2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=pod
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 NAME
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-18 19:33:56 +00:00
|
|
|
openssl-s_client,
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s_client - SSL/TLS client program
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 SYNOPSIS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B<openssl> B<s_client>
|
2016-02-05 16:58:45 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-help>]
|
2004-01-04 18:59:14 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-connect host:port>]
|
2018-02-08 09:49:02 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-bind host:port>]
|
2015-05-08 19:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-proxy host:port>]
|
2016-11-12 20:08:32 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-unix path>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-4>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-6>]
|
2014-07-03 02:42:40 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-servername name>]
|
2017-02-13 13:26:37 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-noservername>]
|
2000-01-14 22:43:11 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-verify depth>]
|
2014-04-07 12:02:10 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-verify_return_error>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-cert filename>]
|
2004-11-16 17:30:59 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-certform DER|PEM>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-key filename>]
|
2004-11-16 17:30:59 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-keyform DER|PEM>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-pass arg>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-CApath directory>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-CAfile filename>]
|
2015-09-22 18:43:59 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-no-CAfile>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-no-CApath>]
|
2017-03-31 16:15:22 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-requestCAfile filename>]
|
2015-12-29 19:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-dane_tlsa_domain domain>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata rrdata>]
|
2016-08-19 15:59:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-dane_ee_no_namechecks>]
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-attime timestamp>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-check_ss_sig>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-crl_check>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-crl_check_all>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-explicit_policy>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-extended_crl>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-ignore_critical>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-inhibit_any>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-inhibit_map>]
|
2016-05-02 21:03:55 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-no_check_time>]
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-partial_chain>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-policy arg>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-policy_check>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-policy_print>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-purpose purpose>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-suiteB_128>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-suiteB_192>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
2015-01-27 11:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-use_deltas>]
|
2016-03-19 02:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-auth_level num>]
|
2017-02-21 11:22:55 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-nameopt option>]
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-verify_depth num>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-verify_email email>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-verify_ip ip>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-verify_name name>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-x509_strict>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-reconnect>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-showcerts>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-debug>]
|
2001-11-10 02:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-msg>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-nbio_test>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-state>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-nbio>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-crlf>]
|
2000-03-10 12:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-ign_eof>]
|
2014-07-03 02:42:40 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-no_ign_eof>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-quiet>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-ssl3>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-tls1>]
|
2016-02-21 21:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-tls1_1>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-tls1_2>]
|
2016-10-21 16:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-tls1_3>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-no_ssl3>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-no_tls1>]
|
2014-10-15 08:43:50 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-no_tls1_1>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-no_tls1_2>]
|
2016-10-21 16:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-no_tls1_3>]
|
2016-02-21 21:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-dtls>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-dtls1>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-dtls1_2>]
|
2017-04-25 13:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-sctp>]
|
2014-10-15 08:43:50 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-fallback_scsv>]
|
2015-10-06 12:48:43 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-async>]
|
2017-04-06 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-max_send_frag>]
|
2016-02-16 11:13:33 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-split_send_frag>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-max_pipelines>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-read_buf>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-bugs>]
|
2016-02-03 21:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-comp>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-no_comp>]
|
2017-07-03 14:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-allow_no_dhe_kex>]
|
2017-03-28 16:02:37 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-sigalgs sigalglist>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-curves curvelist>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
|
2014-07-03 02:42:40 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-serverpref>]
|
2003-03-20 16:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-starttls protocol>]
|
2012-08-06 00:24:51 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-xmpphost hostname>]
|
2017-10-16 19:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-name hostname>]
|
2000-10-26 21:07:28 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-engine id>]
|
2007-08-23 11:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-tlsextdebug>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-no_ticket>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-sess_out filename>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-sess_in filename>]
|
2017-07-05 14:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-rand file...>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-writerand file>]
|
2013-06-14 05:36:45 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-serverinfo types>]
|
2014-07-06 21:16:21 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-status>]
|
2016-09-21 14:59:15 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-alpn protocols>]
|
2014-06-06 14:48:43 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-nextprotoneg protocols>]
|
2017-08-14 13:32:07 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-ct>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-noct>]
|
2016-03-03 14:07:28 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-ctlogfile>]
|
2017-02-24 16:17:00 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-keylogfile file>]
|
|
|
|
[B<-early_data file>]
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<-force_pha>]
|
2016-06-05 03:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
[B<target>]
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 DESCRIPTION
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The B<s_client> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects
|
|
|
|
to a remote host using SSL/TLS. It is a I<very> useful diagnostic tool for
|
|
|
|
SSL servers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-19 16:07:53 +00:00
|
|
|
In addition to the options below the B<s_client> utility also supports the
|
|
|
|
common and client only options documented in the
|
2016-09-14 15:13:57 +00:00
|
|
|
in the "Supported Command Line Commands" section of the L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
|
2012-11-20 01:01:33 +00:00
|
|
|
manual page.
|
2012-11-19 16:07:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=over 4
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-05 16:58:45 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-help>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Print out a usage message.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-connect host:port>
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-05 03:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
This specifies the host and optional port to connect to. It is possible to
|
|
|
|
select the host and port using the optional target positional argument instead.
|
|
|
|
If neither this nor the target positonal argument are specified then an attempt
|
|
|
|
is made to connect to the local host on port 4433.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-02-08 09:49:02 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-bind host:port>]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This specifies the host address and or port to bind as the source for the
|
|
|
|
connection. For Unix-domain sockets the port is ignored and the host is
|
|
|
|
used as the source socket address.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-08 19:34:07 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-proxy host:port>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When used with the B<-connect> flag, the program uses the host and port
|
|
|
|
specified with this flag and issues an HTTP CONNECT command to connect
|
|
|
|
to the desired server.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-12 20:08:32 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-unix path>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Connect over the specified Unix-domain socket.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-4>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use IPv4 only.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-6>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use IPv6 only.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-03 02:42:40 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-servername name>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-13 13:26:37 +00:00
|
|
|
Set the TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) extension in the ClientHello message to
|
2017-06-13 12:18:55 +00:00
|
|
|
the given value. If both this option and the B<-noservername> are not given, the
|
|
|
|
TLS SNI extension is still set to the hostname provided to the B<-connect> option,
|
|
|
|
or "localhost" if B<-connect> has not been supplied. This is default since OpenSSL
|
|
|
|
1.1.1.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Even though SNI name should normally be a DNS name and not an IP address, this
|
|
|
|
option will not make the distinction when parsing B<-connect> and will send
|
|
|
|
IP address if one passed.
|
2017-02-13 13:26:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-noservername>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Suppresses sending of the SNI (Server Name Indication) extension in the
|
|
|
|
ClientHello message. Cannot be used in conjunction with the B<-servername> or
|
2017-06-13 12:18:55 +00:00
|
|
|
<-dane_tlsa_domain> options.
|
2014-07-03 02:42:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-cert certname>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is
|
|
|
|
not to use a certificate.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-16 17:30:59 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-certform format>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The certificate format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-key keyfile>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will
|
|
|
|
be used.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-16 17:30:59 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-keyform format>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The private format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-pass arg>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
|
2015-08-17 19:21:33 +00:00
|
|
|
see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)>.
|
2004-11-16 17:30:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-verify depth>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the
|
|
|
|
server certificate chain and turns on server certificate verification.
|
|
|
|
Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems
|
|
|
|
with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection
|
|
|
|
will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-07 12:02:10 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-verify_return_error>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically
|
|
|
|
abort the handshake with a fatal error.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-21 11:22:55 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-nameopt option>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
|
2017-02-21 11:22:55 +00:00
|
|
|
B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
|
|
|
|
commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
|
|
|
|
set multiple options. See the L<x509(1)> manual page for details.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-CApath directory>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory
|
|
|
|
must be in "hash format", see B<verify> for more information. These are
|
|
|
|
also used when building the client certificate chain.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-CAfile file>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
|
|
|
|
and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-22 18:43:59 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-no-CAfile>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-no-CApath>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-31 16:15:22 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-requestCAfile file>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A file containing a list of certificates whose subject names will be sent
|
|
|
|
to the server in the B<certificate_authorities> extension. Only supported
|
|
|
|
for TLS 1.3
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-29 19:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-dane_tlsa_domain domain>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enable RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA authentication and specify the
|
|
|
|
TLSA base domain which becomes the default SNI hint and the primary
|
|
|
|
reference identifier for hostname checks. This must be used in
|
|
|
|
combination with at least one instance of the B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata>
|
|
|
|
option below.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When DANE authentication succeeds, the diagnostic output will include
|
|
|
|
the lowest (closest to 0) depth at which a TLSA record authenticated
|
|
|
|
a chain certificate. When that TLSA record is a "2 1 0" trust
|
|
|
|
anchor public key that signed (rather than matched) the top-most
|
|
|
|
certificate of the chain, the result is reported as "TA public key
|
|
|
|
verified". Otherwise, either the TLSA record "matched TA certificate"
|
|
|
|
at a positive depth or else "matched EE certificate" at depth 0.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata rrdata>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use one or more times to specify the RRDATA fields of the DANE TLSA
|
|
|
|
RRset associated with the target service. The B<rrdata> value is
|
|
|
|
specied in "presentation form", that is four whitespace separated
|
|
|
|
fields that specify the usage, selector, matching type and associated
|
|
|
|
data, with the last of these encoded in hexadecimal. Optional
|
|
|
|
whitespace is ignored in the associated data field. For example:
|
|
|
|
|
Suppress DANE TLSA reflection when verification fails
As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails. However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction. Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.
This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails. Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail. They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible. Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.
Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records. Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.
This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.
Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).
Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.
Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().
Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error. [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-08 00:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
$ openssl s_client -brief -starttls smtp \
|
|
|
|
-connect smtp.example.com:25 \
|
2015-12-29 19:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
-dane_tlsa_domain smtp.example.com \
|
|
|
|
-dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1
|
|
|
|
B111DD8A1C2091A89BD4FD60C57F0716CCE50FEEFF8137CDBEE0326E 02CF362B" \
|
|
|
|
-dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1
|
|
|
|
60B87575447DCBA2A36B7D11AC09FB24A9DB406FEE12D2CC90180517 616E8A18"
|
|
|
|
...
|
Suppress DANE TLSA reflection when verification fails
As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails. However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction. Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.
This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails. Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail. They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible. Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.
Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records. Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.
This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.
Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).
Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.
Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().
Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error. [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-08 00:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
Verification: OK
|
2015-12-29 19:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
Verified peername: smtp.example.com
|
Suppress DANE TLSA reflection when verification fails
As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails. However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction. Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.
This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails. Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail. They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible. Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.
Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records. Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.
This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.
Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).
Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.
Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().
Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error. [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-08 00:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
DANE TLSA 2 1 1 ...ee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 matched TA certificate at depth 1
|
2015-12-29 19:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-19 15:59:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-dane_ee_no_namechecks>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This disables server name checks when authenticating via DANE-EE(3) TLSA
|
|
|
|
records.
|
|
|
|
For some applications, primarily web browsers, it is not safe to disable name
|
|
|
|
checks due to "unknown key share" attacks, in which a malicious server can
|
|
|
|
convince a client that a connection to a victim server is instead a secure
|
|
|
|
connection to the malicious server.
|
|
|
|
The malicious server may then be able to violate cross-origin scripting
|
|
|
|
restrictions.
|
|
|
|
Thus, despite the text of RFC7671, name checks are by default enabled for
|
|
|
|
DANE-EE(3) TLSA records, and can be disabled in applications where it is safe
|
|
|
|
to do so.
|
|
|
|
In particular, SMTP and XMPP clients should set this option as SRV and MX
|
|
|
|
records already make it possible for a remote domain to redirect client
|
|
|
|
connections to any server of its choice, and in any case SMTP and XMPP clients
|
|
|
|
do not execute scripts downloaded from remote servers.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
|
2016-02-09 19:17:13 +00:00
|
|
|
B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
|
2016-05-02 21:03:55 +00:00
|
|
|
B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
|
2014-06-19 13:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
|
2016-02-09 19:17:13 +00:00
|
|
|
B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
|
2016-03-19 02:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
|
|
|
|
B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
|
2009-04-15 15:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 11:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
Set various certificate chain validation options. See the
|
2015-08-17 19:21:33 +00:00
|
|
|
L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
2009-04-15 15:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-reconnect>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
be used as a test that session caching is working.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-showcerts>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Display the whole server certificate chain: normally only the server
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
certificate itself is displayed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-prexit>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Print session information when the program exits. This will always attempt
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
to print out information even if the connection fails. Normally information
|
|
|
|
will only be printed out once if the connection succeeds. This option is useful
|
|
|
|
because the cipher in use may be renegotiated or the connection may fail
|
|
|
|
because a client certificate is required or is requested only after an
|
|
|
|
attempt is made to access a certain URL. Note: the output produced by this
|
|
|
|
option is not always accurate because a connection might never have been
|
|
|
|
established.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-state>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Prints out the SSL session states.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-debug>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-10 02:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-msg>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Show all protocol messages with hex dump.
|
2001-11-10 02:12:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-11-19 16:37:18 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-trace>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Show verbose trace output of protocol messages. OpenSSL needs to be compiled
|
2012-11-19 16:37:18 +00:00
|
|
|
with B<enable-ssl-trace> for this option to work.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-msgfile>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
File to send output of B<-msg> or B<-trace> to, default standard output.
|
2012-11-19 16:37:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-nbio_test>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Tests non-blocking I/O
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-nbio>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Turns on non-blocking I/O
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-crlf>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
This option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF as required
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
by some servers.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-03-10 12:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-ign_eof>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Inhibit shutting down the connection when end of file is reached in the
|
2000-03-10 12:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
input.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-quiet>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Inhibit printing of session and certificate information. This implicitly
|
2000-03-10 12:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
turns on B<-ign_eof> as well.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-03 02:42:40 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-no_ign_eof>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Shut down the connection when end of file is reached in the input.
|
2014-07-03 02:42:40 +00:00
|
|
|
Can be used to override the implicit B<-ign_eof> after B<-quiet>.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-10 23:06:27 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-psk_identity identity>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use the PSK identity B<identity> when using a PSK cipher suite.
|
2017-06-02 20:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
The default value is "Client_identity" (without the quotes).
|
2006-03-10 23:06:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-psk key>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use the PSK key B<key> when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is
|
|
|
|
given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
|
|
|
|
1a2b3c4d.
|
2017-06-02 20:05:37 +00:00
|
|
|
This option must be provided in order to use a PSK cipher.
|
2006-03-10 23:06:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-10-21 16:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-tls1_3>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>, B<-no_tls1_3>
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-21 21:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols.
|
|
|
|
By default B<s_client> will negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol
|
|
|
|
version.
|
|
|
|
When a specific TLS version is required, only that version will be offered to
|
|
|
|
and accepted from the server.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-21 21:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-dtls>, B<-dtls1>, B<-dtls1_2>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
These options make B<s_client> use DTLS protocols instead of TLS.
|
2016-08-05 17:56:58 +00:00
|
|
|
With B<-dtls>, B<s_client> will negotiate any supported DTLS protocol version,
|
2016-02-21 21:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
whilst B<-dtls1> and B<-dtls1_2> will only support DTLS1.0 and DTLS1.2
|
|
|
|
respectively.
|
2014-10-15 08:43:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-04-25 13:37:25 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-sctp>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use SCTP for the transport protocol instead of UDP in DTLS. Must be used in
|
|
|
|
conjunction with B<-dtls>, B<-dtls1> or B<-dtls1_2>. This option is only
|
|
|
|
available where OpenSSL has support for SCTP enabled.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-15 08:43:50 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-fallback_scsv>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-06 12:48:43 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-async>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Switch on asynchronous mode. Cryptographic operations will be performed
|
2015-10-06 12:48:43 +00:00
|
|
|
asynchronously. This will only have an effect if an asynchronous capable engine
|
|
|
|
is also used via the B<-engine> option. For test purposes the dummy async engine
|
|
|
|
(dasync) can be used (if available).
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-06 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-max_send_frag int>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The maximum size of data fragment to send.
|
|
|
|
See L<SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(3)> for further information.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-16 11:13:33 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-split_send_frag int>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The size used to split data for encrypt pipelines. If more data is written in
|
|
|
|
one go than this value then it will be split into multiple pipelines, up to the
|
|
|
|
maximum number of pipelines defined by max_pipelines. This only has an effect if
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
a suitable cipher suite has been negotiated, an engine that supports pipelining
|
2016-02-16 11:13:33 +00:00
|
|
|
has been loaded, and max_pipelines is greater than 1. See
|
|
|
|
L<SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(3)> for further information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-max_pipelines int>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used. This will only have
|
|
|
|
an effect if an engine has been loaded that supports pipelining (e.g. the dasync
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
engine) and a suitable cipher suite has been negotiated. The default value is 1.
|
2016-02-16 11:13:33 +00:00
|
|
|
See L<SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(3)> for further information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-read_buf int>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The default read buffer size to be used for connections. This will only have an
|
|
|
|
effect if the buffer size is larger than the size that would otherwise be used
|
|
|
|
and pipelining is in use (see L<SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(3)> for
|
|
|
|
further information).
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-bugs>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
There are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
option enables various workarounds.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-03 21:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-comp>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enables support for SSL/TLS compression.
|
|
|
|
This option was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
|
|
|
TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of
|
|
|
|
OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-no_comp>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disables support for SSL/TLS compression.
|
|
|
|
TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of
|
|
|
|
OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-19 16:07:53 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-brief>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Only provide a brief summary of connection parameters instead of the
|
2012-11-19 16:07:53 +00:00
|
|
|
normal verbose output.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-28 16:02:37 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-sigalgs sigalglist>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Specifies the list of signature algorithms that are sent by the client.
|
|
|
|
The server selects one entry in the list based on its preferences.
|
|
|
|
For example strings, see L<SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(3)>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-curves curvelist>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Specifies the list of supported curves to be sent by the client. The curve is
|
|
|
|
is ultimately selected by the server. For a list of all curves, use:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
$ openssl ecparam -list_curves
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-cipher cipherlist>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
This allows the cipher list sent by the client to be modified. Although
|
2000-01-23 02:28:08 +00:00
|
|
|
the server determines which cipher suite is used it should take the first
|
|
|
|
supported cipher in the list sent by the client. See the B<ciphers>
|
|
|
|
command for more information.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-03-20 16:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-starttls protocol>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication.
|
2003-03-20 16:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
B<protocol> is a keyword for the intended protocol. Currently, the only
|
2015-05-13 20:00:21 +00:00
|
|
|
supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp", "xmpp", "xmpp-server",
|
2017-05-13 00:50:49 +00:00
|
|
|
"irc", "postgres", "mysql", "lmtp", "nntp", "sieve" and "ldap".
|
2003-03-20 16:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-08-06 00:24:51 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-xmpphost hostname>
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-29 21:41:00 +00:00
|
|
|
This option, when used with "-starttls xmpp" or "-starttls xmpp-server",
|
|
|
|
specifies the host for the "to" attribute of the stream element.
|
2012-08-06 00:24:51 +00:00
|
|
|
If this option is not specified, then the host specified with "-connect"
|
|
|
|
will be used.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-16 19:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
This option is an alias of the B<-name> option for "xmpp" and "xmpp-server".
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-name hostname>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is used to specify hostname information for various protocols
|
|
|
|
used with B<-starttls> option. Currently only "xmpp", "xmpp-server",
|
|
|
|
"smtp" and "lmtp" can utilize this B<-name> option.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this option is used with "-starttls xmpp" or "-starttls xmpp-server",
|
|
|
|
if specifies the host for the "to" attribute of the stream element. If this
|
|
|
|
option is not specified, then the host specified with "-connect" will be used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this option is used with "-starttls lmtp" or "-starttls smtp", it specifies
|
|
|
|
the name to use in the "LMTP LHLO" or "SMTP EHLO" message, respectively. If
|
|
|
|
this option is not specified, then "mail.example.com" will be used.
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-23 11:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-tlsextdebug>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Print out a hex dump of any TLS extensions received from the server.
|
2007-08-23 11:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-no_ticket>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Disable RFC4507bis session ticket support.
|
2007-08-23 11:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-sess_out filename>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Output SSL session to B<filename>.
|
2007-08-23 11:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-sess_in sess.pem>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Load SSL session from B<filename>. The client will attempt to resume a
|
2007-08-23 11:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
connection from this session.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-26 21:07:28 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-engine id>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_client>
|
2000-10-26 21:07:28 +00:00
|
|
|
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
|
|
|
|
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
|
|
|
|
for all available algorithms.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-05 14:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-rand file...>
|
2001-02-15 10:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
A file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
|
2017-07-05 14:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
generator.
|
2016-03-19 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character.
|
2001-02-15 10:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
|
|
|
|
all others.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-05 14:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
=item [B<-writerand file>]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Writes random data to the specified I<file> upon exit.
|
|
|
|
This can be used with a subsequent B<-rand> flag.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-14 05:36:45 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-serverinfo types>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
A list of comma-separated TLS Extension Types (numbers between 0 and
|
2013-06-14 05:36:45 +00:00
|
|
|
65535). Each type will be sent as an empty ClientHello TLS Extension.
|
|
|
|
The server's response (if any) will be encoded and displayed as a PEM
|
|
|
|
file.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-06 21:16:21 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-status>
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Sends a certificate status request to the server (OCSP stapling). The server
|
2014-07-06 21:16:21 +00:00
|
|
|
response (if any) is printed out.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-21 14:59:15 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-alpn protocols>, B<-nextprotoneg protocols>
|
2014-06-06 14:48:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-29 21:38:30 +00:00
|
|
|
These flags enable the Enable the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation
|
|
|
|
or Next Protocol Negotiation (NPN) extension, respectively. ALPN is the
|
|
|
|
IETF standard and replaces NPN.
|
|
|
|
The B<protocols> list is a comma-separated list of protocol names that
|
|
|
|
the client should advertise support for. The list should contain the most
|
|
|
|
desirable protocols first. Protocol names are printable ASCII strings,
|
|
|
|
for example "http/1.1" or "spdy/3".
|
|
|
|
An empty list of protocols is treated specially and will cause the
|
|
|
|
client to advertise support for the TLS extension but disconnect just
|
|
|
|
after receiving ServerHello with a list of server supported protocols.
|
2017-06-16 10:12:02 +00:00
|
|
|
The flag B<-nextprotoneg> cannot be specified if B<-tls1_3> is used.
|
2014-06-06 14:48:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-14 13:32:07 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-ct>, B<-noct>
|
2016-03-03 14:07:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-07 18:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
Use one of these two options to control whether Certificate Transparency (CT)
|
|
|
|
is enabled (B<-ct>) or disabled (B<-noct>).
|
|
|
|
If CT is enabled, signed certificate timestamps (SCTs) will be requested from
|
|
|
|
the server and reported at handshake completion.
|
2016-03-03 14:07:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enabling CT also enables OCSP stapling, as this is one possible delivery method
|
|
|
|
for SCTs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=item B<-ctlogfile>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A file containing a list of known Certificate Transparency logs. See
|
|
|
|
L<SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(3)> for the expected file format.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-24 16:17:00 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-keylogfile file>
|
2017-02-01 18:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Appends TLS secrets to the specified keylog file such that external programs
|
|
|
|
(like Wireshark) can decrypt TLS connections.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-24 16:17:00 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-early_data file>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Reads the contents of the specified file and attempts to send it as early data
|
|
|
|
to the server. This will only work with resumed sessions that support early
|
|
|
|
data and when the server accepts the early data.
|
|
|
|
|
Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA)
Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
2017-12-18 21:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<-force_pha>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For TLSv1.3 only, always send the Post-Handshake Authentication extension,
|
|
|
|
whether or not a certificate has been provided via B<-cert>.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-05 03:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
=item B<[target]>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rather than providing B<-connect>, the target hostname and optional port may
|
|
|
|
be provided as a single positional argument after all options. If neither this
|
|
|
|
nor B<-connect> are provided, falls back to attempting to connect to localhost
|
|
|
|
on port 4433.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-11 00:06:40 +00:00
|
|
|
=back
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If a connection is established with an SSL server then any data received
|
|
|
|
from the server is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the
|
2000-03-10 12:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
server. When used interactively (which means neither B<-quiet> nor B<-ign_eof>
|
2001-09-07 06:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
have been given), the session will be renegotiated if the line begins with an
|
2000-03-10 12:18:28 +00:00
|
|
|
B<R>, and if the line begins with a B<Q> or if end of file is reached, the
|
|
|
|
connection will be closed down.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 NOTES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B<s_client> can be used to debug SSL servers. To connect to an SSL HTTP
|
|
|
|
server the command:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
openssl s_client -connect servername:443
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
would typically be used (https uses port 443). If the connection succeeds
|
|
|
|
then an HTTP command can be given such as "GET /" to retrieve a web page.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is
|
2014-11-30 14:35:22 +00:00
|
|
|
nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs>,
|
|
|
|
B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> options can be tried
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these
|
|
|
|
options B<before> submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A frequent problem when attempting to get client certificates working
|
|
|
|
is that a web client complains it has no certificates or gives an empty
|
|
|
|
list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending
|
|
|
|
the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it
|
|
|
|
requests a certificate. By using B<s_client> the CA list can be viewed
|
|
|
|
and checked. However some servers only request client authentication
|
|
|
|
after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it
|
2004-01-04 18:59:14 +00:00
|
|
|
is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option and send an HTTP request
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
for an appropriate page.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert>
|
|
|
|
option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests
|
|
|
|
a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate
|
|
|
|
on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the
|
|
|
|
B<-showcerts> option can be used to show the whole chain.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-07 12:02:10 +00:00
|
|
|
The B<s_client> utility is a test tool and is designed to continue the
|
|
|
|
handshake after any certificate verification errors. As a result it will
|
|
|
|
accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer. None test
|
|
|
|
applications should B<not> do this as it makes them vulnerable to a MITM
|
|
|
|
attack. This behaviour can be changed by with the B<-verify_return_error>
|
|
|
|
option: any verify errors are then returned aborting the handshake.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-08 09:49:02 +00:00
|
|
|
The B<-bind> option may be useful if the server or a firewall requires
|
|
|
|
connections to come from some particular address and or port.
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 BUGS
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-21 21:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of the
|
|
|
|
techniques used are rather old, the C source of B<s_client> is rather hard to
|
|
|
|
read and not a model of how things should be done.
|
|
|
|
A typical SSL client program would be much simpler.
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report
|
|
|
|
information whenever a session is renegotiated.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-06 21:47:18 +00:00
|
|
|
L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>, L<sess_id(1)>, L<s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)>,
|
|
|
|
L<SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(3)>
|
2016-06-05 03:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
L<SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(3)>
|
2000-01-08 19:05:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-27 11:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 HISTORY
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-16 19:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
The B<-no_alt_chains> option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
|
|
|
|
The B<-name> option was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
|
2015-01-27 11:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-18 15:44:05 +00:00
|
|
|
=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-13 12:51:29 +00:00
|
|
|
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
2016-05-18 15:44:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
|
|
|
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
|
|
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
|
|
|
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=cut
|