1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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2001-09-04 11:02:23 +00:00
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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2001-09-04 11:02:23 +00:00
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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2015-05-14 14:56:48 +00:00
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
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#include "internal/threads.h"
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2004-04-19 18:09:28 +00:00
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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/*
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* Each structure type (sometimes called a class), that supports
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* exdata has a stack of callbacks for each instance.
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*/
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2016-01-06 02:54:18 +00:00
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struct ex_callback_st {
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2016-02-05 20:23:54 +00:00
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long argl; /* Arbitrary long */
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void *argp; /* Arbitrary void * */
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func;
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CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func;
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func;
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2016-01-06 02:54:18 +00:00
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};
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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/*
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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* The state for each class. This could just be a typedef, but
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* a structure allows future changes.
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*/
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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typedef struct ex_callbacks_st {
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STACK_OF(EX_CALLBACK) *meth;
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} EX_CALLBACKS;
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First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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static EX_CALLBACKS ex_data[CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT];
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First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
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2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
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static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *ex_data_lock;
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static CRYPTO_ONCE ex_data_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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static void do_ex_data_init(void)
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{
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CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE);
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ex_data_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE);
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}
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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/*
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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* Return the EX_CALLBACKS from the |ex_data| array that corresponds to
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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* a given class. On success, *holds the lock.*
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*/
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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static EX_CALLBACKS *get_and_lock(int class_index)
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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{
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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EX_CALLBACKS *ip;
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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if (class_index < 0 || class_index >= CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT) {
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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return NULL;
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}
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2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
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CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ex_data_init, do_ex_data_init);
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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ip = &ex_data[class_index];
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2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
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CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ex_data_lock);
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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if (ip->meth == NULL) {
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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ip->meth = sk_EX_CALLBACK_new_null();
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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/* We push an initial value on the stack because the SSL
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* "app_data" routines use ex_data index zero. See RT 3710. */
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if (ip->meth == NULL
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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|| !sk_EX_CALLBACK_push(ip->meth, NULL)) {
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CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
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CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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return ip;
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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}
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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static void cleanup_cb(EX_CALLBACK *funcs)
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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{
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OPENSSL_free(funcs);
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}
|
First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
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/*
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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* Release all "ex_data" state to prevent memory leaks. This can't be made
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* thread-safe without overhauling a lot of stuff, and shouldn't really be
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* called under potential race-conditions anyway (it's for program shutdown
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* after all).
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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*/
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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void CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(void)
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
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{
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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int i;
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT; ++i) {
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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EX_CALLBACKS *ip = &ex_data[i];
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2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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sk_EX_CALLBACK_pop_free(ip->meth, cleanup_cb);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
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ip->meth = NULL;
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2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
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}
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}
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2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
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/*
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* Unregister a new index by replacing the callbacks with no-ops.
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* Any in-use instances are leaked.
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*/
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static void dummy_new(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
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long argl, void *argp)
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{
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}
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static void dummy_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
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long argl, void *argp)
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{
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|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int dummy_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
|
|
|
|
void *from_d, int idx,
|
|
|
|
long argl, void *argp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int CRYPTO_free_ex_index(int class_index, int idx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index);
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK *a;
|
|
|
|
int toret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (idx < 0 || idx >= sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
a = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, idx);
|
|
|
|
if (a == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
a->new_func = dummy_new;
|
|
|
|
a->dup_func = dummy_dup;
|
|
|
|
a->free_func = dummy_free;
|
|
|
|
toret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return toret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
* Register a new index.
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int toret = -1;
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK *a;
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
a = (EX_CALLBACK *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a));
|
2015-10-30 11:12:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
a->argl = argl;
|
|
|
|
a->argp = argp;
|
|
|
|
a->new_func = new_func;
|
|
|
|
a->dup_func = dup_func;
|
|
|
|
a->free_func = free_func;
|
First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!sk_EX_CALLBACK_push(ip->meth, NULL)) {
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(a);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
toret = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth) - 1;
|
|
|
|
(void)sk_EX_CALLBACK_set(ip->meth, toret, a);
|
First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
err:
|
2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return toret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* Initialise a new CRYPTO_EX_DATA for use in a particular class - including
|
|
|
|
* calling new() callbacks for each index in the class used by this variable
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
* Thread-safe by copying a class's array of "EX_CALLBACK" entries
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* in the lock, then using them outside the lock. Note this only applies
|
|
|
|
* to the global "ex_data" state (ie. class definitions), not 'ad' itself.
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int mx, i;
|
|
|
|
void *ptr;
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK *stack[10];
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ad->sk = NULL;
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mx > 0) {
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
|
|
|
|
storage = stack;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
|
2015-10-30 11:12:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (storage != NULL)
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (storage[i] && storage[i]->new_func) {
|
|
|
|
ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i);
|
|
|
|
storage[i]->new_func(obj, ptr, ad, i,
|
|
|
|
storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (storage != stack)
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(storage);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Duplicate a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling dup() callbacks
|
|
|
|
* for each index in the class used by this variable
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int mx, j, i;
|
|
|
|
char *ptr;
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK *stack[10];
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACKS *ip;
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (from->sk == NULL)
|
|
|
|
/* Nothing to copy over */
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((ip = get_and_lock(class_index)) == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
j = sk_void_num(from->sk);
|
|
|
|
if (j < mx)
|
|
|
|
mx = j;
|
|
|
|
if (mx > 0) {
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
|
|
|
|
storage = stack;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
|
2015-10-30 11:12:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (storage != NULL)
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
|
|
|
|
ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, i);
|
|
|
|
if (storage[i] && storage[i]->dup_func)
|
|
|
|
storage[i]->dup_func(to, from, &ptr, i,
|
|
|
|
storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, i, ptr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (storage != stack)
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(storage);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Cleanup a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling free() callbacks for
|
|
|
|
* each index in the class used by this variable
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int mx, i;
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACKS *ip;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
void *ptr;
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK *stack[10];
|
|
|
|
EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL;
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((ip = get_and_lock(class_index)) == NULL)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mx > 0) {
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
|
|
|
|
storage = stack;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
|
2015-10-30 11:12:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (storage != NULL)
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
|
2015-07-21 14:06:03 +00:00
|
|
|
storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-05 21:54:02 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (storage[i] && storage[i]->free_func) {
|
|
|
|
ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i);
|
|
|
|
storage[i]->free_func(obj, ptr, ad, i,
|
|
|
|
storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (storage != stack)
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(storage);
|
2015-05-01 18:37:16 +00:00
|
|
|
sk_void_free(ad->sk);
|
|
|
|
ad->sk = NULL;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
First step in fixing "ex_data" support. Warning: big commit log ...
Currently, this change merely addresses where ex_data indexes are stored
and managed, and thus fixes the thread-safety issues that existed at that
level. "Class" code (eg. RSA, DSA, etc) no longer store their own STACKS
and per-class index counters - all such data is stored inside ex_data.c. So
rather than passing both STACK+counter to index-management ex_data
functions, a 'class_index' is instead passed to indicate the class (eg.
CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA). New classes can be dynamically registered on-the-fly
and this is also thread-safe inside ex_data.c (though whether the caller
manages the return value in a thread-safe way is not addressed).
This does not change the "get/set" functions on individual "ex_data"
structures, and so thread-safety at that level isn't (yet) assured.
Likewise, the method of getting and storing per-class indexes has not
changed, so locking may still be required at the "caller" end but is
nonetheless thread-safe inside "ex_data"'s internal implementation.
Typically this occurs when code implements a new method of some kind and
stores its own per-class index in a global variable without locking the
setting and usage of that variable. If the code in question is likely to be
used in multiple threads, locking the setting and use of that index is
still up to the code in question. Possible fixes to this are being
sketched, but definitely require more major changes to the API itself than
this change undertakes.
The underlying implementation in ex_data.c has also been modularised so
that alternative "ex_data" implementations (that control all access to
state) can be plugged in. Eg. a loaded module can have its implementation
set to that of the application loaded it - the result being that
thread-safety and consistency of "ex_data" classes and indexes can be
maintained in the same place rather than the loaded module using its own
copy of ex_data support code and state.
Due to the centralisation of "state" with this change, cleanup of all
"ex_data" state can now be performed properly. Previously all allocation of
ex_data state was guaranteed to leak - and MemCheck_off() had been used to
avoid it flagging up the memory debugging. A new function has been added to
perfrom all this cleanup, CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). The "openssl"
command(s) have been changed to use this cleanup, as have the relevant test
programs. External application code may want to do so too - failure to
cleanup will not induce more memory leaking than was the case before, but
the memory debugging is not tricked into hiding it any more so it may
"appear" where it previously did not.
2001-09-01 19:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For a given CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable, set the value corresponding to a
|
|
|
|
* particular index in the class used by this variable
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-01-23 23:41:49 +00:00
|
|
|
int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, void *val)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ad->sk == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ad->sk = sk_void_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = sk_void_num(ad->sk); i <= idx; ++i) {
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!sk_void_push(ad->sk, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_void_set(ad->sk, idx, val);
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For a given CRYPTO_EX_DATA_ variable, get the value corresponding to a
|
|
|
|
* particular index in the class used by this variable
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-11-06 23:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx)
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-04-24 20:33:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ad->sk == NULL || idx >= sk_void_num(ad->sk))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return sk_void_value(ad->sk, idx);
|
2015-01-22 03:40:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|