1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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1999-04-23 22:13:45 +00:00
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#include <openssl/comp.h>
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1999-04-27 04:18:53 +00:00
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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1999-04-23 22:13:45 +00:00
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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1999-04-23 15:01:15 +00:00
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static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
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int sec_len, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len,
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unsigned char *out, int olen)
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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{
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int chunk,n;
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unsigned int j;
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HMAC_CTX ctx;
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HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
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unsigned char A1[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
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unsigned int A1_len;
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chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
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HMAC_Init(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md);
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HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
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HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
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n=0;
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for (;;)
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{
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HMAC_Init(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL); /* re-init */
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HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len);
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memcpy(&ctx_tmp,&ctx,sizeof(ctx)); /* Copy for A2 */ /* not needed for last one */
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HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len);
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if (olen > chunk)
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{
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HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j);
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out+=j;
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olen-=j;
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HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len); /* calc the next A1 value */
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}
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else /* last one */
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{
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HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
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memcpy(out,A1,olen);
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break;
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}
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}
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HMAC_cleanup(&ctx);
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HMAC_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
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memset(A1,0,sizeof(A1));
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}
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1999-04-19 23:43:11 +00:00
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static void tls1_PRF(const EVP_MD *md5, const EVP_MD *sha1,
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1999-04-23 15:01:15 +00:00
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unsigned char *label, int label_len,
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const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out1,
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unsigned char *out2, int olen)
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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{
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int len,i;
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1999-04-23 15:01:15 +00:00
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const unsigned char *S1,*S2;
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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len=slen/2;
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S1=sec;
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S2= &(sec[len]);
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len+=(slen&1); /* add for odd, make longer */
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tls1_P_hash(md5 ,S1,len,label,label_len,out1,olen);
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tls1_P_hash(sha1,S2,len,label,label_len,out2,olen);
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for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
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out1[i]^=out2[i];
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}
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1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
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static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
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unsigned char *tmp, int num)
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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{
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unsigned char *p;
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unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+
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TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE];
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p=buf;
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memcpy(p,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
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TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE);
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p+=TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE;
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memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
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p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
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memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
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p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
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1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
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tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),
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1999-04-19 23:43:11 +00:00
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s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
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km,tmp,num);
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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}
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1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
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int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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{
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1999-04-23 15:01:15 +00:00
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static const unsigned char empty[]="";
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret;
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unsigned char *exp_label,buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+
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SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2];
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unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
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unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
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unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
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int client_write;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
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1999-04-17 21:25:43 +00:00
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const EVP_CIPHER *c;
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const SSL_COMP *comp;
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const EVP_MD *m;
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1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
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int _exp,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
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_exp=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
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m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
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comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
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key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
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if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
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{
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if ((s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) &&
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((s->enc_read_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
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2000-06-08 11:00:37 +00:00
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OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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goto err;
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dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
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s->read_hash=m;
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1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
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if (s->expand != NULL)
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{
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COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
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s->expand=NULL;
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}
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if (comp != NULL)
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{
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
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s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
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1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
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if (s->expand == NULL)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
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goto err2;
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}
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
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if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
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s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
|
2000-06-08 11:00:37 +00:00
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OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
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1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
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if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
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mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
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}
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else
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{
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if ((s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) &&
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((s->enc_write_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
|
2000-06-08 11:00:37 +00:00
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OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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goto err;
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dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
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s->write_hash=m;
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
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if (s->compress != NULL)
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{
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COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
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s->compress=NULL;
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}
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|
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if (comp != NULL)
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|
|
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{
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
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s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
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if (s->compress == NULL)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
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goto err2;
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}
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}
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
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memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
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mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
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}
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(dd);
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p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
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i=EVP_MD_size(m);
|
1999-02-13 12:39:50 +00:00
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cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
|
1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
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j=_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
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cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
|
1999-02-13 12:39:50 +00:00
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/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
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k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
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er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
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er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
|
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if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
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(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
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{
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ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
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key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
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iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
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exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
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exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
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client_write=1;
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}
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|
else
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{
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n=i;
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ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
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key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
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iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
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exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
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exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
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client_write=0;
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}
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|
if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
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|
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{
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|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
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|
|
goto err2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
|
|
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
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|
#endif
|
1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (_exp)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
|
|
|
|
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
p=buf;
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|
|
memcpy(p,exp_label,exp_label_len);
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|
|
p+=exp_label_len;
|
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|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),key,j,
|
1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
|
|
|
tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
key=tmp1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (k > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
p=buf;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,
|
|
|
|
TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
1999-04-23 15:01:15 +00:00
|
|
|
tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,p-buf,empty,0,
|
|
|
|
iv1,iv2,k*2);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (client_write)
|
|
|
|
iv=iv1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
iv= &(iv1[k]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->session->key_arg_length=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EVP_CipherInit(dd,c,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
|
|
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
|
|
printf("\niv=");
|
|
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(tmp1,0,sizeof(tmp1));
|
|
|
|
memset(tmp2,0,sizeof(tmp1));
|
|
|
|
memset(iv1,0,sizeof(iv1));
|
|
|
|
memset(iv2,0,sizeof(iv2));
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
err2:
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p1,*p2;
|
1999-04-17 21:25:43 +00:00
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *hash;
|
1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int num;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&comp))
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
|
|
|
|
num*=2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-06-08 11:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2000-06-08 11:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("client random\n");
|
|
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
|
|
printf("server random\n");
|
|
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
|
|
printf("pre-master\n");
|
|
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num);
|
|
|
|
memset(p2,0,num);
|
2000-06-08 11:00:37 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(p2);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("\nkey block\n");
|
|
|
|
{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
|
1999-04-17 21:25:43 +00:00
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (send)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->write_hash != NULL)
|
|
|
|
n=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
|
|
|
|
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
|
|
|
|
rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
|
|
|
|
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
enc=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->read_hash != NULL)
|
|
|
|
n=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
|
|
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
|
|
|
|
rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
|
|
|
|
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
enc=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
(enc == NULL))
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memcpy(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
|
|
|
|
rec->input=rec->data;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
l=rec->length;
|
|
|
|
bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((bs != 1) && send)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
i=bs-((int)l%bs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
|
|
|
|
j=i-1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
|
|
|
|
j++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
|
|
|
|
rec->input[k]=j;
|
|
|
|
l+=i;
|
|
|
|
rec->length+=i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ii=i=rec->data[l-1];
|
|
|
|
i++;
|
|
|
|
if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* First packet is even in size, so check */
|
|
|
|
if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
|
|
|
|
"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
|
|
|
|
i--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i > (int)rec->length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (rec->data[j] != ii)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rec->length-=i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int ret;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&ctx,in_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,out,&ret);
|
|
|
|
return((int)ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in1_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *in2_ctx,
|
2000-01-05 23:31:47 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
q=buf;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(q,str,slen);
|
|
|
|
q+=slen;
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&ctx,in1_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,q,&i);
|
|
|
|
q+=i;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&ctx,in2_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,q,&i);
|
|
|
|
q+=i;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(q-buf),
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
|
|
|
|
out,buf2,12);
|
|
|
|
memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return((int)12);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
|
1999-04-17 21:25:43 +00:00
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *hash;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int md_size;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX hmac;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[5];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (send)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
|
|
|
|
mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
|
|
|
|
seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
|
|
|
|
hash=ssl->write_hash;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
|
|
|
|
mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
|
|
|
|
seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
|
|
|
|
hash=ssl->read_hash;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[0]=rec->type;
|
|
|
|
buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
|
|
|
|
buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
|
|
|
|
buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
|
|
|
|
buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Init(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash);
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8);
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5);
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length);
|
|
|
|
HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("sec=");
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("seq=");
|
|
|
|
{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
|
|
|
printf("buf=");
|
|
|
|
{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
|
|
|
printf("rec=");
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
|
|
|
|
if (++seq[i]) break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
|
1998-12-21 11:00:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return(md_size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
|
|
|
|
int len)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the stuff to munge */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
|
|
|
|
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&(buf[TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
|
|
|
|
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&(buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]),
|
|
|
|
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,
|
|
|
|
buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE+SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2,p,len,
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,buff,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int tls1_alert_code(int code)
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (code)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
|
2000-02-03 23:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
2000-02-03 23:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
|
|
default: return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|