openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c

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/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
2000-06-01 02:36:58 +00:00
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl3_connect,
ssl3_get_client_method)
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
long num1;
2002-01-12 15:56:13 +00:00
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch(s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->new_session=1;
s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server=0;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
{
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
buf=NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
s->hit = 1;
2007-11-03 13:09:34 +00:00
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
}
#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
/* or PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* at this point we check that we have the
* required stuff from the server */
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
1999-06-12 01:03:40 +00:00
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
* sent back */
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
* ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
* We need to skip the certificate verify
* message when client's ECDH public key is sent
* inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth=0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth=0;
else
s->session->compress_meth=
s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
if (s->hit)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
{
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
}
}
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
/* number of bytes to be flushed */
num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
if (num1 > 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
}
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
}
/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
* remove the buffering now */
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
s->init_num=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret=1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
if (buf != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
int i;
unsigned long Time,l;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
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#endif
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if ((sess == NULL) ||
(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
!sess->session_id_length ||
#else
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
#endif
(sess->not_resumable))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p=s->s3->client_random;
2005-12-05 17:21:22 +00:00
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
s->client_version=s->version;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i=0;
else
i=s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++)=i;
if (i != 0)
{
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
2002-08-02 11:48:15 +00:00
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
p+=i;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
p+=i;
/* COMPRESSION */
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++)=1;
#else
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j=0;
else
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++)=1+j;
for (i=0; i<j; i++)
{
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
*(p++)=comp->id;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#endif
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
l2n3(l,d);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
return(-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,al,ok;
unsigned int j;
long n;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
-1,
20000, /* ?? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
2009-04-20 11:33:12 +00:00
if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
{
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
{
if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
}
else /* already sent a cookie */
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
goto f_err;
}
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
p+=2;
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1999-03-22 12:22:14 +00:00
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
{
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
{
/* actually a client application bug */
1999-03-22 12:22:14 +00:00
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit=1;
}
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
{
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
s->hit=0;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->session_id_length=j;
memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
}
p+=j;
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
if (c == NULL)
{
/* unknown cipher */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
if (i < 0)
{
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
{
if (!(s->options &
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (*(p++) != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
#else
j= *(p++);
if ((j == 0) || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
comp=NULL;
else
comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
}
2005-09-30 23:35:33 +00:00
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
{
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
2007-04-24 01:06:19 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (p != (d+n))
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
X509 *x=NULL;
const unsigned char *q,*p;
unsigned char *d;
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
if (x == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != (p+l))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
nc+=l+3;
p=q;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2009-01-07 23:44:27 +00:00
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL) goto err;
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
sc->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
? 0 : 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
if (need_cert && i < 0)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
if (need_cert)
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer=x;
}
else
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
sc->peer_key= NULL;
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=NULL;
}
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
long n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
param_len=0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
* NULL-terminated string. */
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
1999-07-12 15:20:08 +00:00
rsa=NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
param_len=3;
if ((param_len > n) ||
(*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
if ((param_len > n) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
int num;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
2009-01-07 23:44:27 +00:00
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
/* let's do ECDSA */
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
2009-01-07 23:44:27 +00:00
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
/* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
{
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1999-07-12 15:20:08 +00:00
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1999-07-12 15:20:08 +00:00
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
1999-07-12 15:20:08 +00:00
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
unsigned long n,nc,l;
unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
const unsigned char *p,*q;
unsigned char *d;
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
ctype_num= *(p++);
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
p+=ctype_num;
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p,llen);
#if 0
{
FILE *out;
out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
fclose(out);
}
#endif
if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2s(p,l);
if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
{
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q=p;
if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
{
2000-02-03 23:23:24 +00:00
/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
goto cont;
else
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (q != (p+l))
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p+=l;
nc+=l+2;
}
if (0)
{
cont:
ERR_clear_error();
}
2000-02-03 23:23:24 +00:00
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
ca_sk=NULL;
ret=1;
err:
1999-04-12 17:23:57 +00:00
if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
return(ret);
}
2000-06-01 02:36:58 +00:00
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
long n;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *d;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
-1,
16384,
&ok);
if (!ok)
return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (n < 6)
{
/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
if (ticklen + 6 != n)
{
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
*
* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
* session resumption.
*
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with
* assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
* to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
* ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
#else
EVP_sha1(), NULL);
#endif
ret=1;
return(ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
2008-01-05 21:35:34 +00:00
unsigned long resplen,n;
const unsigned char *p;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
16384,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (n < 4)
{
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p, resplen);
if (resplen + 4 != n)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
{
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
return(-1);
}
#endif
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
long n;
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (n > 0)
{
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
ret=1;
return(ret);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int n;
unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
{
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1999-07-12 17:15:42 +00:00
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
q=p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p+=2;
n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
#endif
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
s2n(n,q);
n+=2;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2009-04-23 16:32:42 +00:00
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
&kssl_err);
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
{
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
if (krb5rc)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
goto err;
}
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
**
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
** Example:
** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
** optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
p+= enc_ticket->length;
n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
/* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
if (authp && authp->length)
{
s2n(authp->length,p);
memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
p+= authp->length;
n+= authp->length + 2;
free(authp->data);
authp->data = NULL;
authp->length = 0;
}
else
{
s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
n+=2;
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
** kssl_ctx->length);
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
kssl_ctx->key,iv);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
sizeof tmp_buf);
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
outl += padl;
2009-04-23 16:32:42 +00:00
if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
2002-08-02 11:48:15 +00:00
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
s2n(outl,p);
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
p+=outl;
n+=outl + 2;
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
{
/* we get them from the cert */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards */
n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,n);
/* clean up */
memset(p,0,n);
/* send off the data */
n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n,p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
n+=2;
DH_free(dh_clnt);
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
* If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
{
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
{
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
}
else
{
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
* We only need our private key to perform
* the ECDH computation.
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0)
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
goto err;
}
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p, n);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
}
else
{
/* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
(bn_ctx == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
{
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
int keytype;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
if (!peer_cert)
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
}
/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
* context data */
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
8,shared_ukm)<0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen=255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80)
{
*(p++)=0x81;
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+3;
}
else
{
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
{
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
else if (psk_len == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t+=psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
n = strlen(identity);
s2n(n, p);
memcpy(p, identity, n);
n+=2;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
else
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n,d);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2003-02-28 15:07:10 +00:00
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
return(-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1999-09-24 19:10:57 +00:00
unsigned u=0;
#endif
unsigned long n;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
int j;
#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
}
else
{
ERR_clear_error();
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_md5,
&(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
1999-09-24 19:10:57 +00:00
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
1999-09-24 19:10:57 +00:00
s2n(u,p);
n=u+2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j,p);
n=j+2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j,p);
n=j+2;
}
else
#endif
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
{
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
2007-12-14 16:53:50 +00:00
size_t sigsize=64;
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94,
data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j,p);
n=j+2;
}
else
{
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
}
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
l2n3(n,d);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
s->init_num=(int)n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
1. Changes for s_client.c to make it return non-zero exit code in case of handshake failure 2. Changes to x509_certificate_type function (crypto/x509/x509type.c) to make it recognize GOST certificates as EVP_PKT_SIGN|EVP_PKT_EXCH (required for s3_srvr to accept GOST client certificates). 3. Changes to EVP - adding of function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey - Make function EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peerkey work for context with ENCRYPT operation, because we use peerkey field in the context to pass non-ephemeral secret key to GOST encrypt operation. - added EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV control command. It is really GOST-specific, but it is used in SSL code, so it has to go in some header file, available during libssl compilation 4. Fix to HMAC to avoid call of OPENSSL_cleanse on undefined data 5. Include des.h if KSSL_DEBUG is defined into some libssl files, to make debugging output which depends on constants defined there, work and other KSSL_DEBUG output fixes 6. Declaration of real GOST ciphersuites, two authentication methods SSL_aGOST94 and SSL_aGOST2001 and one key exchange method SSL_kGOST 7. Implementation of these methods. 8. Support for sending unsolicited serverhello extension if GOST ciphersuite is selected. It is require for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.0 and 3.6 and controlled by SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG constant. This constant is added to SSL_OP_ALL, because it does nothing, if non-GOST ciphersuite is selected, and all implementation of GOST include compatibility with CryptoPro. 9. Support for CertificateVerify message without length field. It is another CryptoPro bug, but support is made unconditional, because it does no harm for draft-conforming implementation. 10. In tls1_mac extra copy of stream mac context is no more done. When I've written currently commited code I haven't read EVP_DigestSignFinal manual carefully enough and haven't noticed that it does an internal digest ctx copying. This implementation was tested against 1. CryptoPro CSP 3.6 client and server 2. Cryptopro CSP 3.0 server
2007-10-26 12:06:36 +00:00
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return(-1);
}
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int i;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
{
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
{
/* If we get an error, we need to
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
* We then get retied later */
i=0;
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return(-1);
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
i=0;
}
else if (i == 1)
{
i=0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i == 0)
{
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return(1);
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
}
}
/* Ok, we have a cert */
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2005-04-26 16:02:40 +00:00
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
long alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL)
{
2001-03-07 01:19:07 +00:00
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return(1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
{
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0)
{ /* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
return 1;
}
}
#endif
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#endif
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
|| RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
err:
return(0);
}
/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
* case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
* session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return 1;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
* message, so permit appropriate message length */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
return 2;
return 1;
}
#endif
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
{
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
return i;
}