Make BUF_strndup() read-safe on arbitrary inputs
BUF_strndup was calling strlen through BUF_strlcpy, and ended up reading past the input if the input was not a C string. Make it explicitly part of BUF_strndup's contract to never read more than |siz| input bytes. This augments the standard strndup contract to be safer. The commit also adds a check for siz overflow and some brief documentation for BUF_strndup(). Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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2 changed files with 14 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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@ -85,12 +86,18 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
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siz = BUF_strnlen(str, siz);
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if (siz >= INT_MAX)
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return (NULL);
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ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
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if (ret == NULL) {
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BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return (NULL);
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}
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BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
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memcpy(ret, str, siz);
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ret[siz] = '\0';
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return (ret);
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}
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@ -90,7 +90,13 @@ size_t BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
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size_t BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
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size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen);
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char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
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/*
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* Returns a pointer to a new string which is a duplicate of the string |str|,
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* but guarantees to never read past the first |siz| bytes of |str|.
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*/
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char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
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void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
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void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
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