openssl/crypto/modes/wrap128.c

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/*
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project. Mode with padding contributed by Petr Spacek
* (pspacek@redhat.com).
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*/
/** Beware!
*
* Following wrapping modes were designed for AES but this implementation
* allows you to use them for any 128 bit block cipher.
*/
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/modes.h>
/** RFC 3394 section 2.2.3.1 Default Initial Value */
static const unsigned char default_iv[] = {
0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6,
};
/** RFC 5649 section 3 Alternative Initial Value 32-bit constant */
static const unsigned char default_aiv[] = {
0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6
};
/** Input size limit: lower than maximum of standards but far larger than
* anything that will be used in practice.
*/
#define CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX (1UL << 31)
/** Wrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.1.
*
* @param[in] key Key value.
* @param[in] iv IV value. Length = 8 bytes. NULL = use default_iv.
* @param[in] in Plaintext as n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2.
* @param[in] inlen Length of in.
* @param[out] out Ciphertext. Minimal buffer length = (inlen + 8) bytes.
* Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
* supports that.
* @param[in] block Block processing function.
* @return 0 if inlen does not consist of n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2.
* or if inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX.
* Output length if wrapping succeeded.
*/
size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
block128_f block)
{
unsigned char *A, B[16], *R;
size_t i, j, t;
if ((inlen & 0x7) || (inlen < 16) || (inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX))
return 0;
A = B;
t = 1;
memmove(out + 8, in, inlen);
if (!iv)
iv = default_iv;
memcpy(A, iv, 8);
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
R = out + 8;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t++, R += 8) {
memcpy(B + 8, R, 8);
block(B, B, key);
A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
if (t > 0xff) {
A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
}
memcpy(R, B + 8, 8);
}
}
memcpy(out, A, 8);
return inlen + 8;
}
/** Unwrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.2 steps 1-2.
* The IV check (step 3) is responsibility of the caller.
*
* @param[in] key Key value.
* @param[out] iv Unchecked IV value. Minimal buffer length = 8 bytes.
* @param[out] out Plaintext without IV.
* Minimal buffer length = (inlen - 8) bytes.
* Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
* supports that.
* @param[in] in Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks.
* @param[in] inlen Length of in.
* @param[in] block Block processing function.
* @return 0 if inlen is out of range [24, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX]
* or if inlen is not a multiple of 8.
* Output length otherwise.
*/
static size_t crypto_128_unwrap_raw(void *key, unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
block128_f block)
{
unsigned char *A, B[16], *R;
size_t i, j, t;
inlen -= 8;
if ((inlen & 0x7) || (inlen < 16) || (inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX))
return 0;
A = B;
t = 6 * (inlen >> 3);
memcpy(A, in, 8);
memmove(out, in + 8, inlen);
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
R = out + inlen - 8;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t--, R -= 8) {
A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
if (t > 0xff) {
A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
}
memcpy(B + 8, R, 8);
block(B, B, key);
memcpy(R, B + 8, 8);
}
}
memcpy(iv, A, 8);
return inlen;
}
/** Unwrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.2, including the IV check.
* The first block of plaintext has to match the supplied IV, otherwise an
* error is returned.
*
* @param[in] key Key value.
* @param[out] iv IV value to match against. Length = 8 bytes.
* NULL = use default_iv.
* @param[out] out Plaintext without IV.
* Minimal buffer length = (inlen - 8) bytes.
* Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
* supports that.
* @param[in] in Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks.
* @param[in] inlen Length of in.
* @param[in] block Block processing function.
* @return 0 if inlen is out of range [24, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX]
* or if inlen is not a multiple of 8
* or if IV doesn't match expected value.
* Output length otherwise.
*/
size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
size_t inlen, block128_f block)
{
size_t ret;
unsigned char got_iv[8];
ret = crypto_128_unwrap_raw(key, got_iv, out, in, inlen, block);
CRYPTO_128_unwrap(): Fix refactoring damage crypto/modes/wrap128.c was heavily refactored to support AES Key Wrap with Padding, and four bugs were introduced into CRYPTO_128_unwrap() at that time: - crypto_128_unwrap_raw()'s return value ('ret') is checked incorrectly, and the function immediately returns 'ret' in (almost) all cases. This makes the IV checking code later in the function unreachable, but callers think the IV check succeeded since CRYPTO_128_unwrap()'s return value is non-zero. FIX: Return 0 (error) if crypto_128_unwrap_raw() returned 0 (error). - crypto_128_unwrap_raw() writes the IV to the 'got_iv' buffer, not to the first 8 bytes of the output buffer ('out') as the IV checking code expects. This makes the IV check fail. FIX: Compare 'iv' to 'got_iv', not 'out'. - The data written to the output buffer ('out') is "cleansed" if the IV check fails, but the code passes OPENSSL_cleanse() the input buffer length ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes that crypto_128_unwrap_raw() wrote to the output buffer ('ret'). This means that OPENSSL_cleanse() could potentially write past the end of 'out'. FIX: Change 'inlen' to 'ret' in the OPENSSL_cleanse() call. - CRYPTO_128_unwrap() is returning the length of the input buffer ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes written to the output buffer ('ret'). This could cause the caller to read past the end of 'out'. FIX: Return 'ret' instead of 'inlen' at the end of the function. PR#3749 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-03-14 04:23:21 +00:00
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
if (!iv)
iv = default_iv;
CRYPTO_128_unwrap(): Fix refactoring damage crypto/modes/wrap128.c was heavily refactored to support AES Key Wrap with Padding, and four bugs were introduced into CRYPTO_128_unwrap() at that time: - crypto_128_unwrap_raw()'s return value ('ret') is checked incorrectly, and the function immediately returns 'ret' in (almost) all cases. This makes the IV checking code later in the function unreachable, but callers think the IV check succeeded since CRYPTO_128_unwrap()'s return value is non-zero. FIX: Return 0 (error) if crypto_128_unwrap_raw() returned 0 (error). - crypto_128_unwrap_raw() writes the IV to the 'got_iv' buffer, not to the first 8 bytes of the output buffer ('out') as the IV checking code expects. This makes the IV check fail. FIX: Compare 'iv' to 'got_iv', not 'out'. - The data written to the output buffer ('out') is "cleansed" if the IV check fails, but the code passes OPENSSL_cleanse() the input buffer length ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes that crypto_128_unwrap_raw() wrote to the output buffer ('ret'). This means that OPENSSL_cleanse() could potentially write past the end of 'out'. FIX: Change 'inlen' to 'ret' in the OPENSSL_cleanse() call. - CRYPTO_128_unwrap() is returning the length of the input buffer ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes written to the output buffer ('ret'). This could cause the caller to read past the end of 'out'. FIX: Return 'ret' instead of 'inlen' at the end of the function. PR#3749 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-03-14 04:23:21 +00:00
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(got_iv, iv, 8)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, ret);
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_128_unwrap(): Fix refactoring damage crypto/modes/wrap128.c was heavily refactored to support AES Key Wrap with Padding, and four bugs were introduced into CRYPTO_128_unwrap() at that time: - crypto_128_unwrap_raw()'s return value ('ret') is checked incorrectly, and the function immediately returns 'ret' in (almost) all cases. This makes the IV checking code later in the function unreachable, but callers think the IV check succeeded since CRYPTO_128_unwrap()'s return value is non-zero. FIX: Return 0 (error) if crypto_128_unwrap_raw() returned 0 (error). - crypto_128_unwrap_raw() writes the IV to the 'got_iv' buffer, not to the first 8 bytes of the output buffer ('out') as the IV checking code expects. This makes the IV check fail. FIX: Compare 'iv' to 'got_iv', not 'out'. - The data written to the output buffer ('out') is "cleansed" if the IV check fails, but the code passes OPENSSL_cleanse() the input buffer length ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes that crypto_128_unwrap_raw() wrote to the output buffer ('ret'). This means that OPENSSL_cleanse() could potentially write past the end of 'out'. FIX: Change 'inlen' to 'ret' in the OPENSSL_cleanse() call. - CRYPTO_128_unwrap() is returning the length of the input buffer ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes written to the output buffer ('ret'). This could cause the caller to read past the end of 'out'. FIX: Return 'ret' instead of 'inlen' at the end of the function. PR#3749 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-03-14 04:23:21 +00:00
return ret;
}
/** Wrapping according to RFC 5649 section 4.1.
*
* @param[in] key Key value.
* @param[in] icv (Non-standard) IV, 4 bytes. NULL = use default_aiv.
* @param[out] out Ciphertext. Minimal buffer length = (inlen + 15) bytes.
* Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
* supports that.
* @param[in] in Plaintext as n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2.
* @param[in] inlen Length of in.
* @param[in] block Block processing function.
* @return 0 if inlen is out of range [1, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX].
* Output length if wrapping succeeded.
*/
size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
block128_f block)
{
/* n: number of 64-bit blocks in the padded key data
*
* If length of plain text is not a multiple of 8, pad the plain text octet
* string on the right with octets of zeros, where final length is the
* smallest multiple of 8 that is greater than length of plain text.
* If length of plain text is a multiple of 8, then there is no padding. */
const size_t blocks_padded = (inlen + 7) / 8; /* CEILING(m/8) */
const size_t padded_len = blocks_padded * 8;
const size_t padding_len = padded_len - inlen;
/* RFC 5649 section 3: Alternative Initial Value */
unsigned char aiv[8];
int ret;
/* Section 1: use 32-bit fixed field for plaintext octet length */
if (inlen == 0 || inlen >= CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX)
return 0;
/* Section 3: Alternative Initial Value */
if (!icv)
memcpy(aiv, default_aiv, 4);
else
memcpy(aiv, icv, 4); /* Standard doesn't mention this. */
aiv[4] = (inlen >> 24) & 0xFF;
aiv[5] = (inlen >> 16) & 0xFF;
aiv[6] = (inlen >> 8) & 0xFF;
aiv[7] = inlen & 0xFF;
if (padded_len == 8) {
/*
* Section 4.1 - special case in step 2: If the padded plaintext
* contains exactly eight octets, then prepend the AIV and encrypt
* the resulting 128-bit block using AES in ECB mode.
*/
memmove(out + 8, in, inlen);
memcpy(out, aiv, 8);
memset(out + 8 + inlen, 0, padding_len);
block(out, out, key);
ret = 16; /* AIV + padded input */
} else {
memmove(out, in, inlen);
memset(out + inlen, 0, padding_len); /* Section 4.1 step 1 */
ret = CRYPTO_128_wrap(key, aiv, out, out, padded_len, block);
}
return ret;
}
/** Unwrapping according to RFC 5649 section 4.2.
*
* @param[in] key Key value.
* @param[in] icv (Non-standard) IV, 4 bytes. NULL = use default_aiv.
* @param[out] out Plaintext. Minimal buffer length = inlen bytes.
* Input and output buffers can overlap if block function
* supports that.
* @param[in] in Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks.
* @param[in] inlen Length of in.
* @param[in] block Block processing function.
* @return 0 if inlen is out of range [16, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX],
* or if inlen is not a multiple of 8
* or if IV and message length indicator doesn't match.
* Output length if unwrapping succeeded and IV matches.
*/
size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
block128_f block)
{
/* n: number of 64-bit blocks in the padded key data */
size_t n = inlen / 8 - 1;
size_t padded_len;
size_t padding_len;
size_t ptext_len;
/* RFC 5649 section 3: Alternative Initial Value */
unsigned char aiv[8];
static unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0x0 };
size_t ret;
/* Section 4.2: Ciphertext length has to be (n+1) 64-bit blocks. */
if ((inlen & 0x7) != 0 || inlen < 16 || inlen >= CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX)
return 0;
memmove(out, in, inlen);
if (inlen == 16) {
/*
* Section 4.2 - special case in step 1: When n=1, the ciphertext
* contains exactly two 64-bit blocks and they are decrypted as a
* single AES block using AES in ECB mode: AIV | P[1] = DEC(K, C[0] |
* C[1])
*/
block(out, out, key);
memcpy(aiv, out, 8);
/* Remove AIV */
memmove(out, out + 8, 8);
padded_len = 8;
} else {
padded_len = inlen - 8;
ret = crypto_128_unwrap_raw(key, aiv, out, out, inlen, block);
if (padded_len != ret) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Section 3: AIV checks: Check that MSB(32,A) = A65959A6. Optionally a
* user-supplied value can be used (even if standard doesn't mention
* this).
*/
if ((!icv && CRYPTO_memcmp(aiv, default_aiv, 4))
|| (icv && CRYPTO_memcmp(aiv, icv, 4))) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check that 8*(n-1) < LSB(32,AIV) <= 8*n. If so, let ptext_len =
* LSB(32,AIV).
*/
ptext_len = ((unsigned int)aiv[4] << 24)
| ((unsigned int)aiv[5] << 16)
| ((unsigned int)aiv[6] << 8)
| (unsigned int)aiv[7];
if (8 * (n - 1) >= ptext_len || ptext_len > 8 * n) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check that the rightmost padding_len octets of the output data are
* zero.
*/
padding_len = padded_len - ptext_len;
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + ptext_len, zeros, padding_len) != 0) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
return 0;
}
/* Section 4.2 step 3: Remove padding */
return ptext_len;
}