crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened. Thanks to Robert Święcki for report. CVE-2017-3731 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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2 changed files with 15 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -1388,10 +1388,15 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
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| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
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/* Correct length for explicit IV */
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if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
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return 0;
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len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
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/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
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if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
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if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
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if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
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return 0;
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len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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}
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
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}
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@ -1946,10 +1951,15 @@ static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
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| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
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/* Correct length for explicit IV */
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if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
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return 0;
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len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
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/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
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if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
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if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
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if (len < cctx->M)
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return 0;
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len -= cctx->M;
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}
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
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}
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@ -398,6 +398,8 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
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len = aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] << 8 |
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aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1];
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if (!ctx->encrypt) {
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if (len < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
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return 0;
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len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* discount attached tag */
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memcpy(temp, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2);
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aad = temp;
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@ -407,8 +409,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
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actx->tls_payload_length = len;
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/*
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* merge record sequence number as per
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* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-03
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* merge record sequence number as per RFC7905
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*/
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actx->key.counter[1] = actx->nonce[0];
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actx->key.counter[2] = actx->nonce[1] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad);
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