1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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/* ssl/s2_srvr.c */
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1998-12-21 10:56:39 +00:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
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|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
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*
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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2001-11-10 01:16:28 +00:00
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
2001-11-10 01:16:28 +00:00
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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|
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
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|
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
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|
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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2000-01-16 21:10:00 +00:00
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
2001-02-20 08:13:47 +00:00
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
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|
#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
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|
# include <stdio.h>
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# include <openssl/bio.h>
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# include <openssl/rand.h>
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# include <openssl/objects.h>
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# include <openssl/evp.h>
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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|
2005-08-14 21:48:33 +00:00
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static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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|
static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s);
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static int get_client_hello(SSL *s);
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
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|
static int server_hello(SSL *s);
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
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static int get_client_finished(SSL *s);
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static int server_verify(SSL *s);
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static int server_finish(SSL *s);
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static int request_certificate(SSL *s);
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static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from,
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
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unsigned char *to, int padding);
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# define BREAK break
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1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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2005-08-14 21:48:33 +00:00
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static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
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|
{
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if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
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return (SSLv2_server_method());
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else
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return (NULL);
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}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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2005-08-05 23:56:11 +00:00
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IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_server_method,
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
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ssl2_accept,
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ssl_undefined_function, ssl2_get_server_method)
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
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1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
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int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
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{
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unsigned long l = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
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BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
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int ret = -1;
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long num1;
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void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
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int new_state, state;
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RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0);
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ERR_clear_error();
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clear_sys_error();
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|
|
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
/* init things to blank */
|
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s->in_handshake++;
|
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|
|
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
|
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|
|
SSL_clear(s);
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert == NULL) {
|
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|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
|
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|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
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|
|
for (;;) {
|
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|
|
state = s->state;
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (s->state) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->server = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
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|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->version = SSL2_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow
|
|
|
|
(buf, (int)SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)) {
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
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|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
s->init_buf = buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
|
|
|
|
s->handshake_func = ssl2_accept;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C:
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = get_client_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B:
|
|
|
|
ret = server_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
|
|
|
|
ret = get_client_master_key(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Ok we how have sent all the stuff needed to start encrypting,
|
|
|
|
* the next packet back will be encrypted.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl2_enc_init(s, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s2->clear_text = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
|
|
|
|
ret = server_verify(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we are in here, we have been buffering the output, so
|
|
|
|
* we need to flush it and remove buffering from future
|
|
|
|
* traffic
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C:
|
|
|
|
/* get the number of bytes to write */
|
|
|
|
num1 = BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_INFO, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (num1 > 0) {
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
|
|
num1 = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (num1 <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* flushed and now remove buffering */
|
|
|
|
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
|
|
|
|
ret = get_client_finished(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A;
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* don't do a 'request certificate' if we don't want to, or we
|
|
|
|
* already have one, and we only want to do it once.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
|
|
|
|
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
|
|
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))) {
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ret = request_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BREAK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
|
|
|
|
ret = server_finish(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
s->init_buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* ERR_clear_error(); */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
|
|
|
|
/* s->server=1; */
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* BREAK; */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* BREAK; */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
|
|
|
|
new_state = s->state;
|
|
|
|
s->state = state;
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
|
|
s->state = new_state;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-19 11:35:33 +00:00
|
|
|
int is_export, i, n, keya;
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int num_encrypted_key_bytes, key_length;
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
|
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char decrypt_good;
|
|
|
|
size_t j;
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) {
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 10 - s->init_num);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i < (10 - s->init_num))
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 10;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY) {
|
|
|
|
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
|
|
|
|
if (cp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = cp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p += 3;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
s->s2->tmp.clear = i;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
s->s2->tmp.enc = i;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->key_arg_length = i;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf->length < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keya = s->session->key_arg_length;
|
|
|
|
len =
|
|
|
|
10 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clear + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.enc +
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long)keya;
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
|
|
|
|
if (i != n)
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
|
|
/* CLIENT-MASTER-KEY */
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += 10;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->session->key_arg, &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear + s->s2->tmp.enc]),
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int)keya);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &md, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-04 17:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
|
|
|
|
* 1 byte message type
|
|
|
|
* 3 bytes cipher
|
|
|
|
* 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
|
|
|
|
* 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
|
|
|
|
* 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
|
|
|
|
* clear key
|
|
|
|
* encrypted key
|
|
|
|
* key args
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
|
|
|
|
* are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* this portion is in |num_encrypted_key_bytes|. If the cipher is not an
|
|
|
|
* export cipher, then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear
|
|
|
|
* key length must be zero).
|
2015-03-04 17:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
key_length = (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
|
|
|
|
if (key_length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) {
|
|
|
|
is_export = 1;
|
|
|
|
num_encrypted_key_bytes = 8;
|
|
|
|
} else if (is_export) {
|
|
|
|
num_encrypted_key_bytes = 5;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
num_encrypted_key_bytes = key_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s2->tmp.clear + num_encrypted_key_bytes != key_length) {
|
2015-03-04 17:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
|
|
|
|
* Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
|
|
|
|
* bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->s2->tmp.enc < num_encrypted_key_bytes) {
|
2015-03-04 17:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
|
|
|
|
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
|
|
|
|
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
|
|
|
|
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
|
|
|
|
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
|
|
|
|
(int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-04 17:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
|
|
|
|
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
|
|
|
|
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
|
|
|
|
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
|
|
|
|
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
|
|
|
|
* secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(i, (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes);
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < num_encrypted_key_bytes; j++) {
|
|
|
|
p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j] =
|
|
|
|
constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j],
|
|
|
|
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = (int)key_length;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->session->master_key, p, key_length);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, key_length);
|
2002-08-02 11:48:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-01 15:08:45 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, n;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
|
|
|
|
int z;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet type the first
|
|
|
|
* time round.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A) {
|
|
|
|
s->first_packet = 1;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B) {
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 9 - s->init_num);
|
|
|
|
if (i < (9 - s->init_num))
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, i));
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 9;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
|
|
|
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i < s->version)
|
|
|
|
s->version = i;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
s->s2->challenge_length = i;
|
|
|
|
if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
|
|
|
|
(i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
len =
|
|
|
|
9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length +
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length +
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
|
|
|
|
if (i != n)
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, i));
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
|
|
/* CLIENT-HELLO */
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += 9;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session structure
|
|
|
|
* if it is cached
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* session-id */
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) &&
|
|
|
|
(s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]),
|
|
|
|
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (i == -1) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
cs = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length,
|
|
|
|
&s->session->ciphers);
|
|
|
|
if (cs == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto mem_err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cl = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
|
|
|
|
prio = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
|
|
|
|
if (prio == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto mem_err;
|
|
|
|
allow = cs;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
prio = cs;
|
|
|
|
allow = cl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
|
|
|
|
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
|
|
|
|
z--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
|
|
s->session->ciphers = prio;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
|
|
|
|
* both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
|
|
|
|
* client sent the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference
|
|
|
|
* if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length;
|
|
|
|
/* done cipher selection */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* session id extracted already */
|
|
|
|
p += s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* challenge */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->s2->challenge, p, (unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
mem_err:
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int server_hello(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
|
|
int n, hit;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A) {
|
|
|
|
d = p + 11;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO; /* type */
|
|
|
|
hit = s->hit;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = (unsigned char)hit;
|
|
|
|
# if 1
|
|
|
|
if (!hit) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This can't really happen because get_client_hello has
|
|
|
|
* called ssl_get_new_session, which does not set sess_cert.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If 'hit' is set, then s->sess_cert may be non-NULL or NULL,
|
|
|
|
* depending on whether it survived in the internal cache or was
|
|
|
|
* retrieved from an external cache. If it is NULL, we cannot put any
|
|
|
|
* useful data in it anyway, so we don't touch it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# else /* That's what used to be done when cert_st
|
|
|
|
* and sess_cert_st were * the same. */
|
|
|
|
if (!hit) { /* else add cert to session */
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
|
|
|
|
ssl_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = s->cert;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* We have a session id-cache hit, if the *
|
|
|
|
* session-id has no certificate listed
|
|
|
|
* against * the 'cert' structure, grab the
|
|
|
|
* 'old' one * listed against the SSL
|
|
|
|
* connection */
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = s->cert;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->cert == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hit) {
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = 0; /* no certificate type */
|
|
|
|
s2n(s->version, p); /* version */
|
|
|
|
s2n(0, p); /* cert len */
|
|
|
|
s2n(0, p); /* ciphers len */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* EAY EAY */
|
|
|
|
/* put certificate type */
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
|
|
s2n(s->version, p); /* version */
|
|
|
|
n = i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509, NULL);
|
|
|
|
s2n(n, p); /* certificate length */
|
|
|
|
i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509, &d);
|
|
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* lets send out the ciphers we like in the prefered order
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
n = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, s->session->ciphers, d, 0);
|
|
|
|
d += n;
|
|
|
|
s2n(n, p); /* add cipher length */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make and send conn_id */
|
|
|
|
s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH, p); /* add conn_id length */
|
|
|
|
s->s2->conn_id_length = SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <=
|
|
|
|
0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(d, s->s2->conn_id, SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
d += SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = d - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we are using TCP/IP, the performance is bad if we do 2 writes
|
|
|
|
* without a read between them. This occurs when Session-id reuse is
|
|
|
|
* used, so I will put in a buffering module
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_do_write(s));
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int get_client_finished(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
int i, n;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A) {
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 1 - s->init_num);
|
|
|
|
if (i < 1 - s->init_num)
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, i));
|
|
|
|
s->init_num += i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*p != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
|
|
|
|
if (*p != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
/* try to read the error message */
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 3 - s->init_num);
|
|
|
|
return ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY, i);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = 1 + (unsigned long)s->s2->conn_id_length;
|
|
|
|
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
|
|
|
|
if (i < n) {
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, i));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
|
|
/* CLIENT-FINISHED */
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(p, s->s2->conn_id, s->s2->conn_id_length) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int server_verify(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A) {
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, s->s2->challenge, (unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
|
|
|
|
/* p+=s->s2->challenge_length; */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = s->s2->challenge_length + 1;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_do_write(s));
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int server_finish(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A) {
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length);
|
|
|
|
/* p+=s->session->session_id_length; */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = s->session->session_id_length + 1;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B */
|
|
|
|
return (ssl2_do_write(s));
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* send the request and check the response */
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *cp;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p, *p2, *buf2;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *ccd;
|
|
|
|
int i, j, ctype, ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x509 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ccd = s->s2->tmp.ccl;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A) {
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
|
|
*(p++) = SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
|
|
|
|
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH + 2;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B) {
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_do_write(s);
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = i;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C) {
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
/* try to read 6 octets ... */
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 6 - s->init_num);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ... but don't call ssl2_part_read now if we got at least 3
|
|
|
|
* (probably NO-CERTIFICATE-ERROR)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (i < 3 - s->init_num) {
|
|
|
|
ret = ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, i);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->init_num += i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((s->init_num >= 3) && (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR)) {
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i != SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* not the error message we expected -- let ssl2_part_read
|
|
|
|
* handle it
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->init_num -= 3;
|
|
|
|
ret = ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, 3);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
|
|
/* ERROR */
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, 3, s,
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* this is the one place where we can recover from an SSL 2.0
|
|
|
|
* error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) || (s->init_num < 6)) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_SHORT_READ);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_num != 6) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ok we have a response */
|
|
|
|
/* certificate type, there is only one right now. */
|
|
|
|
ctype = *(p++);
|
|
|
|
if (ctype != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION) {
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
s->s2->tmp.clen = i;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
s->s2->tmp.rlen = i;
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D */
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
len = 6 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clen + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.rlen;
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
j = (int)len - s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), j);
|
|
|
|
if (i < j) {
|
|
|
|
ret = ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, i);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->msg_callback) {
|
|
|
|
/* CLIENT-CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += 6;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cp = p;
|
|
|
|
x509 = (X509 *)d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (long)s->s2->tmp.clen);
|
|
|
|
if (x509 == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto msg_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(sk, x509))) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto msg_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0) { /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL)
|
|
|
|
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx, s->s2->key_material,
|
|
|
|
s->s2->key_material_length)
|
|
|
|
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx, ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH))
|
|
|
|
goto msg_end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509, NULL);
|
|
|
|
buf2 = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i);
|
|
|
|
if (buf2 == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto msg_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p2 = buf2;
|
|
|
|
i = i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509, &p2);
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx, buf2, (unsigned int)i)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf2);
|
|
|
|
goto msg_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf2);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
i = EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx, cp, s->s2->tmp.rlen, pkey);
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
|
|
s->session->peer = x509;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM);
|
|
|
|
goto msg_end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
msg_end:
|
|
|
|
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_free(sk);
|
|
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 10:52:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-19 21:31:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from,
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *to, int padding)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((c == NULL) || (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rsa = c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->pkey.rsa;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we have the public key */
|
|
|
|
i = RSA_private_decrypt(len, from, to, rsa, padding);
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
|
|
|
|
return (i);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
|
2000-01-08 21:06:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# if PEDANTIC
|
2015-01-22 03:29:12 +00:00
|
|
|
static void *dummy = &dummy;
|
2000-01-08 21:06:24 +00:00
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-27 03:19:12 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|