2002-08-26 11:25:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-01-19 09:49:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2016-05-17 19:38:09 +00:00
|
|
|
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
|
|
|
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
|
|
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
|
|
|
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-10 01:36:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "ec_lcl.h"
|
2002-07-26 08:41:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
2017-08-18 03:52:46 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "internal/nelem.h"
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-08-26 18:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *group)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-02-22 18:11:08 +00:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
|
|
|
|
NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
|
|
|
|
/* everything else is currently not supported */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-22 18:11:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Find the last non-zero element of group->poly[] */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0;
|
2017-02-22 20:06:27 +00:00
|
|
|
i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(group->poly) && group->poly[i] != 0;
|
2017-02-22 18:11:08 +00:00
|
|
|
i++)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i == 4)
|
|
|
|
return NID_X9_62_ppBasis;
|
|
|
|
else if (i == 2)
|
|
|
|
return NID_X9_62_tpBasis;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
/* everything else is currently not supported */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
|
2002-08-26 18:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (group == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
|
|
|
|
NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
|
|
|
|
|| !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
|
|
|
|
&& (group->poly[2] == 0))) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (k)
|
|
|
|
*k = group->poly[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-26 18:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1,
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (group == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
|
|
|
|
NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
|
|
|
|
|| !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
|
|
|
|
&& (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0)
|
|
|
|
&& (group->poly[4] == 0))) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (k1)
|
|
|
|
*k1 = group->poly[3];
|
|
|
|
if (k2)
|
|
|
|
*k2 = group->poly[2];
|
|
|
|
if (k3)
|
|
|
|
*k3 = group->poly[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-08-26 11:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/* some structures needed for the asn1 encoding */
|
|
|
|
typedef struct x9_62_pentanomial_st {
|
2017-04-05 11:24:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int32_t k1;
|
|
|
|
int32_t k2;
|
|
|
|
int32_t k3;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
} X9_62_PENTANOMIAL;
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct x9_62_characteristic_two_st {
|
2017-04-05 11:24:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int32_t m;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *type;
|
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
char *ptr;
|
|
|
|
/* NID_X9_62_onBasis */
|
|
|
|
ASN1_NULL *onBasis;
|
|
|
|
/* NID_X9_62_tpBasis */
|
|
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *tpBasis;
|
|
|
|
/* NID_X9_62_ppBasis */
|
|
|
|
X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *ppBasis;
|
|
|
|
/* anything else */
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TYPE *other;
|
|
|
|
} p;
|
|
|
|
} X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO;
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct x9_62_fieldid_st {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *fieldType;
|
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
char *ptr;
|
|
|
|
/* NID_X9_62_prime_field */
|
|
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *prime;
|
|
|
|
/* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
|
|
|
|
X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
|
|
|
|
/* anything else */
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TYPE *other;
|
|
|
|
} p;
|
|
|
|
} X9_62_FIELDID;
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct x9_62_curve_st {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed;
|
|
|
|
} X9_62_CURVE;
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-10 10:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ec_parameters_st {
|
2017-04-05 11:24:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int32_t version;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
X9_62_FIELDID *fieldID;
|
|
|
|
X9_62_CURVE *curve;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *order;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor;
|
2016-03-10 10:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
} /* ECPARAMETERS */ ;
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ecpk_parameters_st {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
int type;
|
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *named_curve;
|
|
|
|
ECPARAMETERS *parameters;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_NULL *implicitlyCA;
|
|
|
|
} value;
|
|
|
|
} /* ECPKPARAMETERS */ ;
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* SEC1 ECPrivateKey */
|
|
|
|
typedef struct ec_privatekey_st {
|
2017-04-05 11:24:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int32_t version;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey;
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS *parameters;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey;
|
|
|
|
} EC_PRIVATEKEY;
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/* the OpenSSL ASN.1 definitions */
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) = {
|
2017-04-12 09:52:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k1, INT32),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k2, INT32),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k3, INT32)
|
2015-09-05 12:32:58 +00:00
|
|
|
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(char_two_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_ADB(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_onBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.onBasis, ASN1_NULL)),
|
|
|
|
ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_tpBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.tpBasis, ASN1_INTEGER)),
|
|
|
|
ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_ppBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.ppBasis, X9_62_PENTANOMIAL))
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, 0, type, 0, &char_two_def_tt, NULL);
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
|
2017-04-12 09:52:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, m, INT32),
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
|
2015-09-05 12:32:58 +00:00
|
|
|
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(fieldID_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_ADB(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_prime_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.prime, ASN1_INTEGER)),
|
|
|
|
ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.char_two, X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO))
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_FIELDID, 0, fieldType, 0, &fieldID_def_tt, NULL);
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, fieldType, ASN1_OBJECT),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_FIELDID)
|
2015-09-05 12:32:58 +00:00
|
|
|
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_FIELDID)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CURVE) = {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, b, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_OPT(X9_62_CURVE, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
|
2015-09-05 12:32:58 +00:00
|
|
|
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CURVE)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECPARAMETERS) = {
|
2017-04-12 09:52:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_EMBED(ECPARAMETERS, version, INT32),
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, fieldID, X9_62_FIELDID),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, curve, X9_62_CURVE),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, base, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, order, ASN1_INTEGER),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_OPT(ECPARAMETERS, cofactor, ASN1_INTEGER)
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECPARAMETERS)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_CHOICE(ECPKPARAMETERS) = {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.named_curve, ASN1_OBJECT),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.parameters, ECPARAMETERS),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.implicitlyCA, ASN1_NULL)
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
} ASN1_CHOICE_END(ECPKPARAMETERS)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS, ECPKPARAMETERS)
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
|
|
|
|
|
2002-07-26 08:41:04 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SEQUENCE(EC_PRIVATEKEY) = {
|
2017-04-12 09:52:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_EMBED(EC_PRIVATEKEY, version, INT32),
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, parameters, ECPKPARAMETERS, 0),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1)
|
2015-09-05 12:32:58 +00:00
|
|
|
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
|
2002-07-26 08:41:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY, EC_PRIVATEKEY)
|
2002-07-26 08:41:04 +00:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-26 11:25:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* some declarations of internal function */
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ec_asn1_group2field() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_FIELDID *);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ec_asn1_group2curve() sets the values in a X9_62_CURVE object */
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_CURVE *);
|
2002-08-26 11:25:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* the function definitions */
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_FIELDID *field)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ok = 0, nid;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (group == NULL || field == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* clear the old values (if necessary) */
|
2015-03-24 11:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT_free(field->fieldType);
|
2015-04-30 15:30:03 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_TYPE_free(field->p.other);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
|
|
|
|
/* set OID for the field */
|
|
|
|
if ((field->fieldType = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
|
|
|
|
if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* the parameters are specified by the prime number p */
|
2018-07-30 15:40:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* set the prime number */
|
|
|
|
field->p.prime = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (field->p.prime == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-02-01 18:15:57 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int field_type;
|
|
|
|
X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
field->p.char_two = X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_new();
|
|
|
|
char_two = field->p.char_two;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (char_two == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char_two->m = (long)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
field_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(group);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (field_type == 0) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* set base type OID */
|
|
|
|
if ((char_two->type = OBJ_nid2obj(field_type)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (field_type == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int k;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(group, &k))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char_two->p.tpBasis = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
|
2015-10-30 11:12:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (char_two->p.tpBasis == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(char_two->p.tpBasis, (long)k)) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int k1, k2, k3;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(group, &k1, &k2, &k3))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char_two->p.ppBasis = X9_62_PENTANOMIAL_new();
|
2015-10-30 11:12:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (char_two->p.ppBasis == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set k? values */
|
|
|
|
char_two->p.ppBasis->k1 = (long)k1;
|
|
|
|
char_two->p.ppBasis->k2 = (long)k2;
|
|
|
|
char_two->p.ppBasis->k3 = (long)k3;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* field_type == NID_X9_62_onBasis */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* for ONB the parameters are (asn1) NULL */
|
|
|
|
char_two->p.onBasis = ASN1_NULL_new();
|
2015-10-30 11:12:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (char_two->p.onBasis == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-02-01 18:15:57 +00:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
BN_free(tmp);
|
2017-10-17 14:04:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return ok;
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-11-10 18:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_CURVE *curve)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-07-30 15:40:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL;
|
2018-05-20 18:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *a_buf = NULL, *b_buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!group || !curve || !curve->a || !curve->b)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((tmp_1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp_2 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get a and b */
|
2018-07-30 15:40:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-20 18:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Per SEC 1, the curve coefficients must be padded up to size. See C.2's
|
|
|
|
* definition of Curve, C.1's definition of FieldElement, and 2.3.5's
|
|
|
|
* definition of how to encode the field elements.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
len = ((size_t)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
|
|
|
|
if ((a_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL
|
|
|
|
|| (b_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-20 18:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (BN_bn2binpad(tmp_1, a_buf, len) < 0
|
|
|
|
|| BN_bn2binpad(tmp_2, b_buf, len) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set a and b */
|
2018-05-20 18:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->a, a_buf, len)
|
|
|
|
|| !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->b, b_buf, len)) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the seed (optional) */
|
|
|
|
if (group->seed) {
|
|
|
|
if (!curve->seed)
|
|
|
|
if ((curve->seed = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curve->seed->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
|
|
|
|
curve->seed->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
|
|
|
|
if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(curve->seed, group->seed,
|
|
|
|
(int)group->seed_len)) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-04-30 15:30:03 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(curve->seed);
|
|
|
|
curve->seed = NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
err:
|
2018-05-20 18:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a_buf);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(b_buf);
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
BN_free(tmp_1);
|
|
|
|
BN_free(tmp_2);
|
2017-10-17 14:04:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return ok;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
|
|
|
|
ECPARAMETERS *params)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t len = 0;
|
|
|
|
ECPARAMETERS *ret = NULL;
|
2016-01-31 16:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *tmp;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
const EC_POINT *point = NULL;
|
|
|
|
point_conversion_form_t form;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (params == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = ECPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = params;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the version (always one) */
|
|
|
|
ret->version = (long)0x1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the fieldID */
|
|
|
|
if (!ec_asn1_group2fieldid(group, ret->fieldID)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the curve */
|
|
|
|
if (!ec_asn1_group2curve(group, ret->curve)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the base point */
|
|
|
|
if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-12 01:04:25 +00:00
|
|
|
len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buffer, NULL);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (len == 0) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret->base == NULL && (ret->base = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
|
2016-08-06 13:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-06 13:24:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING_set0(ret->base, buffer, len);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the order */
|
2016-01-31 16:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
|
|
|
|
if (tmp == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->order);
|
|
|
|
if (ret->order == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the cofactor (optional) */
|
2016-01-31 16:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
|
|
|
|
if (tmp != NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->cofactor);
|
|
|
|
if (ret->cofactor == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
err:
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (params == NULL)
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
ECPARAMETERS_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ok = 1, tmp;
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS *ret = params;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = ECPKPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-03-24 11:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret->type == 0)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve);
|
|
|
|
else if (ret->type == 1 && ret->value.parameters)
|
|
|
|
ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-12-29 06:07:15 +00:00
|
|
|
* use the asn1 OID to describe the elliptic curve parameters
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
|
|
|
|
if (tmp) {
|
|
|
|
ret->type = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
2016-02-05 20:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* we don't know the nid => ERROR */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */
|
|
|
|
ret->type = 1;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret->value.parameters =
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL)) == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ok = 0, tmp;
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *ret = NULL, *dup = NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
|
|
|
|
long field_bits;
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
int curve_name = NID_undef;
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType ||
|
|
|
|
!params->fieldID->p.ptr) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-20 18:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now extract the curve parameters a and b. Note that, although SEC 1
|
|
|
|
* specifies the length of their encodings, historical versions of OpenSSL
|
|
|
|
* encoded them incorrectly, so we must accept any length for backwards
|
|
|
|
* compatibility.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!params->curve || !params->curve->a ||
|
|
|
|
!params->curve->a->data || !params->curve->b ||
|
|
|
|
!params->curve->b->data) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
a = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->a->data, params->curve->a->length, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->b->data, params->curve->b->length, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (b == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the field parameters */
|
|
|
|
tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->fieldID->fieldType);
|
|
|
|
if (tmp == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
field_bits = char_two->m;
|
|
|
|
if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the base type */
|
|
|
|
tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(char_two->type);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tmp == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
|
|
|
|
long tmp_long;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS,
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* create the polynomial */
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)tmp_long))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
} else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
|
|
|
|
X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *penta;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
penta = char_two->p.ppBasis;
|
|
|
|
if (!penta) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!
|
|
|
|
(char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2
|
|
|
|
&& penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS,
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* create the polynomial */
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k2))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k3))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
} else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_onBasis) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* error */
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* create the EC_GROUP structure */
|
|
|
|
ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-12 17:23:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
|
|
|
|
/* we have a curve over a prime field */
|
|
|
|
/* extract the prime number */
|
|
|
|
if (!params->fieldID->p.prime) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->fieldID->p.prime, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (p == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
field_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
|
|
|
|
if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* create the EC_GROUP structure */
|
|
|
|
ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* extract seed (optional) */
|
|
|
|
if (params->curve->seed != NULL) {
|
2015-05-01 14:02:07 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ret->seed);
|
2015-05-06 17:43:59 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((ret->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(params->curve->seed->length)) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ret->seed, params->curve->seed->data,
|
|
|
|
params->curve->seed->length);
|
|
|
|
ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!params->order || !params->base || !params->base->data) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((point = EC_POINT_new(ret)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the point conversion form */
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(ret, (point_conversion_form_t)
|
|
|
|
(params->base->data[0] & ~0x01));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* extract the ec point */
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret, point, params->base->data,
|
|
|
|
params->base->length, NULL)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* extract the order */
|
|
|
|
if ((a = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->order, a)) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) { /* Hasse bound */
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* extract the cofactor (optional) */
|
|
|
|
if (params->cofactor == NULL) {
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
BN_free(b);
|
|
|
|
b = NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if ((b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->cofactor, b)) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* set the generator, order and cofactor (if present) */
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret, point, a, b)) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if the explicit parameters group just created matches one of the
|
|
|
|
* built-in curves.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We create a copy of the group just built, so that we can remove optional
|
|
|
|
* fields for the lookup: we do this to avoid the possibility that one of
|
|
|
|
* the optional parameters is used to force the library into using a less
|
|
|
|
* performant and less secure EC_METHOD instead of the specialized one.
|
|
|
|
* In any case, `seed` is not really used in any computation, while a
|
|
|
|
* cofactor different from the one in the built-in table is just
|
|
|
|
* mathematically wrong anyway and should not be used.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((dup = EC_GROUP_dup(ret)) == NULL
|
|
|
|
|| EC_GROUP_set_seed(dup, NULL, 0) != 1
|
|
|
|
|| !EC_GROUP_set_generator(dup, point, a, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((curve_name = ec_curve_nid_from_params(dup, ctx)) != NID_undef) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The input explicit parameters successfully matched one of the
|
|
|
|
* built-in curves: often for built-in curves we have specialized
|
|
|
|
* methods with better performance and hardening.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In this case we replace the `EC_GROUP` created through explicit
|
|
|
|
* parameters with one created from a named group.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *named_group = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 and NID_secp224r1 are both aliases for
|
|
|
|
* the same curve, we prefer the SECP nid when matching explicit
|
|
|
|
* parameters as that is associated with a specialized EC_METHOD.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (curve_name == NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12)
|
|
|
|
curve_name = NID_secp224r1;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((named_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_name)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
ret = named_group;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set the flag so that EC_GROUPs created from explicit parameters are
|
|
|
|
* serialized using explicit parameters by default.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-25 22:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_free(ret);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_free(dup);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-01 01:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
BN_free(p);
|
|
|
|
BN_free(a);
|
|
|
|
BN_free(b);
|
2015-03-25 22:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_POINT_free(point);
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-17 14:04:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int tmp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (params == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (params->type == 0) { /* the curve is given by an OID */
|
|
|
|
tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve);
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS,
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
|
|
|
|
} else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a
|
|
|
|
* ECPARAMETERS structure */
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(params->value.parameters);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-20 18:37:06 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* EC_GROUP <-> DER encoding of ECPKPARAMETERS */
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-12 03:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
|
2015-08-17 14:02:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *p = *in;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-08-17 14:02:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(params)) == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-25 22:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (a) {
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_free(*a);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*a = group;
|
2015-03-25 22:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
|
2015-08-17 14:02:18 +00:00
|
|
|
*in = p;
|
2017-10-17 14:04:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return group;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a, NULL);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tmp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, out)) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
|
2017-10-17 14:04:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-10 12:41:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* some EC_KEY functions */
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-12 03:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
|
2015-08-17 14:02:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *p = *in;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-08-17 14:02:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ret = *a;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (priv_key->parameters) {
|
[ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
2019-09-07 15:05:31 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_free(ret->group);
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(priv_key->parameters);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret->group == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret->version = priv_key->version;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (priv_key->privateKey) {
|
2016-02-01 15:46:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkey = priv_key->privateKey;
|
2016-08-16 13:06:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (EC_KEY_oct2priv(ret, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pkey),
|
2016-02-01 15:46:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING_length(pkey)) == 0)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-25 22:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
|
|
|
|
if (ret->pub_key == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (priv_key->publicKey) {
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *pub_oct;
|
|
|
|
int pub_oct_len;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-16 13:06:48 +00:00
|
|
|
pub_oct = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(priv_key->publicKey);
|
2015-03-14 04:16:42 +00:00
|
|
|
pub_oct_len = ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
|
2016-02-17 15:05:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL)) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-02-28 17:47:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret->group->meth->keygenpub == NULL
|
|
|
|
|| ret->group->meth->keygenpub(ret) == 0)
|
2016-02-01 18:15:57 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */
|
|
|
|
ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-09 11:38:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (a)
|
|
|
|
*a = ret;
|
2015-05-01 18:37:16 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
|
2015-08-17 14:02:18 +00:00
|
|
|
*in = p;
|
2017-10-17 14:04:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2015-05-01 18:37:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0, ok = 0;
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *priv= NULL, *pub= NULL;
|
2016-02-05 07:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t privlen = 0, publen = 0;
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-01 15:46:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL ||
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
(!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
priv_key->version = a->version;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
privlen = EC_KEY_priv2buf(a, &priv);
|
2015-03-25 23:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (privlen == 0) {
|
2016-02-01 15:46:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-03-25 23:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->privateKey, priv, privlen);
|
|
|
|
priv = NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS)) {
|
|
|
|
if ((priv_key->parameters =
|
2016-03-09 16:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a->group,
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
priv_key->parameters)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY)) {
|
2015-03-14 04:16:42 +00:00
|
|
|
priv_key->publicKey = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (priv_key->publicKey == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
publen = EC_KEY_key2buf(a, a->conv_form, &pub, NULL);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (publen == 0) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
priv_key->publicKey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
|
|
|
|
priv_key->publicKey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->publicKey, pub, publen);
|
|
|
|
pub = NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = i2d_EC_PRIVATEKEY(priv_key, out)) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2016-02-04 23:18:57 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(priv, privlen);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(pub);
|
2015-05-01 18:37:16 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return (ok ? ret : 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return i2d_ECPKParameters(a->group, out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (in == NULL || *in == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ret = *a;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
2015-03-19 10:16:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_free(ret);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-19 10:16:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (a)
|
|
|
|
*a = ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-02-21 13:58:23 +00:00
|
|
|
EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-02-05 20:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
* sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structure is necessary to set the public key
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = *a;
|
2016-02-17 15:05:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, *in, len, NULL)) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*in += len;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-07 10:49:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-18 12:59:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
int new_buffer = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
|
|
|
|
a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (out == NULL || buf_len == 0)
|
|
|
|
/* out == NULL => just return the length of the octet string */
|
|
|
|
return buf_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*out == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if ((*out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new_buffer = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form,
|
|
|
|
*out, buf_len, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
if (new_buffer) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(*out);
|
|
|
|
*out = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!new_buffer)
|
|
|
|
*out += buf_len;
|
|
|
|
return buf_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-27 16:45:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECDSA_SIG) = {
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM),
|
|
|
|
ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM)
|
|
|
|
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECDSA_SIG)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG)
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG)
|
2016-07-19 17:57:15 +00:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sig));
|
|
|
|
if (sig == NULL)
|
|
|
|
ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return sig;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (sig == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
BN_clear_free(sig->r);
|
|
|
|
BN_clear_free(sig->s);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sig);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-27 18:51:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-09 21:09:48 +00:00
|
|
|
void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
|
2015-10-27 18:51:04 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-12-09 13:10:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pr != NULL)
|
2015-10-27 18:51:04 +00:00
|
|
|
*pr = sig->r;
|
2015-12-09 13:10:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ps != NULL)
|
2015-10-27 18:51:04 +00:00
|
|
|
*ps = sig->s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-27 19:34:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-27 07:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return sig->r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return sig->s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-09 21:52:04 +00:00
|
|
|
int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
|
2016-06-08 20:54:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-06-10 07:36:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-06-08 20:54:22 +00:00
|
|
|
BN_clear_free(sig->r);
|
|
|
|
BN_clear_free(sig->s);
|
|
|
|
sig->r = r;
|
|
|
|
sig->s = s;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-27 19:34:17 +00:00
|
|
|
int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret, i;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER bs;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[4];
|
|
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (r == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r);
|
|
|
|
if (group == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-31 16:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
i = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
2015-10-27 19:34:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
bs.length = (i + 7) / 8;
|
|
|
|
bs.data = buf;
|
|
|
|
bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
|
|
|
|
/* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = 0xff;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL);
|
|
|
|
i += i; /* r and s */
|
|
|
|
ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
|
2017-10-17 14:04:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2015-10-27 19:34:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|