openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c

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/*
* Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include "record_locl.h"
#include "../packet_locl.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
rl->d = d;
d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL
|| d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) {
pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(d);
rl->d = NULL;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q);
pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(rl->d);
rl->d = NULL;
}
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
pitem *item = NULL;
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pqueue *unprocessed_rcds;
pqueue *processed_rcds;
pqueue *buffered_app_data;
d = rl->d;
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
}
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
{
if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
} else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
}
rl->d->w_epoch = e;
}
DTLSv1_listen rewrite The existing implementation of DTLSv1_listen() is fundamentally flawed. This function is used in DTLS solutions to listen for new incoming connections from DTLS clients. A client will send an initial ClientHello. The server will respond with a HelloVerifyRequest containing a unique cookie. The client the responds with a second ClientHello - which this time contains the cookie. Once the cookie has been verified then DTLSv1_listen() returns to user code, which is typically expected to continue the handshake with a call to (for example) SSL_accept(). Whilst listening for incoming ClientHellos, the underlying BIO is usually in an unconnected state. Therefore ClientHellos can come in from *any* peer. The arrival of the first ClientHello without the cookie, and the second one with it, could be interspersed with other intervening messages from different clients. The whole purpose of this mechanism is as a defence against DoS attacks. The idea is to avoid allocating state on the server until the client has verified that it is capable of receiving messages at the address it claims to come from. However the existing DTLSv1_listen() implementation completely fails to do this. It attempts to super-impose itself on the standard state machine and reuses all of this code. However the standard state machine expects to operate in a stateful manner with a single client, and this can cause various problems. A second more minor issue is that the return codes from this function are quite confused, with no distinction made between fatal and non-fatal errors. Most user code treats all errors as non-fatal, and simply retries the call to DTLSv1_listen(). This commit completely rewrites the implementation of DTLSv1_listen() and provides a stand alone implementation that does not rely on the existing state machine. It also provides more consistent return codes. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2015-09-14 21:49:35 +00:00
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
{
memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
}
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/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
{
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
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/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
return 1;
}
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int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pitem *item;
/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
return 0;
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
item->data = rdata;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
(SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
|| SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return -1;
}
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if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
/* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
}
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return 1;
}
int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
{
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pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
if (item) {
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dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
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return 1;
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}
return 0;
}
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/*
* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
* processed yet
*/
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#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
&((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds))
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int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
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pitem *item;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-01 14:20:33 +00:00
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
int replayok = 1;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
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/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-01 14:20:33 +00:00
return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) {
/*
* We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
* be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
* with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
* finished reading the current packet).
*/
return 1;
}
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/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
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dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-01 14:20:33 +00:00
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if (bitmap == NULL) {
/*
* Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
* current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
* be the case because we already checked the epoch above
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-01 14:20:33 +00:00
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
#endif
{
/*
* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
* check once already when we first received the record - but
* we might have updated the window since then due to
* records we subsequently processed.
*/
replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
}
if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
/* dtls1_process_record called SSLfatal() */
return -1;
}
Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-01 14:20:33 +00:00
/* dump this record */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
continue;
}
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-01 14:20:33 +00:00
return 0;
}
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}
}
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/*
* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
* processed
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-07-01 14:20:33 +00:00
return 1;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/*-
* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
* 'type' is one of the following:
*
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
*
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
*
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
* messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
* argument is non NULL.
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
* Change cipher spec protocol
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
* Alert protocol
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
* Handshake protocol
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
{
int i, j, iret;
size_t n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
}
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
/* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
if (i < 0)
return i;
if (i == 0)
return -1;
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
/*
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
*/
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) {
goto start;
} else if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
/* dtls1_handle_timeout() has failed with a fatal error */
return -1;
}
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
|| (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
iret = dtls1_get_record(s);
if (iret <= 0) {
iret = dtls1_read_failed(s, iret);
/*
* Anything other than a timeout is an error. SSLfatal() already
* called if appropriate.
*/
if (iret <= 0)
return iret;
else
goto start;
}
RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
}
/*
* Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
* record that isn't an alert.
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !SSL_in_init(s)
&& (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec != 0
|| s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec != 0)) {
/*
* The timer is still running but we've received something that isn't
* handshake data - so the peer must have finished processing our
* last handshake flight. Stop the timer.
*/
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
/*
* We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
* the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
* data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
*/
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
goto start;
}
/*
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
* 'peek' mode)
*/
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return 0;
}
if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
|| (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
/*
* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
* SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
*/
/*
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
* doing a handshake for the first time
*/
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
return -1;
}
if (recvd_type != NULL)
*recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
if (len == 0) {
/*
* Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
* SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
* SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
return 0;
}
if (len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
else
n = len;
memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n);
if (peek) {
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
} else {
SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
* app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
* anymore, finally set shutdown.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
s->d1->shutdown_received
&& !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return 0;
}
#endif
*readbytes = n;
return 1;
}
/*
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
* then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
PACKET alert;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
|| !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
|| !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
|| PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
return -1;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
s->rlayer.alert_count++;
if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
return -1;
}
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
* after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
* that nothing gets discarded.
*/
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
return -1;
}
#endif
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return 0;
}
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
return 0;
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
return -1;
}
goto start;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
* shutdown */
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
return 0;
}
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
* are still missing, so just drop it.
*/
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
goto start;
}
/*
* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
*/
if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
/*
* This may just be a stale retransmit. Also sanity check that we have
* at least enough record bytes for a message header
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch
|| SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
goto start;
}
dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
/*
* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
* here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
*/
if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) {
/* SSLfatal) already called */
return -1;
}
if (dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) <= 0) {
/* Fail if we encountered a fatal error */
if (ossl_statem_in_error(s))
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
/* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return -1;
}
}
goto start;
}
/*
* To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
* data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
* (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
* finished
*/
if (!ossl_assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
i = s->handshake_func(s);
/* SSLfatal() called if appropriate */
if (i < 0)
return i;
if (i == 0)
return -1;
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
/* no read-ahead left? */
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
* trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
* option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
* problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return -1;
}
}
goto start;
}
switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
default:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
return -1;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
/*
* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
* that should not happen when type != rr->type
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/*
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
* application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
* (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
* application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
* started), we will indulge it.
*/
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
return -1;
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
return -1;
}
}
/* not reached */
}
/*
* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
* not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
*/
int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, size_t len,
size_t *written)
{
int i;
if (!ossl_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_BYTES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0, written);
return i;
}
int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
{
unsigned char *p, *pseq;
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
size_t prefix_len = 0;
int eivlen;
SSL3_RECORD wr;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
/*
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (!ossl_assert(SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) == 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return i;
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
return 0;
if (len > ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,
SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE);
return 0;
}
sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
clear = 1;
if (clear)
mac_size = 0;
else {
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
if (mac_size < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,
SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE);
return -1;
}
}
p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
/* write the header */
*(p++) = type & 0xff;
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type);
/*
* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
* haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
* header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
*/
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
} else {
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
}
/* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
pseq = p;
p += 10;
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else
eivlen = 0;
} else
eivlen = 0;
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, len);
SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
/*
* we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data
*/
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL) {
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
} else {
memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr),
SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/*
* we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from
* wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the
* wb->buf
*/
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr,
&(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]),
1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
/* this is true regardless of mac size */
SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p);
SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (eivlen)
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1) < 1) {
if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
return -1;
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr,
&(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)]), 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
}
/* record length after mac and block padding */
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/* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
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s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
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memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
pseq += 6;
s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq);
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if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
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/*
* we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
* wr->length long
*/
SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
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ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
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if (create_empty_fragment) {
/*
* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
* out anything here
*/
*written = wr.length;
return 1;
}
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/* now let's set up wb */
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
/*
* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
* retries later
*/
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
/* we now just need to write the buffer. Calls SSLfatal() as required. */
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len, written);
}
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DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
{
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*is_next_epoch = 0;
/* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
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/*
* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
* have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
* epoch
*/
else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch &&
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
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*is_next_epoch = 1;
return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
}
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return NULL;
}
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void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
{
unsigned char *seq;
unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence);
if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap,
sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap));
memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap));
Prevent DTLS Finished message injection Follow on from CVE-2016-2179 The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw. This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its own. The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e where the client receives the injected Finished message). The MITM requires the following capabilities: - The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages. - The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client - The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message, with the second fragment containing the final byte. During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message. OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and will buffer it for later use. After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM fragment and the final byte from the real client. The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g. the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in 256 of such injection attempts will succeed. It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be correct in all cases. In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection. Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL. The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate Finished message injection flaw. The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-06-30 14:06:27 +00:00
/*
* We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
* epoch
*/
dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
} else {
seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
}
memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);
}