2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_set_tmp_dh - handle DH keys for ephemeral key exchange
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
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DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
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long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh);
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2014-07-03 02:44:53 +00:00
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void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ctx,
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
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long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh)
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback function for B<ctx> to be
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used when a DH parameters are required to B<tmp_dh_callback>.
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The callback is inherited by all B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>.
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SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() sets DH parameters to be used to be B<dh>.
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The key is inherited by all B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>.
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SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback only for B<ssl>.
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2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
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SSL_set_tmp_dh() sets the parameters only for B<ssl>.
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only.
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=head1 NOTES
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When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral DH key exchange
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2001-07-31 15:04:50 +00:00
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can take place. Ciphers with DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys as well.
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In these cases, the session data are negotiated using the
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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ephemeral/temporary DH key and the key supplied and certified
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by the certificate chain is only used for signing.
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2001-07-31 15:04:50 +00:00
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Anonymous ciphers (without a permanent server key) also use ephemeral DH keys.
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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Using ephemeral DH key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection
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can only be decrypted, when the DH key is known. By generating a temporary
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DH key inside the server application that is lost when the application
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is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions,
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even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was
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only used for signing.
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In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
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2014-08-26 17:02:03 +00:00
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(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
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The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
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if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
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SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
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It will immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
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SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
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In this case,
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2001-07-31 15:04:50 +00:00
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it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
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being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
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negotiation is being saved.
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If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
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necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
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secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
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the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
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in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
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has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
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very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
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this option.
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
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should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
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DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during
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the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
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2001-07-31 15:04:50 +00:00
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may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
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2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
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generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
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2001-07-31 15:04:50 +00:00
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openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
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time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
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instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
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is mandatory.
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Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
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2014-07-03 02:44:53 +00:00
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dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of current
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2001-07-31 15:04:50 +00:00
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version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
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which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
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These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
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L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
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Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
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L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
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generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
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recommended.
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An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
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has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
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key lengths.
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The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
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the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
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ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
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=head1 EXAMPLES
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Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
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partly left out.)
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...
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/* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
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DH *dh_512 = NULL;
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DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
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FILE *paramfile;
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...
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/* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
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paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
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if (paramfile) {
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dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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fclose(paramfile);
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}
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/* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
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paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
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if (paramfile) {
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dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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fclose(paramfile);
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}
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...
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/* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
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DH *get_dh512() { ... }
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DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
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DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
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{
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DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
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switch (keylength) {
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case 512:
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if (!dh_512)
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dh_512 = get_dh512();
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dh_tmp = dh_512;
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break;
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case 1024:
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2014-08-26 17:02:03 +00:00
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if (!dh_1024)
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
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dh_tmp = dh_1024;
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break;
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default:
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/* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
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setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
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}
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return(dh_tmp);
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}
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=head1 RETURN VALUES
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SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() do not return
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diagnostic output.
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SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_set_tmp_dh() do return 1 on success and 0
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on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure.
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>,
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2001-07-31 15:04:50 +00:00
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L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>,
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2001-07-21 11:02:17 +00:00
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L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>,
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L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)>, L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>
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=cut
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