2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
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/* ssl/statem.c */
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/*
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* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL project.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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/*
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* This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines.
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*
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* There are two primary state machines:
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*
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* 1) Message flow state machine
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* 2) Handshake state machine
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*
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* The Message flow state machine controls the reading and sending of messages
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* including handling of non-blocking IO events, flushing of the underlying
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* write BIO, handling unexpected messages, etc. It is itself broken into two
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* separate sub-state machines which control reading and writing respectively.
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*
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* The Handshake state machine keeps track of the current SSL/TLS handshake
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* state. Transitions of the handshake state are the result of events that
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* occur within the Message flow state machine.
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*
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* Overall it looks like this:
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*
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* --------------------------------------------- -------------------
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* | | | |
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* | Message flow state machine | | |
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* | | | |
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* | -------------------- -------------------- | Transition | Handshake state |
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* | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event | machine |
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* | | sub-state | | sub-state | |----------->| |
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* | | machine for | | machine for | | | |
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* | | reading messages | | writing messages | | | |
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* | -------------------- -------------------- | | |
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* | | | |
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* --------------------------------------------- -------------------
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*
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*/
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/* Sub state machine return values */
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enum SUB_STATE_RETURN {
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/* Something bad happened or NBIO */
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SUB_STATE_ERROR,
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/* Sub state finished go to the next sub state */
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SUB_STATE_FINISHED,
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/* Sub state finished and handshake was completed */
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SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE
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};
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2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
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static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server);
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2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
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static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s);
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static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s);
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static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s);
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static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s);
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2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
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static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
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static inline int key_exchange_skip_allowed(SSL *s);
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static int client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
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static enum WRITE_TRAN client_write_transition(SSL *s);
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static enum WORK_STATE client_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
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static enum WORK_STATE client_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
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static int client_construct_message(SSL *s);
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static unsigned long client_max_message_size(SSL *s);
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static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN client_process_message(SSL *s,
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unsigned long len);
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static enum WORK_STATE client_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
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2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
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static int server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt);
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static inline int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
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static inline int send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
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static enum WRITE_TRAN server_write_transition(SSL *s);
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static enum WORK_STATE server_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
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static enum WORK_STATE server_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
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static int server_construct_message(SSL *s);
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static unsigned long server_max_message_size(SSL *s);
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static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN server_process_message(SSL *s, unsigned long len);
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static enum WORK_STATE server_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
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2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
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/*
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* Clear the state machine state and reset back to MSG_FLOW_UNINITED
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*/
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void statem_clear(SSL *s)
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{
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s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
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}
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/*
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* Set the state machine up ready for a renegotiation handshake
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*/
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void statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s)
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{
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s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE;
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}
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/*
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* Put the state machine into an error state. This is a permanent error for
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* the current connection.
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*/
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void statem_set_error(SSL *s)
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{
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s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR;
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/* TODO: This is temporary - remove me */
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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}
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2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
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int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) {
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return state_machine(s, 0);
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}
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2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
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int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
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{
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return state_machine(s, 0);
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}
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2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
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int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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{
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return state_machine(s, 1);
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}
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2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
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/*
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* The main message flow state machine. We start in the MSG_FLOW_UNINITED or
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* MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and
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* transitions are as follows:
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*
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* MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE
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* | |
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* +-----------------------+
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* v
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* MSG_FLOW_WRITING <---> MSG_FLOW_READING
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* |
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* V
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* MSG_FLOW_FINISHED
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* |
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* V
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* [SUCCESS]
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*
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* We may exit at any point due to an error or NBIO event. If an NBIO event
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* occurs then we restart at the point we left off when we are recalled.
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* MSG_FLOW_WRITING and MSG_FLOW_READING have sub-state machines associated with them.
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*
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* In addition to the above there is also the MSG_FLOW_ERROR state. We can move
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* into that state at any point in the event that an irrecoverable error occurs.
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*
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* Valid return values are:
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* 1: Success
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* <=0: NBIO or error
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*/
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2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
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static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) {
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2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
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BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
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unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
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void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
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STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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int ret = -1;
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int ssret;
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if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) {
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/* Shouldn't have been called if we're already in the error state */
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return -1;
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}
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RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
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ERR_clear_error();
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
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s->in_handshake++;
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if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
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if (!SSL_clear(s))
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return -1;
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}
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2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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/*
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* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
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* identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
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*/
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BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
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s->in_handshake, NULL);
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}
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#endif
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2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
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/*
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* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
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* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
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* handshakes anyway.
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*/
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if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
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dtls1_stop_timer(s);
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s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
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s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
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}
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#endif
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/* Initialise state machine */
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if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
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s->renegotiate = 1;
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if (!server)
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s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
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}
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if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
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/* TODO: Temporary - fix this */
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if (server)
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s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
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else
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s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
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if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
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}
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s->server = server;
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if (cb != NULL)
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cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
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(server
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|| (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto end;
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}
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} else {
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if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
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&& s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto end;
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}
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}
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2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
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if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
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if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION &&
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!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
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goto end;
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}
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2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
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}
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if (server)
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s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
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else
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s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
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if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
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if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
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goto end;
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}
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if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_buf = buf;
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buf = NULL;
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}
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_num = 0;
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/*
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* Should have been reset by tls_process_finished, too.
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*/
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
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if (!server || st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
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/*
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* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with
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* SCTP
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
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if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
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#endif
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if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, server ? 1 : 0)) {
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goto end;
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}
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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}
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if (server) {
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if (st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) {
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
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} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
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!(s->options &
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SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
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/*
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* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
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* support secure renegotiation.
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*/
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SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE,
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|
|
|
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
statem_set_error(s);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
|
|
|
|
* HelloRequest
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* mark client_random uninitialized */
|
|
|
|
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->use_timer = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
|
|
|
|
init_write_state_machine(s);
|
|
|
|
st->read_state_first_init = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while(st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) {
|
|
|
|
if(st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) {
|
|
|
|
ssret = read_state_machine(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) {
|
|
|
|
st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING;
|
|
|
|
init_write_state_machine(s);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* NBIO or error */
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_WRITING) {
|
|
|
|
ssret = write_state_machine(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) {
|
|
|
|
st->state = MSG_FLOW_READING;
|
|
|
|
init_read_state_machine(s);
|
|
|
|
} else if (ssret == SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
|
|
st->state = MSG_FLOW_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* NBIO or error */
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Error */
|
|
|
|
statem_set_error(s);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st->state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream
|
|
|
|
* identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (server)
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialise the MSG_FLOW_READING sub-state machine
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in
|
|
|
|
* MSG_FLOW_READING. The valid sub-states and transitions are:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* READ_STATE_HEADER <--+<-------------+
|
|
|
|
* | | |
|
|
|
|
* v | |
|
|
|
|
* READ_STATE_BODY -----+-->READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS
|
|
|
|
* | |
|
|
|
|
* +----------------------------+
|
|
|
|
* v
|
|
|
|
* [SUB_STATE_FINISHED]
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* READ_STATE_HEADER has the responsibility for reading in the message header
|
|
|
|
* and transitioning the state of the handshake state machine.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* READ_STATE_BODY reads in the rest of the message and then subsequently
|
|
|
|
* processes it.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS is an optional step that may occur if some post
|
|
|
|
* processing activity performed on the message may block.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occuring in which case
|
|
|
|
* control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we
|
|
|
|
* will resume in the same state where we left off.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) {
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
int ret, mt;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len;
|
|
|
|
int (*transition)(SSL *s, int mt);
|
|
|
|
enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN (*process_message)(SSL *s, unsigned long n);
|
|
|
|
enum WORK_STATE (*post_process_message)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
|
|
|
|
unsigned long (*max_message_size)(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(s->server) {
|
2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
transition = server_read_transition;
|
|
|
|
process_message = server_process_message;
|
|
|
|
max_message_size = server_max_message_size;
|
|
|
|
post_process_message = server_post_process_message;
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
transition = client_read_transition;
|
|
|
|
process_message = client_process_message;
|
|
|
|
max_message_size = client_max_message_size;
|
|
|
|
post_process_message = client_post_process_message;
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st->read_state_first_init) {
|
|
|
|
s->first_packet = 1;
|
|
|
|
st->read_state_first_init = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while(1) {
|
|
|
|
switch(st->read_state) {
|
|
|
|
case READ_STATE_HEADER:
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the state the peer wants to move to */
|
2015-08-11 10:41:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Could be non-blocking IO */
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
|
|
|
|
if (s->server)
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move
|
|
|
|
* to that state if so
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(!transition(s, mt)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st->read_state = READ_STATE_BODY;
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case READ_STATE_BODY:
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
/* We already got this above for DTLS */
|
|
|
|
ret = tls_get_message_body(s, &len);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Could be non-blocking IO */
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->first_packet = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = process_message(s, len);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING) {
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING) {
|
|
|
|
st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS;
|
|
|
|
st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS:
|
|
|
|
st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work);
|
|
|
|
switch(st->read_state_work) {
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
|
|
|
|
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
statem_set_error(s);
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Send a previously constructed message to the peer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int statem_do_write(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
|
|
|
|
|| st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) {
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
|
|
return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_do_write(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialise the MSG_FLOW_WRITING sub-state machine
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in
|
|
|
|
* MSG_FLOW_WRITING. The valid sub-states and transitions are:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* +-> WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION ------> [SUB_STATE_FINISHED]
|
|
|
|
* | |
|
|
|
|
* | v
|
|
|
|
* | WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK -----> [SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE]
|
|
|
|
* | |
|
|
|
|
* | v
|
|
|
|
* | WRITE_STATE_SEND
|
|
|
|
* | |
|
|
|
|
* | v
|
|
|
|
* | WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK
|
|
|
|
* | |
|
|
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION transitions the state of the handshake state machine
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK performs any work necessary to prepare the later
|
|
|
|
* sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occuring in
|
|
|
|
* which case control returns to the calling application. When this function
|
|
|
|
* is recalled we will resume in the same state where we left off.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* WRITE_STATE_SEND sends the message and performs any work to be done after
|
|
|
|
* sending.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK performs any work necessary after the sending of the
|
|
|
|
* message has been completed. As for WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK this could also
|
|
|
|
* result in an NBIO event.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
enum WRITE_TRAN (*transition)(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
enum WORK_STATE (*pre_work)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
|
|
|
|
enum WORK_STATE (*post_work)(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst);
|
|
|
|
int (*construct_message)(SSL *s);
|
|
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb = s->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(s->server) {
|
2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
transition = server_write_transition;
|
|
|
|
pre_work = server_pre_work;
|
|
|
|
post_work = server_post_work;
|
|
|
|
construct_message = server_construct_message;
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
transition = client_write_transition;
|
|
|
|
pre_work = client_pre_work;
|
|
|
|
post_work = client_post_work;
|
|
|
|
construct_message = client_construct_message;
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while(1) {
|
|
|
|
switch(st->write_state) {
|
|
|
|
case WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION:
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
|
|
|
|
if (s->server)
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch(transition(s)) {
|
|
|
|
case WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE:
|
|
|
|
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK;
|
|
|
|
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK:
|
|
|
|
switch(st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
|
|
|
|
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_SEND;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(construct_message(s) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WRITE_STATE_SEND:
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && st->use_timer) {
|
|
|
|
dtls1_start_timer(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = statem_do_write(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK;
|
|
|
|
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK:
|
|
|
|
switch(st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
|
|
|
|
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Flush the write BIO
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int statem_flush(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called by the record layer to determine whether application data is
|
|
|
|
* allowed to be sent in the current handshake state or not.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Yes (application data allowed)
|
|
|
|
* 0: No (application data not allowed)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s)
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE)
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->server) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we're a server and we haven't got as far as writing our
|
|
|
|
* ServerHello yet then we allow app data
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
|
|
|
|
|| st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we're a client and we haven't read the ServerHello yet then we
|
|
|
|
* allow app data
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO)
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set flag used by SCTP to determine whether we are in the read sock state
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void statem_set_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s, int read_sock)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock = read_sock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called by the record layer to determine whether we are in the read sock
|
|
|
|
* state or not.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Yes (we are in the read sock state)
|
|
|
|
* 0: No (we are not in the read sock state)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int statem_in_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Yes
|
|
|
|
* 0: No
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
|
|
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION
|
|
|
|
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Are we allowed to skip the ServerKeyExchange message?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Yes
|
|
|
|
* 0: No
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int key_exchange_skip_allowed(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
|
|
|
|
* ciphersuite.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-29 13:23:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
|
|
|
|
* state transitions when the client is reading messages from the server. The
|
|
|
|
* message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
|
|
|
|
* is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
|
|
|
|
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
|
|
|
|
&& cert_req_allowed(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (key_exchange_skip_allowed(s)) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No valid transition found */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
|
|
|
|
* when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WRITE_TRAN client_write_transition(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
|
|
/* Renegotiation - fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
|
|
|
|
* we will be sent
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
|
|
|
|
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
|
|
|
|
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
|
|
|
|
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
|
|
|
|
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: This needs removing */
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: This needs removing */
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
|
|
|
|
* the client to the server.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WORK_STATE client_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
|
|
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
|
|
|
|
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
|
|
|
|
* messages unless we need to.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
|
|
|
|
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* No pre work to be done */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
|
|
|
|
* client to the server.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WORK_STATE client_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
/* Disable buffering for SCTP */
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* turn on buffering for the next lot of output
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
|
|
|
|
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
|
|
|
|
s->first_packet = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
|
|
return WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit && tls_finish_handshake(s, WORK_MORE_A) != 1)
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* No post work to be done */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Success
|
|
|
|
* 0: Error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int client_construct_message(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
|
|
return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_finished(s,
|
|
|
|
s->method->
|
|
|
|
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
|
|
|
|
s->method->
|
|
|
|
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The spec allows for a longer length than this, but we limit it */
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#define HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 258
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#define SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 20000
|
|
|
|
#define SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 102400
|
|
|
|
#define SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH 0
|
|
|
|
#define CCS_MAX_LENGTH 1
|
|
|
|
/* Max should actually be 36 but we are generous */
|
|
|
|
#define FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH 64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
|
|
|
|
* reading. Excludes the message header.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
|
|
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
|
|
|
|
return s->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
|
|
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN client_process_message(SSL *s, unsigned long len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_server_hello(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 21:00:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
|
|
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 15:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_cert_status(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_key_exchange(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_certificate_request(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_server_done(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_finished(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
|
|
|
|
* from the server
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WORK_STATE client_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
/* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
|
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
|
|
|
statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
|
|
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit)
|
|
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-08 08:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
|
|
|
|
* state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
|
|
|
|
* message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
|
|
|
|
* is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
|
|
|
|
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
|
|
|
|
* 1) We didn't request a Certificate
|
|
|
|
* OR
|
|
|
|
* 2) If we did request one then
|
|
|
|
* a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
|
|
|
|
* AND
|
|
|
|
* b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
|
|
|
|
* list if we requested a certificate)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
|
|
|
|
&& (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
|
|
|
|
|| (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
|
|
|
&& (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
|
|
|
|
* received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
|
|
|
|
* will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
|
|
|
|
* not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
|
|
|
|
* the case of static DH). In that case |s->no_cert_verify| should be
|
|
|
|
* set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer == NULL || s->no_cert_verify) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
|
|
|
|
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
|
|
|
|
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
|
|
|
|
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No valid transition found */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Yes
|
|
|
|
* 0: No
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH, fortezza or RSA but we have a
|
|
|
|
* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
|
|
|
|
* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
|
|
|
|
* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
|
|
|
|
* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
|
|
|
|
* key exchange.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
|
|
|
|
|| (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
|
|
|
|
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
|
|
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|
|
|
|
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
|
|
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
|
|
|
|
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
|
|
|
|
8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
|
|
|
|
* provided
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
|
|
/* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
|
|
|
|
|| ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
|
|
|
|
&& s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
|
|
/* For other PSK always send SKE */
|
|
|
|
|| (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
|
|
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|
|
|
|
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Yes
|
|
|
|
* 0: No
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
|
|
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
|
|
|
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
|
|
|
|
* during re-negotiation:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
&& ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
|
|
|
|
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
|
|
|
|
* RFC 2246):
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
&& (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ... except when the application insists on
|
|
|
|
* verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
|
|
|
|
* this for SSL 3)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
|
|
|
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
|
|
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
|
|
|
|
* are omitted
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
|
|
|
|
* when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WRITE_TRAN server_write_transition(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
|
|
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
|
|
/* We must be trying to renegotiate */
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: This needs removing */
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
|
|
|
|
/* normal PSK or SRP */
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
|
|
|
|
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
|
|
|
|
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
} else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
|
|
if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: This needs removing */
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: This needs removing */
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
|
|
|
|
* the server to the client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WORK_STATE server_pre_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
|
|
|
statem_set_error(s);
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* No pre work to be done */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
|
|
|
|
* server to the client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WORK_STATE server_post_work(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
|
|
|
|
statem_set_error(s);
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* No post work to be done */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
|
|
* 1: Success
|
|
|
|
* 0: Error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int server_construct_message(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_server_done(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
|
|
return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return tls_construct_finished(s,
|
|
|
|
s->method->
|
|
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
|
|
|
s->method->
|
|
|
|
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
|
|
|
|
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
|
|
|
|
* reading. Excludes the message header.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
|
|
|
return s->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
|
|
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
|
|
return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Process a message that the server has received from the client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN server_process_message(SSL *s,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_client_hello(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_next_proto(s, len);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return tls_process_finished(s, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
|
|
|
|
* from the client
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum WORK_STATE server_post_process_message(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(st->hand_state) {
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
|
|
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|