Whitespace cleanup in crypto
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
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0517ffc47c
commit
02e112a885
23 changed files with 30 additions and 31 deletions
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@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
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rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
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ROTATE(tp9,24) ^ ROTATE(tpb,8);
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#else
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rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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(tp9 >> 8) ^ (tp9 << 24) ^
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(tpb >> 24) ^ (tpb << 8);
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#endif
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@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
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rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
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ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
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#else
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rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
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(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
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#endif
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@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
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(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
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(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
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/* now do the linear transform using words */
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/* now do the linear transform using words */
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{
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int i;
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u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
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@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
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t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
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ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
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#else
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t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
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(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
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#endif
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@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
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(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
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(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
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/* now do the linear transform using words */
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/* now do the linear transform using words */
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{
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int i;
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u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
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@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
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t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
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ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
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#else
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t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
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(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
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(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
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#endif
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@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
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goto end;
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if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
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const unsigned char *sp = p;
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ep = p + len;
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if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
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goto end;
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@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
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# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
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/*-
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* BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
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* BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
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* zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds.
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* Thus:
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* dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero)
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@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
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bn_check_top(m);
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/*-
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* For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
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* For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
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* a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
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* exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
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* reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
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@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
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* i.e.
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* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
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*
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* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
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* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
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* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
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* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
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* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
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@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
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* i.e.
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* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
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*
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* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
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* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
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* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
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* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
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* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
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@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, prime_t *mods)
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*/
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if (is_single_word) {
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BN_ULONG size_limit;
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if (bits == BN_BITS2) {
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/*
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* Shifting by this much has undefined behaviour so we do it a
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@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name,
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static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name);
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static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value,
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const CONF *cnf);
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static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
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static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
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const char *value);
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/* Main function: load modules from a CONF structure */
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@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value,
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}
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/* Load a module from a DSO */
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static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
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static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
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const char *name, const char *value)
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{
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DSO *dso = NULL;
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@ -284,7 +284,6 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
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} else
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BN_zero(group->cofactor);
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/*
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* Some groups have an order with
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* factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
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@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static long ok_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
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{
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long ret = 1;
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BIO *next;
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next = BIO_next(b);
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if (next == NULL)
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@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
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if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
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return -1;
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len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
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@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
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/*
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* Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths.
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* We don't support this at this stage
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* We don't support this at this stage
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*/
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if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) {
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return -1;
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@ -2314,11 +2314,11 @@ static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={
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{"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
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"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
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NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5609]),0},
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{"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
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"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
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NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5616]),0},
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{"id-GostR3410-94-a","id-GostR3410-94-a",NID_id_GostR3410_94_a,7,
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&(lvalues[5623]),0},
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{"id-GostR3410-94-aBis","id-GostR3410-94-aBis",
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@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
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BIO_free_all(btmp);
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BIO_free_all(etmp);
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BIO_free_all(bio);
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return NULL;
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return NULL;
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}
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static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
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@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
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/*
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* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
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* leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
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* information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
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* information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
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* pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
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*
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* TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
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@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
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TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
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ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
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length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
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@ -2538,7 +2538,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
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/*
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* If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
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* further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
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* further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
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* Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
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*/
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if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
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@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n);
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*/
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void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags);
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/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier, */
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/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier */
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int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
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BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void);
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ extern "C" {
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# define BUF_strlcpy(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcpy(dst, src, size)
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# define BUF_strlcat(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcat(dst, src, size)
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# define BUF_strnlen(str, maxlen) OPENSSL_strnlen(str, maxlen)
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struct buf_mem_st {
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size_t length; /* current number of bytes */
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char *data;
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@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ typedef struct err_state_st {
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# define ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR (4|ERR_R_FATAL)
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# define ERR_R_DISABLED (5|ERR_R_FATAL)
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# define ERR_R_INIT_FAIL (6|ERR_R_FATAL)
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# define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT (7)
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# define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT (7)
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/*
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* 99 is the maximum possible ERR_R_... code, higher values are reserved for
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@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES)
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void PKCS12_PBE_add(void);
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int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
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STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
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PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert,
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PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert,
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int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);
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PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_cert(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, X509 *cert);
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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st {
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} SRP_VBASE;
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/*
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* Internal structure storing N and g pair
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* Internal structure storing N and g pair
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*/
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typedef struct SRP_gN_st {
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char *id;
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@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS)
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GENERAL_NAME *a2i_GENERAL_NAME(GENERAL_NAME *out,
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const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
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X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type,
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X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type,
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const char *value, int is_nc);
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# ifdef HEADER_CONF_H
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