2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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2001-01-15 22:19:30 +00:00
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ocsp - Online Certificate Status Protocol utility
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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B<openssl> B<ocsp>
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2016-02-05 16:58:45 +00:00
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[B<-help>]
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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[B<-out file>]
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[B<-issuer file>]
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[B<-cert file>]
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[B<-serial n>]
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2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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[B<-signer file>]
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[B<-signkey file>]
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[B<-sign_other file>]
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[B<-no_certs>]
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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[B<-req_text>]
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[B<-resp_text>]
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[B<-text>]
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[B<-reqout file>]
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[B<-respout file>]
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[B<-reqin file>]
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[B<-respin file>]
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[B<-nonce>]
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[B<-no_nonce>]
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2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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[B<-url URL>]
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2015-04-25 20:07:28 +00:00
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[B<-host host:port>]
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[B<-header>]
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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[B<-path>]
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2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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[B<-CApath dir>]
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2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
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[B<-CAfile file>]
|
2015-09-22 18:43:59 +00:00
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[B<-no-CAfile>]
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[B<-no-CApath>]
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2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
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[B<-attime timestamp>]
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[B<-check_ss_sig>]
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[B<-crl_check>]
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[B<-crl_check_all>]
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[B<-explicit_policy>]
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[B<-extended_crl>]
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[B<-ignore_critical>]
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[B<-inhibit_any>]
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[B<-inhibit_map>]
|
2016-05-02 21:03:55 +00:00
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[B<-no_check_time>]
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2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
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[B<-partial_chain>]
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[B<-policy arg>]
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[B<-policy_check>]
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[B<-policy_print>]
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[B<-purpose purpose>]
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[B<-suiteB_128>]
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[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
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[B<-suiteB_192>]
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2014-06-18 17:55:03 +00:00
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[B<-trusted_first>]
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2015-01-27 11:15:15 +00:00
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[B<-no_alt_chains>]
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2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
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[B<-use_deltas>]
|
2016-03-19 02:09:41 +00:00
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[B<-auth_level num>]
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
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[B<-verify_depth num>]
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[B<-verify_email email>]
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[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
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[B<-verify_ip ip>]
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[B<-verify_name name>]
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[B<-x509_strict>]
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2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
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[B<-VAfile file>]
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2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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[B<-validity_period n>]
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[B<-status_age n>]
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2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
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[B<-noverify>]
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2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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[B<-verify_other file>]
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2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
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[B<-trust_other>]
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[B<-no_intern>]
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2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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[B<-no_signature_verify>]
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2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
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[B<-no_cert_verify>]
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[B<-no_chain>]
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[B<-no_cert_checks>]
|
2015-02-24 13:52:21 +00:00
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[B<-no_explicit>]
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2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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[B<-port num>]
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[B<-index file>]
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[B<-CA file>]
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[B<-rsigner file>]
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[B<-rkey file>]
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[B<-rother file>]
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[B<-resp_no_certs>]
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[B<-nmin n>]
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[B<-ndays n>]
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[B<-resp_key_id>]
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[B<-nrequest n>]
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2007-12-04 12:41:28 +00:00
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[B<-md5|-sha1|...>]
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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2001-01-15 22:19:30 +00:00
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The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to
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determine the (revocation) state of an identified certificate (RFC 2560).
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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The B<ocsp> command performs many common OCSP tasks. It can be used
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to print out requests and responses, create requests and send queries
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2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
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to an OCSP responder and behave like a mini OCSP server itself.
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
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=head1 OCSP CLIENT OPTIONS
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=over 4
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|
2016-02-05 16:58:45 +00:00
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=item B<-help>
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Print out a usage message.
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=item B<-out filename>
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specify output filename, default is standard output.
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=item B<-issuer filename>
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This specifies the current issuer certificate. This option can be used
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multiple times. The certificate specified in B<filename> must be in
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2008-02-25 18:11:47 +00:00
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PEM format. This option B<MUST> come before any B<-cert> options.
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=item B<-cert filename>
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Add the certificate B<filename> to the request. The issuer certificate
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is taken from the previous B<issuer> option, or an error occurs if no
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issuer certificate is specified.
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=item B<-serial num>
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Same as the B<cert> option except the certificate with serial number
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2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
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B<num> is added to the request. The serial number is interpreted as a
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decimal integer unless preceded by B<0x>. Negative integers can also
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be specified by preceding the value by a B<-> sign.
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2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=item B<-signer filename>, B<-signkey filename>
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Sign the OCSP request using the certificate specified in the B<signer>
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option and the private key specified by the B<signkey> option. If
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the B<signkey> option is not present then the private key is read
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from the same file as the certificate. If neither option is specified then
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the OCSP request is not signed.
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|
2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
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=item B<-sign_other filename>
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Additional certificates to include in the signed request.
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|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=item B<-nonce>, B<-no_nonce>
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Add an OCSP nonce extension to a request or disable OCSP nonce addition.
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
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Normally if an OCSP request is input using the B<reqin> option no
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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nonce is added: using the B<nonce> option will force addition of a nonce.
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If an OCSP request is being created (using B<cert> and B<serial> options)
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a nonce is automatically added specifying B<no_nonce> overrides this.
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=item B<-req_text>, B<-resp_text>, B<-text>
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|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
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print out the text form of the OCSP request, response or both respectively.
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=item B<-reqout file>, B<-respout file>
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write out the DER encoded certificate request or response to B<file>.
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=item B<-reqin file>, B<-respin file>
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read OCSP request or response file from B<file>. These option are ignored
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if OCSP request or response creation is implied by other options (for example
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with B<serial>, B<cert> and B<host> options).
|
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|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
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=item B<-url responder_url>
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specify the responder URL. Both HTTP and HTTPS (SSL/TLS) URLs can be specified.
|
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|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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=item B<-host hostname:port>, B<-path pathname>
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if the B<host> option is present then the OCSP request is sent to the host
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B<hostname> on port B<port>. B<path> specifies the HTTP path name to use
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
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or "/" by default. This is equivalent to specifying B<-url> with scheme
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http:// and the given hostname, port, and pathname.
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
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|
2015-04-25 20:07:28 +00:00
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=item B<-header name=value>
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Adds the header B<name> with the specified B<value> to the OCSP request
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that is sent to the responder.
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This may be repeated.
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|
2014-11-27 10:11:33 +00:00
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=item B<-timeout seconds>
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connection timeout to the OCSP responder in seconds
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|
2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
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=item B<-CAfile file>, B<-CApath pathname>
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file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
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the signature on the OCSP response.
|
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|
2015-09-22 18:43:59 +00:00
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=item B<-no-CAfile>
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Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
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=item B<-no-CApath>
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Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
|
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|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
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=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
|
2016-02-09 19:17:13 +00:00
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B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
|
2016-05-02 21:03:55 +00:00
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B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
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B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
|
2016-02-09 19:17:13 +00:00
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B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
|
2016-03-19 02:09:41 +00:00
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B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
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B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
|
2014-06-18 17:55:03 +00:00
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|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
|
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|
Set different certificate verification options.
|
2016-03-19 02:09:41 +00:00
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|
See L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
2014-06-18 17:55:03 +00:00
|
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|
2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-verify_other file>
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
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file containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate
|
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|
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the OCSP response signing certificate. Some responders omit the actual signer's
|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
certificate from the response: this option can be used to supply the necessary
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
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certificate in such cases.
|
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=item B<-trust_other>
|
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|
2008-02-25 18:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
the certificates specified by the B<-verify_other> option should be explicitly
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
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|
|
trusted and no additional checks will be performed on them. This is useful
|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
when the complete responder certificate chain is not available or trusting a
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
root CA is not appropriate.
|
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=item B<-VAfile file>
|
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file containing explicitly trusted responder certificates. Equivalent to the
|
2008-02-25 18:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
B<-verify_other> and B<-trust_other> options.
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
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|
2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-noverify>
|
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|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
don't attempt to verify the OCSP response signature or the nonce values. This
|
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|
option will normally only be used for debugging since it disables all verification
|
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of the responders certificate.
|
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=item B<-no_intern>
|
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|
|
ignore certificates contained in the OCSP response when searching for the
|
|
|
|
signers certificate. With this option the signers certificate must be specified
|
2008-02-25 18:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
with either the B<-verify_other> or B<-VAfile> options.
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-03-26 00:46:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-no_signature_verify>
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
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|
|
don't check the signature on the OCSP response. Since this option tolerates invalid
|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
signatures on OCSP responses it will normally only be used for testing purposes.
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
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=item B<-no_cert_verify>
|
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|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
don't verify the OCSP response signers certificate at all. Since this option allows
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
the OCSP response to be signed by any certificate it should only be used for
|
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|
|
testing purposes.
|
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|
|
=item B<-no_chain>
|
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|
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|
|
do not use certificates in the response as additional untrusted CA
|
|
|
|
certificates.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-24 13:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-no_explicit>
|
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|
do not explicitly trust the root CA if it is set to be trusted for OCSP signing.
|
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|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-no_cert_checks>
|
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|
|
don't perform any additional checks on the OCSP response signers certificate.
|
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|
|
That is do not make any checks to see if the signers certificate is authorised
|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
to provide the necessary status information: as a result this option should
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
only be used for testing purposes.
|
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|
|
=item B<-validity_period nsec>, B<-status_age age>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
these options specify the range of times, in seconds, which will be tolerated
|
|
|
|
in an OCSP response. Each certificate status response includes a B<notBefore> time and
|
|
|
|
an optional B<notAfter> time. The current time should fall between these two values, but
|
|
|
|
the interval between the two times may be only a few seconds. In practice the OCSP
|
|
|
|
responder and clients clocks may not be precisely synchronised and so such a check
|
|
|
|
may fail. To avoid this the B<-validity_period> option can be used to specify an
|
|
|
|
acceptable error range in seconds, the default value is 5 minutes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the B<notAfter> time is omitted from a response then this means that new status
|
|
|
|
information is immediately available. In this case the age of the B<notBefore> field
|
|
|
|
is checked to see it is not older than B<age> seconds old. By default this additional
|
|
|
|
check is not performed.
|
2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-08-27 16:28:08 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-[digest]>
|
2007-12-04 12:41:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
this option sets digest algorithm to use for certificate identification
|
2015-08-27 16:28:08 +00:00
|
|
|
in the OCSP request.
|
|
|
|
Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
|
|
|
|
The default is SHA-1.
|
2007-12-04 12:41:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 OCSP SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=over 4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-index indexfile>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B<indexfile> is a text index file in B<ca> format containing certificate revocation
|
|
|
|
information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the B<index> option is specified the B<ocsp> utility is in responder mode, otherwise
|
|
|
|
it is in client mode. The request(s) the responder processes can be either specified on
|
|
|
|
the command line (using B<issuer> and B<serial> options), supplied in a file (using the
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
B<reqin> option) or via external OCSP clients (if B<port> or B<url> is specified).
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the B<index> option is present then the B<CA> and B<rsigner> options must also be
|
|
|
|
present.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-CA file>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CA certificate corresponding to the revocation information in B<indexfile>.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-rsigner file>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The certificate to sign OCSP responses with.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-rother file>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Additional certificates to include in the OCSP response.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-resp_no_certs>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Don't include any certificates in the OCSP response.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-resp_key_id>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Identify the signer certificate using the key ID, default is to use the subject name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-rkey file>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The private key to sign OCSP responses with: if not present the file specified in the
|
|
|
|
B<rsigner> option is used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-port portnum>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Port to listen for OCSP requests on. The port may also be specified using the B<url>
|
|
|
|
option.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-nrequest number>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The OCSP server will exit after receiving B<number> requests, default unlimited.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-nmin minutes>, B<-ndays days>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number of minutes or days when fresh revocation information is available: used in the
|
|
|
|
B<nextUpdate> field. If neither option is present then the B<nextUpdate> field is
|
|
|
|
omitted meaning fresh revocation information is immediately available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 OCSP Response verification.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OCSP Response follows the rules specified in RFC2560.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Initially the OCSP responder certificate is located and the signature on
|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
the OCSP request checked using the responder certificate's public key.
|
2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Then a normal certificate verify is performed on the OCSP responder certificate
|
|
|
|
building up a certificate chain in the process. The locations of the trusted
|
|
|
|
certificates used to build the chain can be specified by the B<CAfile>
|
|
|
|
and B<CApath> options or they will be looked for in the standard OpenSSL
|
|
|
|
certificates directory.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the initial verify fails then the OCSP verify process halts with an
|
|
|
|
error.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Otherwise the issuing CA certificate in the request is compared to the OCSP
|
|
|
|
responder certificate: if there is a match then the OCSP verify succeeds.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Otherwise the OCSP responder certificate's CA is checked against the issuing
|
|
|
|
CA certificate in the request. If there is a match and the OCSPSigning
|
|
|
|
extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder certificate then the
|
|
|
|
OCSP verify succeeds.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-24 13:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
Otherwise, if B<-no_explicit> is B<not> set the root CA of the OCSP responders
|
|
|
|
CA is checked to see if it is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP
|
|
|
|
verify succeeds.
|
2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If none of these checks is successful then the OCSP verify fails.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
What this effectively means if that if the OCSP responder certificate is
|
|
|
|
authorised directly by the CA it is issuing revocation information about
|
|
|
|
(and it is correctly configured) then verification will succeed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the OCSP responder is a "global responder" which can give details about
|
|
|
|
multiple CAs and has its own separate certificate chain then its root
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
CA can be trusted for OCSP signing. For example:
|
2001-01-20 01:26:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl x509 -in ocspCA.pem -addtrust OCSPSigning -out trustedCA.pem
|
|
|
|
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
Alternatively the responder certificate itself can be explicitly trusted
|
|
|
|
with the B<-VAfile> option.
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 NOTES
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
As noted, most of the verify options are for testing or debugging purposes.
|
|
|
|
Normally only the B<-CApath>, B<-CAfile> and (if the responder is a 'global
|
|
|
|
VA') B<-VAfile> options need to be used.
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
The OCSP server is only useful for test and demonstration purposes: it is
|
|
|
|
not really usable as a full OCSP responder. It contains only a very
|
|
|
|
simple HTTP request handling and can only handle the POST form of OCSP
|
|
|
|
queries. It also handles requests serially meaning it cannot respond to
|
|
|
|
new requests until it has processed the current one. The text index file
|
|
|
|
format of revocation is also inefficient for large quantities of revocation
|
|
|
|
data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It is possible to run the B<ocsp> application in responder mode via a CGI
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
script using the B<reqin> and B<respout> options.
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 EXAMPLES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Create an OCSP request and write it to a file:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem -reqout req.der
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
Send a query to an OCSP responder with URL http://ocsp.myhost.com/ save the
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
response to a file, print it out in text form, and verify the response:
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem \
|
2001-03-09 13:57:14 +00:00
|
|
|
-url http://ocsp.myhost.com/ -resp_text -respout resp.der
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Read in an OCSP response and print out text form:
|
|
|
|
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
openssl ocsp -respin resp.der -text -noverify
|
2001-01-14 00:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
OCSP server on port 8888 using a standard B<ca> configuration, and a separate
|
|
|
|
responder certificate. All requests and responses are printed to a file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
|
|
|
|
-text -out log.txt
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As above but exit after processing one request:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
|
|
|
|
-nrequest 1
|
|
|
|
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
Query status information using an internally generated request:
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
|
|
|
|
-issuer demoCA/cacert.pem -serial 1
|
|
|
|
|
GH650: Minor tidying around the ocsp app
The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it. In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response. All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify. (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)
Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.
Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-10 02:29:21 +00:00
|
|
|
Query status information using request read from a file, and write the response
|
|
|
|
to a second file.
|
2001-07-13 13:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
|
|
|
|
-reqin req.der -respout resp.der
|
2015-01-27 11:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 HISTORY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=cut
|