2009-10-18 15:28:59 +00:00
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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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2014-06-22 05:31:00 +00:00
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc - X509 verification parameters
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2009-10-18 15:28:59 +00:00
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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unsigned long flags);
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unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust);
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void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
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void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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2014-05-21 09:57:44 +00:00
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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const unsigned char *name, size_t namelen);
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void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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unsigned int flags);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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const unsigned char *email, size_t emaillen);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen);
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int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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const char *ipasc);
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2009-10-18 15:28:59 +00:00
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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These functions manipulate the B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure associated with
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a certificate verification operation.
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The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags() function sets the flags in B<param> by oring
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it with B<flags>. See the B<VERIFICATION FLAGS> section for a complete
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description of values the B<flags> parameter can take.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the flags in B<param>.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags() clears the flags B<flags> in B<param>.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose() sets the verification purpose in B<param>
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to B<purpose>. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate
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chain, for example SSL client or SSL server.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust() sets the trust setting in B<param> to
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B<trust>.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
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B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
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by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
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by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
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policy set is cleared. The B<policies> parameter can be B<NULL> to clear
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an existing policy set.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() sets the maximum verification depth to B<depth>.
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That is the maximum number of untrusted CA certificates that can appear in a
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chain.
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2014-05-21 09:57:44 +00:00
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to B<name>. If
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B<name> is NUL-terminated, B<namelen> may be zero, otherwise B<namelen> must
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be set to the length of B<name>. When a hostname is specified, certificate
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verification automatically invokes L<X509_check_host(3)> with flags equal to
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the B<flags> argument given to B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags()> (default
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zero). Applications are strongly advised to use this interface in preference
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to explicitly calling L<X509_check_host(3)>, hostname checks are
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out of scope with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal
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check will be suppressed as appropriate when DANE support is added
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to OpenSSL.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email() sets the expected RFC822 email address to
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B<email>. If B<email> is NUL-terminated, B<emaillen> may be zero, otherwise
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B<emaillen> must be set to the length of B<email>. When an email address
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is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
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L<X509_check_email(3)>.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() sets the expected IP address to B<ip>.
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The B<ip> argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and
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B<iplen> must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6. When an IP
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address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
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L<X509_check_ip(3)>.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() sets the expected IP address to
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B<ipasc>. The B<ipasc> argument is a NUL-terminal ASCII string:
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dotted decimal quad for IPv4 and colon-separated hexadecimal for
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IPv6. The condensed "::" notation is supported for IPv6 addresses.
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2009-10-18 15:28:59 +00:00
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=head1 RETURN VALUES
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2014-05-21 09:57:44 +00:00
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(),
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2009-10-18 15:28:59 +00:00
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(),
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2014-05-21 09:57:44 +00:00
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(),
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(),
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() and
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for
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failure.
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2009-10-18 15:28:59 +00:00
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the current verification flags.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() do not return
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values.
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth() returns the current verification depth.
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=head1 VERIFICATION FLAGS
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The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags
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ored together.
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B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK> enables CRL checking for the certificate chain leaf
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certificate. An error occurs if a suitable CRL cannot be found.
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B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL> enables CRL checking for the entire certificate
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chain.
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B<X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL> disabled critical extension checking. By default
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any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results
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in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are
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ignored. B<WARNING> setting this option for anything other than debugging
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purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are
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supported can be performed in the verification callback.
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THe B<X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT> flag disables workarounds for some broken
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certificates and makes the verification strictly apply B<X509> rules.
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B<X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS> enables proxy certificate verification.
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B<X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK> enables certificate policy checking, by default
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no policy checking is peformed. Additional information is sent to the
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verification callback relating to policy checking.
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B<X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY>, B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY> and
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B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP> set the B<require explicit policy>, B<inhibit any
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policy> and B<inhibit policy mapping> flags respectively as defined in
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B<RFC3280>. Policy checking is automatically enabled if any of these flags
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are set.
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If B<X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY> is set and the policy checking is successful
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a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it
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to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply
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log it for debugging purposes.
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2013-12-23 18:28:30 +00:00
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By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
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different keys are disabled. If B<X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT> is set
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they are enabled.
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If B<X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS> ise set delta CRLs (if present) are used to
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determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored.
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B<X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE> enables checking of the root CA self signed
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cerificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't
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add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to
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check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root CA
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signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA
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are not treated as fatal errors.
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The B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> flag enables debugging of certificate
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issuer checks. It is B<not> needed unless you are logging certificate
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verification. If this flag is set then additional status codes will be sent
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to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases
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without assuming they are hard errors.
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=head1 NOTES
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The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
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instead of legacy functions which work in specific structures such as
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags().
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=head1 BUGS
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Delta CRL checking is currently primitive. Only a single delta can be used and
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(partly due to limitations of B<X509_STORE>) constructed CRLs are not
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maintained.
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If CRLs checking is enable CRLs are expected to be available in the
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corresponding B<X509_STORE> structure. No attempt is made to download
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CRLs from the CRL distribution points extension.
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=head1 EXAMPLE
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Enable CRL checking when performing certificate verification during SSL
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connections associated with an B<SSL_CTX> structure B<ctx>:
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
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param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
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SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, param);
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param);
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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2014-06-22 05:31:00 +00:00
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L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3)>,
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L<X509_check_host(3)|X509_check_host(3)>,
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L<X509_check_email(3)|X509_check_email(3)>,
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L<X509_check_ip(3)|X509_check_ip(3)>
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2009-10-18 15:28:59 +00:00
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=head1 HISTORY
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TBA
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=cut
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