openssl/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod

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=pod
=head1 NAME
X509_STORE_CTX_new, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_free,
X509_STORE_CTX_init, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack, X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert,
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls,
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain,
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param,
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted,
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted,
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default,
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify,
X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX initialisation
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void);
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X609_STORE_CTX *ctx);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
STACK_OF(X509)* X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
These functions initialise an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure for subsequent use
by X509_verify_cert().
X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly initialised B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() internally cleans up an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
The context can then be reused with an new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init().
X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B<ctx>. After this call B<ctx>
is no longer valid.
If B<ctx> is NULL nothing is done.
X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets |ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where |ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs: 1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising in between. 2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes the value of |ctx->chain| directly. With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should not be supported to allow this. With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined. Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if |ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-25 08:47:15 +00:00
It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup()
Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets |ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where |ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs: 1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising in between. 2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes the value of |ctx->chain| directly. With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should not be supported to allow this. With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined. Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if |ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-25 08:47:15 +00:00
and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
B<NULL>.
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of
B<ctx> to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates
instead of using an B<X509_STORE>.
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the certificate to be verified in B<ctx> to
B<x>.
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain() sets the validated chain used
by B<ctx> to be B<chain>.
Ownership of the chain is transferred to B<ctx> and should not be
free'd by the caller.
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain() returns a the internal pointer used by the
B<ctx> that contains the validated chain.
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() sets a set of CRLs to use to aid certificate
verification to B<sk>. These CRLs will only be used if CRL verification is
enabled in the associated B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure. This might be
used where additional "useful" CRLs are supplied as part of a protocol,
for example in a PKCS#7 structure.
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() retrieves an internal pointer
to the verification parameters associated with B<ctx>.
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted() retrieves an internal pointer to the
stack of untrusted certificates associated with B<ctx>.
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted() sets the internal point to the stack
of untrusted certificates associated with B<ctx> to B<sk>.
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() sets the internal verification parameter pointer
to B<param>. After this call B<param> should not be used.
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() looks up and sets the default verification
method to B<name>. This uses the function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() to
find an appropriate set of parameters from B<name>.
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates
that were used in building the chain following a call to X509_verify_cert().
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify() provides the capability for overriding the default
verify function. This function is responsible for verifying chain signatures and
expiration times.
A verify function is defined as an X509_STORE_CTX_verify type which has the
following signature:
int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *);
This function should receive the current X509_STORE_CTX as a parameter and
return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
=head1 NOTES
The certificates and CRLs in a store are used internally and should B<not>
be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed.
=head1 BUGS
The certificates and CRLs in a context are used internally and should B<not>
be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed. Copies
should be made or reference counts increased instead.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns an newly allocates context or B<NULL> is an
error occurred.
X509_STORE_CTX_init() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() returns a pointer to an B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM>
structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(), X509_STORE_CTX_free(),
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(),
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(),
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() do not return
values.
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates
used.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
=cut