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openssl/test/ssl-tests/26-tls13_client_auth.conf.in

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Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
# -*- mode: perl; -*-
# Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
## Test TLSv1.3 certificate authentication
## Similar to 04-client_auth.conf.in output, but specific for
## TLSv1.3 and post-handshake authentication
use strict;
use warnings;
package ssltests;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
our @tests = (
{
name => "server-auth-TLSv1.3",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-request",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "Request",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-fail",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyMode" => "Require",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
Fix some TLSv1.3 alert issues Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3). Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts. Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used. Fixes #6804 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
2018-07-30 08:13:14 +00:00
"ExpectedServerAlert" => "CertificateRequired",
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-require",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"ClientSignatureAlgorithms" => "PSS+SHA256",
"VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyMode" => "Request",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
"ExpectedClientCertType" => "RSA",
"ExpectedClientSignType" => "RSA-PSS",
"ExpectedClientSignHash" => "SHA256",
"ExpectedClientCANames" => "empty"
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-non-empty-names",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"ClientSignatureAlgorithms" => "PSS+SHA256",
"ClientCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyMode" => "Request",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
"ExpectedClientCertType" => "RSA",
"ExpectedClientSignType" => "RSA-PSS",
"ExpectedClientSignHash" => "SHA256",
"ExpectedClientCANames" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-noroot",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "Require",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
"ExpectedServerAlert" => "UnknownCA",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-fail-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyMode" => "RequirePostHandshake",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"ClientSignatureAlgorithms" => "PSS+SHA256",
"VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
"ExpectedClientCertType" => "RSA",
"ExpectedClientSignType" => "RSA-PSS",
"ExpectedClientSignHash" => "SHA256",
"ExpectedClientCANames" => "empty"
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-non-empty-names-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"ClientSignatureAlgorithms" => "PSS+SHA256",
"ClientCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
"ExpectedClientCertType" => "RSA",
"ExpectedClientSignType" => "RSA-PSS",
"ExpectedClientSignHash" => "SHA256",
"ExpectedClientCANames" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"),
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-noroot-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "RequirePostHandshake",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
"ExpectedServerAlert" => "UnknownCA",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-force-client-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-force-server-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
},
},
{
name => "client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-force-both-post-handshake",
server => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit function call is required for a client to indicate support for post-handshake auth. Fixes #6933. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
2018-08-13 14:23:27 +00:00
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates initially configured, but use a certificate callback. Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode: * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after the initial handshake. * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake, re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication. Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options Add support to s_client: * Enabled automatically when cert is configured * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha Add support to s_server: * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server * Remove some dead code Update documentation Update unit tests: * Illegal use of PHA extension * TLSv1.3 certificate tests DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different. Add a TODO and a #error Update handshake context to deal with PHA. The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication. After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs, copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest. This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages and any prior post-handshake authentication. This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript. This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the first ClientFinished. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
"HandshakeMode" => "PostHandshakeAuth",
},
},
);
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