10:12 +00:00
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
{
/*
* becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
* handshake has finished
*/
return (s->renegotiate != 0);
}
long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
long l;
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return (s->read_ahead);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l = s->read_ahead;
s->read_ahead = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return (s->options |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
return (s->options &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return (s->mode |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return (s->mode &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return (s->max_cert_list);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
l = s->max_cert_list;
s->max_cert_list = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
s->max_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
if (s->s3)
return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
else
return 0;
default:
return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
}
}
long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
{
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
s->msg_callback = (void (*)
(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp));
}
}
2008-05-26 11:24:29 +00:00
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->sessions;
}
long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
long l;
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return (ctx->read_ahead);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l = ctx->read_ahead;
ctx->read_ahead = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return (ctx->max_cert_list);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
l = ctx->max_cert_list;
ctx->max_cert_list = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
l = ctx->session_cache_size;
ctx->session_cache_size = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
return (ctx->session_cache_size);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
return (l);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
return (ctx->session_cache_mode);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
return (ctx->stats.sess_miss);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
return (ctx->options |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
return (ctx->options &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return (ctx->mode |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
default:
return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
}
}
long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
{
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp));
}
}
2000-06-01 02:36:58 +00:00
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
{
long l;
l = a->id - b->id;
if (l == 0L)
return (0);
else
return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
}
int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
{
long l;
l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id;
if (l == 0L)
return (0);
else
return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* preference */
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
return (s->cipher_list);
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
return (s->ctx->cipher_list);
}
}
return (NULL);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* algorithm id */
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
return (s->cipher_list_by_id);
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
}
}
return (NULL);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
{
SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
if (s == NULL)
return (NULL);
sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
return (NULL);
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
if (c == NULL)
return (NULL);
return (c->name);
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list,
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str);
/*
* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
* find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
* string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
* error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
* ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
*/
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list,
&s->cipher_list_by_id, str);
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
{
char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
return (NULL);
p = buf;
sk = s->session->ciphers;
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
int n;
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
n = strlen(c->name);
if (n + 1 > len) {
if (p != buf)
--p;
*p = '\0';
return buf;
}
strcpy(p, c->name);
p += n;
*(p++) = ':';
len -= n + 1;
}
p[-1] = '\0';
return (buf);
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p,
int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
unsigned char *))
{
int i, j = 0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
q = p;
if (put_cb == NULL)
put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
continue;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)
|| (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5)
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK))
&& s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
j = put_cb(c, p);
p += j;
}
/*
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
* applicable SCSVs.
*/
if (p != q) {
if (!s->renegotiate) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
p += j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
}
return (p - q);
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
int num,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
int i, n;
if (s->s3)
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return (NULL);
}
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
if(sk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
} else {
sk = *skp;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
p += n;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
#endif
continue;
}
/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/*
* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
* downgrade.
*/
if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
if (s->s3)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
p += n;
continue;
}
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
p += n;
if (c != NULL) {
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (skp != NULL)
*skp = sk;
return (sk);
err:
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
return (NULL);
}
2007-08-12 18:05:20 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
* So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
*/
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
{
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
return NULL;
return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname;
}
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->session
&& (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->
tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
return -1;
}
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
* expected that this function is called from the callback set by
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
* vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
* not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
* string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
* selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
* is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
* abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
* the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
* selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
* fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
* protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
* This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
* which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
* of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
* case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
* found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
*/
int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *server,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client,
unsigned int client_len)
{
unsigned int i, j;
const unsigned char *result;
int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
if (server[i] == client[j] &&
memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
/* We found a match */
result = &server[i];
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
goto found;
}
j += client[j];
j++;
}
i += server[i];
i++;
}
/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
result = client;
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
found:
*out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
*outlen = result[0];
return status;
}
/*
* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
* client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
* client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
* the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
* this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
* provided by the callback.
*/
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned *len)
{
*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
if (!*data) {
*len = 0;
} else {
*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
}
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
* a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
* Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is
* returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
* memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
* reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
* wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
* ServerHello.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const unsigned char
**out,
unsigned int *outlen,
void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
* client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
* must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
* The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
* server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
* callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
* select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
* a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int inlen,
void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
# endif
#endif
2011-12-13 14:25:11 +00:00
int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
int use_context)
{
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
return -1;
2011-11-15 23:51:22 +00:00
return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
llen, p, plen,
use_context);
}
2011-11-15 23:51:22 +00:00
2008-05-26 11:24:29 +00:00
static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
{
unsigned long l;
l = (unsigned long)
((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) |
((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) |
((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L);
return (l);
}
/*
* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
* being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
* session with a matching session ID.
*/
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
{
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
return (1);
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
return (1);
return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length));
}
/*
* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
* SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
* variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
* via ssl.h.
*/
2008-05-26 11:24:29 +00:00
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
if (meth == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return NULL;
}
#endif
if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
goto err;
}
ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
ret->method = meth;
ret->cert_store = NULL;
ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
ret->session_cache_head = NULL;
ret->session_cache_tail = NULL;
/* We take the system default */
ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
ret->new_session_cb = 0;
ret->remove_session_cb = 0;
ret->get_session_cb = 0;
ret->generate_session_id = 0;
memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats));
ret->references = 1;
ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/*-
ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
ret->key_arg=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->info_callback = NULL;
ret->app_verify_callback = 0;
ret->app_verify_arg = NULL;
ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
ret->read_ahead = 0;
ret->msg_callback = 0;
ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL;
ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
#if 0
ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
#endif
ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
ret->default_verify_callback = NULL;
if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
ret->default_passwd_callback = 0;
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL;
ret->client_cert_cb = 0;
ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0;
ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0;
ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
if (ret->sessions == NULL)
goto err;
ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
goto err;
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
&ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
meth->version ==
SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
goto err2;
}
ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!ret->param)
goto err;
if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
ret->extra_certs = NULL;
/* No compression for DTLS */
if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
2011-11-13 21:55:42 +00:00
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
2008-06-03 02:48:34 +00:00
#endif
2011-03-16 11:26:40 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
2011-03-16 11:26:40 +00:00
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
goto err;
ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) {
OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
goto err;
}
ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
# define eng_strx(x) #x
# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
{
ENGINE *eng;
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
if (!eng) {
ERR_clear_error();
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
}
if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
ERR_clear_error();
}
# endif
#endif
/*
* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
* deployed might change this.
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
/*
* Disable SSLv2 by default, callers that want to enable SSLv2 will have to
* explicitly clear this option via either of SSL_CTX_clear_options() or
* SSL_clear_options().
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
return (ret);
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err2:
if (ret != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
2000-12-02 07:20:47 +00:00
#if 0
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
{
OPENSSL_free(comp);
}
2000-12-02 07:20:47 +00:00
#endif
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
{
SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) {
next = ent->next;
OPENSSL_free(ent);
}
OPENSSL_free(list);
}
2008-06-03 02:48:34 +00:00
#endif
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
{
int i;
if (a == NULL)
return;
i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
if (a->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
/*
* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
* the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
* after the sessions were flushed.
* As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
* the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
* free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
* (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
*/
if (a->sessions != NULL)
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
if (a->sessions != NULL)
lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
if (a->cert_store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
if (a->cert != NULL)
ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
if (a->client_CA != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it
* removes a global database */
if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free);
#else
a->comp_methods = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (a->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
#endif
2011-11-15 23:02:16 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (a->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
2011-03-16 11:26:40 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
2011-03-16 11:26:40 +00:00
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (a->client_cert_engine)
ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
#endif
2008-06-03 02:48:34 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
if (a->wbuf_freelist)
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
if (a->rbuf_freelist)
ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
2008-06-03 02:48:34 +00:00
#endif
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
void *arg)
{
ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_mode = mode;
ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
X509 *x = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
#endif
if (c == NULL)
return;
kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
1999-02-21 21:58:59 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
#else
rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
#else
dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
#endif
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
rsa_enc = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
rsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
dsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
dh_rsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
dh_dsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
have_ecc_cert = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
#endif
mask_k = 0;
mask_a = 0;
emask_k = 0;
emask_a = 0;
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,
rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa);
#endif
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
}
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
}
if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
#if 0
/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
#endif
if (dh_tmp_export)
emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
if (dh_tmp)
mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
if (dh_rsa)
mask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
if (dh_rsa_export)
emask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
if (dh_dsa)
mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (dh_dsa_export)
emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
emask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
}
if (dsa_sign) {
mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
emask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
}
mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
emask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
#endif
/*
* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
* depending on the key usage extension.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (have_ecc_cert) {
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (ecdh_ok) {
if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) {
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
}
}
if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
}
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (ecdsa_ok) {
mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
}
#endif
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (have_ecdh_tmp) {
mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
#endif
c->mask_k = mask_k;
c->mask_a = mask_a;
c->export_mask_k = emask_k;
c->export_mask_a = emask_a;
c->valid = 1;
}
/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
2009-04-23 15:24:27 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int keysize = 0;
int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) {
/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (keysize > 163)
return 0;
}
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) {
/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
return 0;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
return 0;
}
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
/* signature alg must be RSA */
if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* all checks are ok */
}
2009-04-23 15:24:27 +00:00
#endif
/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
CERT *c;
int i;
c = s->cert;
ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
/*
* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH since no certificate is needed
* for anon ECDH and for authenticated EECDH, the check for the auth
* algorithm will set i correctly NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
* not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA we need an RSA cert. Placing the
* checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA checks ensures the correct cert is
* chosen.
*/
i = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
i = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
i = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
i = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
i = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
else
i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5) {
/* VRS something else here? */
return (NULL);
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
i = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
i = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
else { /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return (NULL);
}
return c->pkeys + i;
}
X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (!cpk)
return NULL;
return cpk->x509;
}
EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
unsigned long alg_a;
CERT *c;
int idx = -1;
alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
c = s->cert;
if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
} else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
if (idx == -1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return (NULL);
}
if (pmd)
*pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
}
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
{
int i;
/*
* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
* would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
return;
i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
|| SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
/* auto flush every 255 connections */
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
: s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
}
}
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
{
return (s->method);
}
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
int conn = -1;
int ret = 1;
if (s->method != meth) {
if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
if (s->method->version == meth->version)
s->method = meth;
else {
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method = meth;
ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
}
if (conn == 1)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
else if (conn == 0)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
}
return (ret);
}
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
{
int reason;
unsigned long l;
BIO *bio;
if (i > 0)
return (SSL_ERROR_NONE);
/*
* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
* where we do encode the error
*/
if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
else
return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) {
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
if (BIO_should_read(bio))
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
/*
* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
* to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
* are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
* However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
* SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
* wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
* might be safer to keep it.
*/
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
}
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) {
bio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (BIO_should_write(bio))
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
/*
* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
*/
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
else
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
}
if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
}
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
/* assume it is the socket being closed */
return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
} else {
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
}
}
return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
{
int ret = 1;
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
return (-1);
}
s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
ret = s->handshake_func(s);
}
return (ret);
}
/*
* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these
* calls will reset it
*/
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server = 1;
s->shutdown = 0;
s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server = 0;
s->shutdown = 0;
s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (0);
}
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (0);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (0);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (NULL);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
return ("TLSv1.2");
else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return ("TLSv1.1");
else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
return ("TLSv1");
else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return ("SSLv3");
else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
return ("SSLv2");
else
return ("unknown");
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
X509_NAME *xn;
SSL *ret;
int i;
if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
return (NULL);
ret->version = s->version;
ret->type = s->type;
ret->method = s->method;
if (s->session != NULL) {
/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s);
} else {
/*
* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
* s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
* point to the same object, and thus we can't use
* SSL_copy_session_id.
*/
ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
ret->method = s->method;
ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
if (s->cert != NULL) {
if (ret->cert != NULL) {
ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
}
ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
if (ret->cert == NULL)
goto err;
}
SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
}
ret->options = s->options;
ret->mode = s->mode;
SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
ret->debug = s->debug;
/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
goto err;
/* setup rbio, and wbio */
if (s->rbio != NULL) {
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
goto err;
}
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
goto err;
} else
ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
}
ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
ret->server = s->server;
ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
ret->new_session = s->new_session;
ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
* though */
ret->rstate = s->rstate;
ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
* ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
* ret->init_off */
ret->hit = s->hit;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
== NULL)
goto err;
/* Dup the client_CA list */
if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL)
goto err;
ret->client_CA = sk;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
X509_NAME_free(xn);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (0) {
err:
if (ret != NULL)
SSL_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
return (ret);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
{
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
}
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->expand != NULL) {
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
s->expand = NULL;
}
if (s->compress != NULL) {
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
s->compress = NULL;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return (s->cert->key->x509);
else
return (NULL);
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return (s->cert->key->privatekey);
else
return (NULL);
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
{
if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
return (s->session->cipher);
return (NULL);
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
{
return NULL;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
{
return NULL;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#else
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
{
if (s->compress != NULL)
return (s->compress->meth);
return (NULL);
}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
{
if (s->expand != NULL)
return (s->expand->meth);
return (NULL);
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push)
{
BIO *bbio;
if (s->bbio == NULL) {
bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
if (bbio == NULL)
return (0);
s->bbio = bbio;
} else {
bbio = s->bbio;
if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
}
(void)BIO_reset(bbio);
/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return (0);
}
if (push) {
if (s->wbio != bbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
} else {
if (s->wbio == bbio)
s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio);
}
return (1);
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
{
if (s->bbio == NULL)
return;
if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
/* remove buffering */
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids
* adding one more preprocessor symbol */
assert(s->wbio != NULL);
#endif
}
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio = NULL;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
{
ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (ctx->quiet_shutdown);
}
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
{
s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->quiet_shutdown);
}
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
{
s->shutdown = mode;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->shutdown);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->version);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
{
return (ssl->ctx);
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
return ssl->ctx;
2007-08-12 18:56:14 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ctx == NULL)
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
2007-08-12 18:56:14 +00:00
#endif
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (ocert != NULL) {
int i;
/* Copy negotiated digests from original */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i;
CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i;
rpk->digest = cpk->digest;
}
ssl_cert_free(ocert);
}
/*
* Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
* so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
*/
OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
/*
* If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
* inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
* not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
* leave it unchanged.
*/
if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
(ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
(memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
}
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
ssl->ctx = ctx;
return (ssl->ctx);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
}
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
const char *CApath)
{
return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath));
}
#endif
2002-01-12 15:56:13 +00:00
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
{
ssl->info_callback = cb;
}
/*
* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
* pointer.
*/
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
int /* type */ ,
int /* val */ ) {
return ssl->info_callback;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
{
return (ssl->state);
}
void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
{
ssl->state = state;
}
void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
{
ssl->verify_result = arg;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
{
return (ssl->verify_result);
}
int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
}
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
{
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
}
int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
}
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
{
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
{
return (1);
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return (ctx->cert_store);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
{
if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
ctx->cert_store = store;
}
2005-03-30 10:26:02 +00:00
int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
{
return (s->rwstate);
}
/**
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param cb the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
#endif
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
#ifdef DOXYGEN
/**
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
* \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
* \param ssl the SSL session.
* \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
* \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
* of the required key in bits.
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
* \return the temporary RSA key.
* \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
*/
RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)
{
}
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
#endif
/**
1999-02-28 12:41:50 +00:00
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param dh the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,
(void (*)(void))ecdh);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
} else
ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
if (s->session == NULL)
return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
} else
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return (s->session->psk_identity_hint);
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return (s->session->psk_identity);
}
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *hint,
char *identity,
unsigned int
max_identity_len,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
s->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *hint,
char *identity,
unsigned int
max_identity_len,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *identity,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
s->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const char *identity,
unsigned char *psk,
unsigned int
max_psk_len))
{
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
/*
* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
* vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
* allocated ctx;
2008-06-03 02:48:34 +00:00
*/
EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
{
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
*hash = NULL;
return NULL;
}
return *hash;
}
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
{
if (*hash)
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
*hash = NULL;
}
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
{
s->debug = debug;
}
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
{
return s->hit;
}
#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
#endif
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);