openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c

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/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "e_os.h"
#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(NeXT) && !defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
#include <dirent.h>
#endif
#if defined(WIN32)
#include <windows.h>
#endif
#ifdef NeXT
#include <sys/dir.h>
#define dirent direct
#endif
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include "../fips/fips_locl.h"
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int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
{
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static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
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/* any write lock will do; usually this branch
* will only be taken once anyway */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
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return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
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CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
{
CERT *ret;
ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references=1;
return(ret);
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
{
CERT *ret;
int i;
ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
/* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
* if you find that more readable */
ret->valid = cert->valid;
ret->mask = cert->mask;
ret->export_mask = cert->export_mask;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
}
ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
{
/* DH parameters don't have a reference count */
ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
{
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
if (!b)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
{
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
if (!b)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
}
}
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
{
ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
{
ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
switch(i)
{
/* If there was anything special to do for
* certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
* (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
/* We have an RSA key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
/* We have a DSA key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
/* We have a DH key. */
break;
default:
/* Can't happen. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
}
}
}
/* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
* chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
ret->references=1;
return(ret);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* avoid 'unreferenced label' warning if OPENSSL_NO_DH is defined */
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
}
return NULL;
}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
{
int i;
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if(c == NULL)
return;
i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
#endif
if (i > 0) return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
#endif
for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
#if 0
if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
#endif
}
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
{
/* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
* (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
* SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
* being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
* turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
* not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
* s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
* initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
*/
if (o == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return(0);
}
if (*o == NULL)
{
if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(0);
}
}
return(1);
}
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
{
SESS_CERT *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
if (ret == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references = 1;
return ret;
}
void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
{
int i;
if (sc == NULL)
return;
i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
/* i == 0 */
if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
* here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
* data structure. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(sc);
}
int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
{
sc->peer_cert_type = type;
return(1);
}
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int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
int i;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
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if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
return(0);
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x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
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/* We need to set the verify purpose. The purpose can be determined by
* the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
* or vice versa.
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*/
if (s->server)
i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT;
else
i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER;
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(&ctx, i, s->purpose, s->trust);
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if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
#else
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i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
#endif
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
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# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if(s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
FIPS_allow_md5(1);
# endif
i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
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# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if(s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
FIPS_allow_md5(0);
# endif
#else
i=0;
ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
#endif
}
s->verify_result=ctx.error;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(i);
}
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static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
{
if (*ca_list != NULL)
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sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
*ca_list=list;
}
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
{
int i;
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
X509_NAME *name;
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ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
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name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
{
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sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
return(NULL);
}
}
return(ret);
}
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void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),list);
}
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void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),list);
}
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->client_CA);
}
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(SSL *s)
{
if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{ /* we are in the client */
if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(s->s3 != NULL))
return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
else
return(NULL);
}
else
{
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
return(s->client_CA);
else
return(s->ctx->client_CA);
}
}
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static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *name;
if (x == NULL) return(0);
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if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
return(0);
if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
return(0);
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if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
{
X509_NAME_free(name);
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
}
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
}
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static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
/*!
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
* for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
* much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
* \param file the file containing one or more certs.
* \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
*/
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
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STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret,*sk;
ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if ((ret == NULL) || (sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
/* check for duplicates */
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
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if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
{
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sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
}
}
if (0)
{
err:
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if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
ret=NULL;
}
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if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
return(ret);
}
#endif
/*!
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to add to.
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
* already in the stack will be added.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/
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int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
int ret=1;
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int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if (in == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
}
if (0)
{
err:
ret=0;
}
if(in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if(x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
return ret;
}
/*!
* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to append to.
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
* examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
* SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
* included.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* XXXX This may be fixed in the future */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! */
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int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *dir)
{
DIR *d;
struct dirent *dstruct;
int ret = 0;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
d = opendir(dir);
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
if(!d)
{
SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto err;
}
while((dstruct=readdir(d)))
{
char buf[1024];
int r;
if(strlen(dir)+strlen(dstruct->d_name)+2 > sizeof buf)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (d) closedir(d);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
return ret;
}
#endif
#endif
#else /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *dir)
{
WIN32_FIND_DATA FindFileData;
HANDLE hFind;
int ret = 0;
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
WCHAR* wdir = NULL;
#endif
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
/* convert strings to UNICODE */
{
BOOL result = FALSE;
int i;
wdir = malloc((strlen(dir)+1)*2);
if (wdir == NULL)
goto err_noclose;
for (i=0; i<(int)strlen(dir)+1; i++)
wdir[i] = (short)dir[i];
}
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
hFind = FindFirstFile(wdir, &FindFileData);
#else
hFind = FindFirstFile(dir, &FindFileData);
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#endif
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
if(hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
{
SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto err_noclose;
}
do
{
char buf[1024];
int r;
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
if(strlen(dir)+_tcslen(FindFileData.cFileName)+2 > sizeof buf)
#else
if(strlen(dir)+strlen(FindFileData.cFileName)+2 > sizeof buf)
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#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,FindFileData.cFileName);
if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;
}
while (FindNextFile(hFind, &FindFileData) != FALSE);
ret = 1;
err:
FindClose(hFind);
err_noclose:
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#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
if (wdir != NULL)
free(wdir);
#endif
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
return ret;
}
#endif