openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c

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/* crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c */
2008-11-05 18:39:08 +00:00
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 2006.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
#include "evp_locl.h"
#include "rsa_locl.h"
/* RSA pkey context structure */
typedef struct
{
/* Key gen parameters */
int nbits;
BIGNUM *pub_exp;
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/* Keygen callback info */
int gentmp[2];
/* RSA padding mode */
int pad_mode;
/* message digest */
const EVP_MD *md;
/* message digest for MGF1 */
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
/* PSS salt length */
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int saltlen;
/* Temp buffer */
unsigned char *tbuf;
/* OAEP label */
unsigned char *oaep_label;
size_t oaep_labellen;
} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
if (!rctx)
return 0;
rctx->nbits = 1024;
rctx->pub_exp = NULL;
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
rctx->md = NULL;
rctx->mgf1md = NULL;
rctx->tbuf = NULL;
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rctx->saltlen = -2;
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rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
ctx->data = rctx;
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ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
return 0;
sctx = src->data;
dctx = dst->data;
dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
if (sctx->pub_exp)
{
dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
if (!dctx->pub_exp)
return 0;
}
dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
dctx->md = sctx->md;
dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
if (sctx->oaep_label)
{
if (dctx->oaep_label)
OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
dctx->oaep_label = BUF_memdup(sctx->oaep_label,
sctx->oaep_labellen);
if (!dctx->oaep_label)
return 0;
dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
}
return 1;
}
static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
{
if (ctx->tbuf)
return 1;
ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
if (!ctx->tbuf)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
if (rctx)
{
if (rctx->pub_exp)
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
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if (rctx->tbuf)
OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
if (rctx->oaep_label)
OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
OPENSSL_free(rctx);
}
}
2011-06-06 11:24:47 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* FIP checker. Return value indicates status of context parameters:
* 1 : redirect to FIPS.
* 0 : don't redirect to FIPS.
* -1 : illegal operation in FIPS mode.
*/
static int pkey_fips_check_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
int rv = -1;
if (!FIPS_mode())
return 0;
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
rv = 0;
if (!(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && rv)
return -1;
if (rctx->md)
{
const EVP_MD *fmd;
fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
return rv;
}
if (rctx->mgf1md && !(rctx->mgf1md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
{
const EVP_MD *fmd;
fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md));
if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
return rv;
}
return 1;
}
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#endif
static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
ret = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
if (ret < 0)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return -1;
}
#endif
if (rctx->md)
{
if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN,
RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (ret > 0)
{
unsigned int slen;
ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md,
rctx->pad_mode,
rctx->saltlen,
rctx->mgf1md,
sig, &slen);
if (ret > 0)
*siglen = slen;
else
*siglen = 0;
return ret;
}
#endif
if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2)
{
unsigned int sltmp;
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return -1;
ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2,
tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = sltmp;
}
else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
rctx->tbuf[tbslen] =
RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
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sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
}
else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
{
unsigned int sltmp;
ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
2006-04-10 12:41:21 +00:00
tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = sltmp;
}
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else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
rctx->tbuf, tbs,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
rctx->saltlen))
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return -1;
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
}
else
return -1;
}
else
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
rctx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*siglen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
if (rctx->md)
{
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
RSA_X931_PADDING);
if (ret < 1)
return 0;
2006-04-09 20:44:00 +00:00
ret--;
if (rctx->tbuf[ret] !=
RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)))
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (rout)
memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
}
else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
{
size_t sltmp;
ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
2010-06-01 13:17:06 +00:00
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
ret = sltmp;
}
else
return -1;
}
else
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
rctx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*routlen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
2006-04-10 12:41:21 +00:00
RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
size_t rslen;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
int rv;
rv = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
if (rv < 0)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return -1;
}
#endif
if (rctx->md)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (rv > 0)
{
return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa,
tbs, tbslen,
rctx->md,
rctx->pad_mode,
rctx->saltlen,
rctx->mgf1md,
sig, siglen);
}
#endif
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
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sig, siglen, rsa);
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
{
if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen,
sig, siglen) <= 0)
return 0;
}
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else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
{
int ret;
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
2006-04-10 12:41:21 +00:00
rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
else
return -1;
}
else
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
2006-04-10 12:41:21 +00:00
rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
if (rslen == 0)
return 0;
}
if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
2006-04-08 13:02:04 +00:00
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
in, inlen,
rctx->oaep_label,
rctx->oaep_labellen,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
return -1;
ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
RSA_NO_PADDING);
}
else
ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
2006-04-08 13:02:04 +00:00
rctx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*outlen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
int i;
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf,
ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < ret; i++)
{
if (rctx->tbuf[i])
break;
}
ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out,ret,rctx->tbuf + i,
ret - i, ret,
rctx->oaep_label,
rctx->oaep_labellen,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
}
else
ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
2006-04-08 13:02:04 +00:00
rctx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*outlen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
{
if (!md)
return 1;
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if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return 0;
}
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
{
if (RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)) == -1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD,
RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
switch (type)
{
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
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if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING))
{
if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
return 0;
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if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
{
if (!(ctx->operation &
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
goto bad_pad;
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if (!rctx->md)
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
}
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
goto bad_pad;
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if (!rctx->md)
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
}
rctx->pad_mode = p1;
return 1;
}
bad_pad:
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
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return -2;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
*(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
2006-04-10 12:55:04 +00:00
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN)
*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
else
{
if (p1 < -2)
return -2;
rctx->saltlen = p1;
}
2006-04-10 12:55:04 +00:00
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
if (p1 < 256)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
return -2;
}
rctx->nbits = p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
if (!p2)
return -2;
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
else
rctx->md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
return 0;
rctx->md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
&& rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD)
{
if (rctx->mgf1md)
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
else
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
}
else
rctx->mgf1md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
if (rctx->oaep_label)
OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
if (p2 && p1 > 0)
{
rctx->oaep_label = p2;
rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
}
else
{
rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
}
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
*(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
return rctx->oaep_labellen;
2008-05-02 11:24:40 +00:00
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
return 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
return 1;
#endif
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
return -2;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const char *type, const char *value)
{
if (!value)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode"))
{
int pm;
if (!strcmp(value, "pkcs1"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "sslv23"))
pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "none"))
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
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else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
else
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR,
RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
return -2;
}
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
}
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if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen"))
{
int saltlen;
saltlen = atoi(value);
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
}
if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits"))
{
int nbits;
nbits = atoi(value);
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
}
if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp"))
{
int ret;
BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
return 0;
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
if (ret <= 0)
BN_free(pubexp);
return ret;
}
if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md"))
{
const EVP_MD *md;
if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)))
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR,
RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md);
}
if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md"))
{
const EVP_MD *md;
if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)))
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR,
RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md);
}
if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label"))
{
unsigned char *lab;
long lablen;
int ret;
lab = string_to_hex(value, &lablen);
if (!lab)
return 0;
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
if (ret <= 0)
OPENSSL_free(lab);
return ret;
}
return -2;
}
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static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
RSA *rsa = NULL;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
BN_GENCB *pcb, cb;
int ret;
if (!rctx->pub_exp)
{
rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
if (!rctx->pub_exp || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
return 0;
}
rsa = RSA_new();
if (!rsa)
return 0;
if (ctx->pkey_gencb)
{
pcb = &cb;
evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
}
else
pcb = NULL;
ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
if (ret > 0)
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
else
RSA_free(rsa);
return ret;
}
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth =
{
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
pkey_rsa_init,
pkey_rsa_copy,
pkey_rsa_cleanup,
0,0,
2006-04-11 13:28:52 +00:00
0,
pkey_rsa_keygen,
0,
pkey_rsa_sign,
0,
pkey_rsa_verify,
0,
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pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
0,0,0,0,
0,
pkey_rsa_encrypt,
0,
pkey_rsa_decrypt,
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0,0,
pkey_rsa_ctrl,
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
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};