openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c

268 lines
8.1 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/* crypto/rand/rand_lib.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# include <openssl/fips.h>
# include <openssl/fips_rand.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL;
#endif
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL;
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (funct_ref) {
ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
funct_ref = NULL;
}
#endif
default_RAND_meth = meth;
return 1;
}
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
if (!default_RAND_meth) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
if (e) {
default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
if (!default_RAND_meth) {
ENGINE_finish(e);
e = NULL;
}
}
if (e)
funct_ref = e;
else
#endif
default_RAND_meth = RAND_SSLeay();
}
return default_RAND_meth;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
if (engine) {
if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
return 0;
tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
if (!tmp_meth) {
ENGINE_finish(engine);
return 0;
}
}
/* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
funct_ref = engine;
return 1;
}
#endif
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
void RAND_cleanup(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth && meth->cleanup)
meth->cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
}
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth && meth->seed)
meth->seed(buf, num);
}
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth && meth->add)
meth->add(buf, num, entropy);
}
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth && meth->bytes)
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
return (-1);
}
Deprecate RAND_pseudo_bytes The justification for RAND_pseudo_bytes is somewhat dubious, and the reality is that it is frequently being misused. RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in the default implementation both end up calling ssleay_rand_bytes. Both may return -1 in an error condition. If there is insufficient entropy then both will return 0, but RAND_bytes will additionally add an error to the error queue. They both return 1 on success. Therefore the fundamental difference between the two is that one will add an error to the error queue with insufficient entory whilst the other will not. Frequently there are constructions of this form: if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(...) <= 1) goto err; In the above form insufficient entropy is treated as an error anyway, so RAND_bytes is probably the better form to use. This form is also seen: if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(...)) goto err; This is technically not correct at all since a -1 return value is incorrectly handled - but this form will also treat insufficient entropy as an error. Within libssl it is required that you have correctly seeded your entropy pool and so there seems little benefit in using RAND_pseudo_bytes. Similarly in libcrypto many operations also require a correctly seeded entropy pool and so in most interesting cases you would be better off using RAND_bytes anyway. There is a significant risk of RAND_pseudo_bytes being incorrectly used in scenarios where security can be compromised by insufficient entropy. If you are not using the default implementation, then most engines use the same function to implement RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in any case. Given its misuse, limited benefit, and potential to compromise security, RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-02-26 13:52:30 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
return (-1);
}
Deprecate RAND_pseudo_bytes The justification for RAND_pseudo_bytes is somewhat dubious, and the reality is that it is frequently being misused. RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in the default implementation both end up calling ssleay_rand_bytes. Both may return -1 in an error condition. If there is insufficient entropy then both will return 0, but RAND_bytes will additionally add an error to the error queue. They both return 1 on success. Therefore the fundamental difference between the two is that one will add an error to the error queue with insufficient entory whilst the other will not. Frequently there are constructions of this form: if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(...) <= 1) goto err; In the above form insufficient entropy is treated as an error anyway, so RAND_bytes is probably the better form to use. This form is also seen: if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(...)) goto err; This is technically not correct at all since a -1 return value is incorrectly handled - but this form will also treat insufficient entropy as an error. Within libssl it is required that you have correctly seeded your entropy pool and so there seems little benefit in using RAND_pseudo_bytes. Similarly in libcrypto many operations also require a correctly seeded entropy pool and so in most interesting cases you would be better off using RAND_bytes anyway. There is a significant risk of RAND_pseudo_bytes being incorrectly used in scenarios where security can be compromised by insufficient entropy. If you are not using the default implementation, then most engines use the same function to implement RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in any case. Given its misuse, limited benefit, and potential to compromise security, RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-02-26 13:52:30 +00:00
#endif
int RAND_status(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth && meth->status)
return meth->status();
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/*
* FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the rest
* of OpenSSL.
*/
/*
* Entropy gatherer: use standard OpenSSL PRNG to seed (this will gather
* entropy internally through RAND_poll().
*/
static size_t drbg_get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
/* Round up request to multiple of block size */
min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20;
*pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len);
if (!*pout)
return 0;
if (RAND_SSLeay()->bytes(*pout, min_len) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_free(*pout);
*pout = NULL;
return 0;
}
return min_len;
}
static void drbg_free_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(out, olen);
}
/*
* Set "additional input" when generating random data. This uses the current
* PID, a time value and a counter.
*/
static size_t drbg_get_adin(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout)
{
/* Use of static variables is OK as this happens under a lock */
static unsigned char buf[16];
static unsigned long counter;
FIPS_get_timevec(buf, &counter);
rand_hw_xor(buf, sizeof(buf));
*pout = buf;
return sizeof(buf);
}
/*
* RAND_add() and RAND_seed() pass through to OpenSSL PRNG so it is
* correctly seeded by RAND_poll().
*/
static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen,
double entropy)
{
return RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
}
static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen)
{
return RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
}
int RAND_init_fips(void)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx;
size_t plen;
unsigned char pers[32], *p;
dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg();
FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, NID_aes_256_ctr, DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF);
FIPS_drbg_set_callbacks(dctx,
drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy, 20,
drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy);
FIPS_drbg_set_rand_callbacks(dctx, drbg_get_adin, 0,
drbg_rand_seed, drbg_rand_add);
/* Personalisation string: a string followed by date time vector */
strcpy((char *)pers, "OpenSSL DRBG2.0");
plen = drbg_get_adin(dctx, &p);
memcpy(pers + 16, p, plen);
FIPS_drbg_instantiate(dctx, pers, sizeof(pers));
FIPS_rand_set_method(FIPS_drbg_method());
return 1;
}
#endif