1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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2001-09-20 21:37:13 +00:00
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/* ====================================================================
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2002-01-14 23:40:26 +00:00
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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2001-09-20 21:37:13 +00:00
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
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2000-02-15 14:19:44 +00:00
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#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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2002-07-10 06:57:54 +00:00
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include "kssl_lcl.h"
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1999-04-23 22:13:45 +00:00
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
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#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
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2001-07-30 23:57:25 +00:00
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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2002-07-30 11:21:19 +00:00
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
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1999-01-31 17:30:18 +00:00
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static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
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2000-01-02 18:52:58 +00:00
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static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
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2000-02-21 17:09:54 +00:00
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static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
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1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
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static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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{
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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return(SSLv3_server_method());
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else
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return(NULL);
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}
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1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
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SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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{
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static int init=1;
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static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
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if (init)
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{
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memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
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sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
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SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
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SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
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1999-04-22 13:37:46 +00:00
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init=0;
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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}
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return(&SSLv3_server_data);
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}
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1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
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int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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{
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BUF_MEM *buf;
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unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
|
2002-01-12 15:56:13 +00:00
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void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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long num1;
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int ret= -1;
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int new_state,state,skip=0;
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2000-01-13 20:59:17 +00:00
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RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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ERR_clear_error();
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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clear_sys_error();
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
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/* init things to blank */
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s->in_handshake++;
|
2001-10-24 19:03:22 +00:00
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if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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1999-05-13 15:09:38 +00:00
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if (s->cert == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
|
1999-05-13 15:09:38 +00:00
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return(-1);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
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|
}
|
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for (;;)
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{
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state=s->state;
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switch (s->state)
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{
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case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
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s->new_session=1;
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|
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/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
|
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|
|
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
|
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case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
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|
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
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|
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case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
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s->server=1;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
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if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
|
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|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
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if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
|
2000-09-04 15:34:43 +00:00
|
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|
{
|
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
|
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
2000-09-04 15:34:43 +00:00
|
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|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
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|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
|
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|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
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|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->init_buf=buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
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|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-09-20 21:37:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
|
|
|
|
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
|
|
|
2000-02-21 10:16:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-09-20 21:37:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
|
|
|
|
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown=0;
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
2001-09-21 00:04:15 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown=0;
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
2002-01-14 23:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
s->new_session = 2;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
|
|
|
|
/* Check if it is anon DH */
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
skip=1;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
|
|
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* clear this, it may get reset by
|
|
|
|
* send_server_key_exchange */
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
&& !(l & SSL_KRB5)
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
2001-07-25 10:04:14 +00:00
|
|
|
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
|
|
|
|
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
|
|
|
|
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
|
|
|
|
* be able to handle this) */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
|
|
|
|
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
|
1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
|
|
|
|
|| (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
|
|
|
|
|| ((l & SSL_kRSA)
|
1999-05-13 15:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|
2000-01-22 03:17:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
|
|
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
skip=1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
|
1999-12-29 17:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
|
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
|
|
|
|
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
|
|
|
|
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
|
1999-12-29 17:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
|
|
|
|
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
|
|
|
|
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
|
|
|
|
* and in RFC 2246): */
|
|
|
|
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
|
|
|
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
|
|
|
|
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
|
2001-07-12 16:17:33 +00:00
|
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
|
|
|
|
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
|
|
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* no cert request */
|
|
|
|
skip=1;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
2000-02-15 14:19:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
2000-02-15 14:19:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to be flushed */
|
|
|
|
num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (num1 > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
|
|
|
num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
|
2000-02-21 10:16:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
|
2000-01-02 18:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
|
2000-02-21 10:16:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 2)
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
|
2000-01-02 18:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
|
|
|
|
* have not asked for it :-) */
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
|
|
|
|
* a client cert, it can be verified */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
|
2000-01-06 00:24:24 +00:00
|
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
|
2000-01-06 00:24:24 +00:00
|
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
|
|
|
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
|
2000-01-05 23:11:51 +00:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
|
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
|
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
|
|
s->init_buf=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* remove buffering on output */
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-01-14 23:40:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
|
2001-09-21 07:01:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
|
|
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->new_session=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
|
|
|
|
/* s->server=1; */
|
|
|
|
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-21 07:01:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-10-15 17:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* break; */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* break; */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->debug)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
new_state=s->state;
|
|
|
|
s->state=state;
|
|
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
|
|
|
|
s->state=new_state;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skip=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
|
|
|
|
|
2001-10-25 08:17:53 +00:00
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
|
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
2000-01-11 01:07:26 +00:00
|
|
|
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=4;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-02 18:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ok;
|
|
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-14 13:47:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
|
|
|
|
* so permit appropriate message length */
|
2000-01-02 18:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
|
|
|
|
-1,
|
2001-09-11 13:08:51 +00:00
|
|
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
2000-01-02 18:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
2000-02-21 17:09:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
|
|
|
|
* which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
|
|
|
|
* I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
|
|
|
|
* when a handshake is not completed ... */
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
2000-02-21 17:09:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-01-02 18:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long id;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
|
|
|
|
* If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
|
|
|
|
* This down switching should be handled by a different method.
|
|
|
|
* If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
|
|
|
|
* TLSv1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->first_packet=1;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
|
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
2001-10-15 19:49:25 +00:00
|
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-09-03 16:33:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
|
|
|
|
* (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
|
|
|
|
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-10-20 17:56:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->client_version < s->version)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
|
|
if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
|
|
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* load the client random */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the session-id */
|
|
|
|
j= *(p++);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->hit=0;
|
2001-09-20 22:54:09 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
|
|
|
|
* (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
|
|
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
|
|
|
|
* Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
|
|
|
|
* but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
|
|
|
|
* might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
|
|
|
|
* an earlier library version)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i == 1)
|
|
|
|
{ /* previous session */
|
|
|
|
s->hit=1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-05-23 13:07:03 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (i == -1)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
else /* i == 0 */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p+=j;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-04-13 22:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* not enough data */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
|
|
|
|
== NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
|
|
|
|
if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
j=0;
|
|
|
|
id=s->session->cipher->id;
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
|
|
|
|
i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (c->id == id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
j=1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (j == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
|
|
|
|
0);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
|
|
|
|
* list if we are asked to reuse it */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* compression */
|
|
|
|
i= *(p++);
|
2002-04-13 22:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((p+i) > (d+n))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* not enough data */
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
q=p;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p[j] == 0) break;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
if (j >= i)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* no compress */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
|
|
|
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
|
|
|
|
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{ /* See if we have a match */
|
|
|
|
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
v=comp->id;
|
|
|
|
for (o=0; o<i; o++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (v == q[o])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
done=1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (done) break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (done)
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
comp=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-04-13 22:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p < (d+n))
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* wrong number of bytes,
|
|
|
|
* there could be more to follow */
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-09 19:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* pick a cipher */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit)
|
|
|
|
{
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphers == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ciphers=NULL;
|
|
|
|
c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
|
2001-02-09 19:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Session-id reuse */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
|
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sk=s->session->ciphers;
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
|
|
|
|
nc=c;
|
1999-02-21 20:03:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ec=c;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nc != NULL)
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
|
|
|
|
else if (ec != NULL)
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we now have the following setup.
|
|
|
|
* client_random
|
|
|
|
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
|
|
|
|
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
|
|
|
|
* compression - basically ignored right now
|
|
|
|
* ssl version is set - sslv3
|
|
|
|
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
2000-02-03 23:23:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* s->hit - session reuse flag
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
|
|
int i,sl;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l,Time;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
p=s->s3->server_random;
|
|
|
|
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
|
|
|
|
l2n(Time,p);
|
2000-01-21 01:15:56 +00:00
|
|
|
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
|
|
d=p= &(buf[4]);
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Random stuff */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
|
|
|
|
* session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
|
|
|
|
* old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
|
|
|
|
* back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
|
|
|
|
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
|
|
|
|
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
|
|
|
|
s->session->session_id_length=0;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
|
2002-07-30 11:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
die(sl <= sizeof s->session->session_id);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
*(p++)=sl;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
|
|
|
|
p+=sl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* put the cipher */
|
|
|
|
i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* put the compression method */
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 09:22:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
|
|
l=(p-d);
|
|
|
|
d=buf;
|
|
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
l2n3(l,d);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=p-buf;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=4;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
|
|
|
int j,num;
|
|
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
2000-01-08 21:06:24 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int u;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
2000-01-30 22:20:28 +00:00
|
|
|
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
|
|
int al,i;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long type;
|
|
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
CERT *cert;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *r[4];
|
|
|
|
int nr[4],kn;
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-30 23:57:25 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
|
1999-05-13 15:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
cert=s->cert;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf=s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
|
|
|
|
n=0;
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
|
1999-05-09 20:12:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-09 20:12:44 +00:00
|
|
|
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
|
1999-03-06 14:09:36 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
1999-02-21 21:58:59 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
2000-02-25 00:23:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if(rsa == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-09-03 13:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rsa == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r[0]=rsa->n;
|
|
|
|
r[1]=rsa->e;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
|
1999-05-09 20:12:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
|
|
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
|
2000-05-25 09:50:40 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
1999-02-21 21:58:59 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (dhp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-01-30 02:23:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
2000-01-30 02:23:03 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
|
1999-01-07 00:37:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-01-07 00:37:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
|
|
|
|
dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
|
|
|
|
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
(dh->priv_key == NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r[0]=dh->p;
|
|
|
|
r[1]=dh->g;
|
|
|
|
r[2]=dh->pub_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
|
|
|
n+=2+nr[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
|
|
|
== NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pkey=NULL;
|
|
|
|
kn=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,n+4+kn))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
p= &(d[4]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s2n(nr[i],p);
|
|
|
|
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
|
|
|
|
p+=nr[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* not anonymous */
|
|
|
|
if (pkey != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
|
|
|
|
* and p points to the space at the end. */
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
q=md_buf;
|
|
|
|
j=0;
|
|
|
|
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-10-16 01:24:29 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
|
|
|
|
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
2001-10-16 01:24:29 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i);
|
|
|
|
q+=i;
|
|
|
|
j+=i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-09-18 22:37:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
|
1999-09-24 19:10:57 +00:00
|
|
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-09-24 19:10:57 +00:00
|
|
|
s2n(u,p);
|
|
|
|
n+=u+2;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* lets do DSS */
|
2001-10-16 01:24:29 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s2n(i,p);
|
|
|
|
n+=i+2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
|
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
|
|
|
* it off */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=n+4;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-30 02:23:03 +00:00
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
2001-07-30 23:57:25 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2001-07-30 23:57:25 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
|
|
int i,j,nl,off,n;
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
buf=s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
|
|
|
|
d[0]=n;
|
|
|
|
p+=n;
|
|
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
off=n;
|
|
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
|
|
n+=2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
|
|
|
nl=0;
|
|
|
|
if (sk != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s2n(j,p);
|
|
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
|
|
|
n+=2+j;
|
|
|
|
nl+=2+j;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
d=p;
|
|
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
|
|
|
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
|
|
|
|
n+=j;
|
|
|
|
nl+=j;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* else no CA names */
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
|
|
|
|
s2n(nl,p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
|
|
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
|
|
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
|
|
|
* it off */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=n+4;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
2000-02-15 14:19:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num += 4;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i,al,ok;
|
|
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
RSA *rsa=NULL;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
1999-04-27 03:19:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
DH *dh_srvr;
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
2000-11-17 14:42:49 +00:00
|
|
|
2048, /* ??? */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
2001-10-15 19:49:25 +00:00
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (l & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-13 15:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
|
1999-05-09 20:12:44 +00:00
|
|
|
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
|
|
|
|
* be sent already */
|
|
|
|
if (rsa == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
|
|
|
|
if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
|
|
|
|
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS */
|
|
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
if (n != i+2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
p-=2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
n=i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-06-01 09:41:25 +00:00
|
|
|
al = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-06-01 09:41:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-05-25 09:50:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
|
|
|
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
|
|
|
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
|
|
|
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
|
2000-05-25 11:24:42 +00:00
|
|
|
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
|
2000-05-25 09:50:40 +00:00
|
|
|
* protocol version.
|
|
|
|
* If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
|
|
|
|
if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
|
|
|
|
(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-06-01 09:41:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (al != -1)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
|
|
|
|
* against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
|
|
|
|
* (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
|
|
|
|
* But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
|
|
|
|
* attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
|
|
|
|
* "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
|
|
|
|
* Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
|
|
|
|
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,
|
|
|
|
p,i);
|
|
|
|
memset(p,0,i);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
2000-02-24 04:41:03 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
if (n != i+2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
p-=2;
|
|
|
|
i=(int)n;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (pub == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BN_clear_free(pub);
|
|
|
|
pub=NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,p,i);
|
2001-01-25 13:15:01 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(p,0,i);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
|
|
|
krb5_data enc_ticket;
|
|
|
|
krb5_data authenticator;
|
|
|
|
krb5_data enc_pms;
|
|
|
|
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
2001-07-21 09:43:43 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
|
2002-07-30 11:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
int padl, outl;
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
|
|
|
|
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-03-14 18:16:49 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
enc_ticket.length = i;
|
2002-03-12 03:00:59 +00:00
|
|
|
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
p+=enc_ticket.length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
authenticator.length = i;
|
2002-03-12 03:00:59 +00:00
|
|
|
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
p+=authenticator.length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
enc_pms.length = i;
|
2002-03-12 03:00:59 +00:00
|
|
|
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
p+=enc_pms.length;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-07-30 11:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Note that the length is checked again below,
|
|
|
|
** after decryption
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-07-30 13:34:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
|
2002-07-30 11:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-12 19:38:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
enc_pms.length + 6)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
|
|
|
|
&kssl_err)) != 0)
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
|
|
|
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
|
|
if (kssl_err.text)
|
|
|
|
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
kssl_err.reason);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
|
|
|
|
** but will return authtime == 0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
|
|
|
|
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
|
|
|
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
|
|
if (kssl_err.text)
|
|
|
|
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
kssl_err.reason);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
2001-07-31 07:21:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (enc == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
|
|
|
|
2001-10-17 17:54:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
|
2001-07-21 09:43:43 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
|
2002-03-12 03:00:59 +00:00
|
|
|
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
|
2001-07-21 09:43:43 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-10-17 00:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
|
2001-07-21 09:43:43 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
outl += padl;
|
|
|
|
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-31 07:21:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
|
|
|
|
if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
|
|
|
|
** but it caused problems for apache.
|
|
|
|
** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
|
|
|
|
** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
err:
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
int al,ok,ret=0;
|
|
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
int type=0,i,j;
|
|
|
|
X509 *peer;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
|
|
|
|
-1,
|
|
|
|
512, /* 512? */
|
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
peer=s->session->peer;
|
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
|
|
|
|
type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
peer=NULL;
|
|
|
|
pkey=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
|
|
|
if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (peer == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
|
2001-10-15 19:49:25 +00:00
|
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
n-=2;
|
|
|
|
if (i > n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
|
|
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-01-06 00:24:24 +00:00
|
|
|
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
|
1999-09-18 22:37:44 +00:00
|
|
|
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
|
|
|
|
pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-09-18 22:37:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
|
2000-01-06 00:24:24 +00:00
|
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
|
|
|
|
if (j <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
1999-02-15 21:05:21 +00:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x=NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
|
|
|
|
-1,
|
2001-09-11 13:08:51 +00:00
|
|
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-29 17:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-10-15 19:49:25 +00:00
|
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2l3(p,llen);
|
|
|
|
if (llen+3 != n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n2l3(p,l);
|
|
|
|
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
q=p;
|
|
|
|
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
|
|
|
|
if (x == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p != (q+l))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
x=NULL;
|
|
|
|
nc+=l+3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
|
|
|
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
|
|
|
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
|
|
|
|
if (!i)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 15:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
1999-11-16 23:15:41 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
1999-05-02 04:03:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 15:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
|
|
|
|
* when we arrive here. */
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
|
1999-05-09 21:22:45 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
|
2000-03-27 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
|
|
|
|
* peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
|
1999-05-02 04:03:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-03-22 12:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
sk=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
|
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
|
2000-11-30 22:53:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (x == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
|
|
|
|
& (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
|
|
|
|
!= (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=(int)l;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
}
|