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A general spring-cleaning (in autumn) to fix up signed/unsigned warnings.

Browse source 
I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.
This commit is contained in:
Geoff Thorpe 2003-10-29 20:24:15 +00:00
parent 2ce90b9b74
commit 2754597013
37 changed files with 97 additions and 82 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

3
apps/ca.c
View file

@ -3005,7 +3005,8 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_G
char *tmp = NULL;
char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p;
int reason_code = -1;
int i, ret = 0;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int i;
ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
tmp = BUF_strdup(str);

2
apps/enc.c
View file

@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ bad:
if (!nosalt)
{
printf("salt=");
for (i=0; i<sizeof salt; i++)
for (i=0; i<(int)sizeof(salt); i++)
printf("%02X",salt[i]);
printf("\n");
}

3
apps/passwd.c
View file

@ -312,7 +312,8 @@ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2]; /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */
unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
char *salt_out;
int n, i;
int n;
unsigned int i;
EVP_MD_CTX md,md2;
size_t passwd_len, salt_len;

2
apps/rand.c
View file

@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
int chunk;
chunk = num;
if (chunk > sizeof buf)
if (chunk > (int)sizeof(buf))
chunk = sizeof buf;
r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk);
if (r <= 0)

7
crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
View file

@ -67,12 +67,13 @@
int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
{
int i,j,k;
int j,k;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
long d;
a->type=V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
{
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
else if (i != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
return -1;
if (a->length > sizeof(long))
if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
{
/* hmm... a bit ugly */
return(0xffffffffL);

7
crypto/asn1/a_int.c
View file

@ -313,12 +313,13 @@ err:
int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v)
{
int i,j,k;
int j,k;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
long d;
a->type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
{
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(ASN1_INTEGER *a)
else if (i != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
return -1;
if (a->length > sizeof(long))
if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
{
/* hmm... a bit ugly */
return(0xffffffffL);

2
crypto/asn1/a_object.c
View file

@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *a)
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return(BIO_write(bp,"NULL",4));
i=i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf,sizeof buf,a);
if (i > sizeof buf) i=sizeof buf;
if (i > (int)sizeof(buf)) i=sizeof buf;
BIO_write(bp,buf,i);
return(i);
}

2
crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
View file

@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class, int exp_cons
static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len)
{
int i;
unsigned int i;
static struct tag_name_st *tntmp, tnst [] = {
ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOL", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOLEAN", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),

2
crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
View file

@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int asn1_get_length(unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, int max)
{
unsigned char *p= *pp;
unsigned long ret=0;
int i;
unsigned int i;
if (max-- < 1) return(0);
if (*p == 0x80)

2
crypto/asn1/x_long.c
View file

@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype,
int neg, i;
long ltmp;
unsigned long utmp = 0;
if(len > sizeof(long)) {
if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
return 0;
}

12
crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
View file

@ -91,28 +91,28 @@ void BN_set_params(int mult, int high, int low, int mont)
{
if (mult >= 0)
{
if (mult > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mult=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits=mult;
bn_limit_num=1<<mult;
}
if (high >= 0)
{
if (high > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
if (high > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
high=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_high=high;
bn_limit_num_high=1<<high;
}
if (low >= 0)
{
if (low > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
if (low > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
low=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_low=low;
bn_limit_num_low=1<<low;
}
if (mont >= 0)
{
if (mont > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mont=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_mont=mont;
bn_limit_num_mont=1<<mont;
@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
BN_ULONG ret=0;
n=BN_num_bytes(a);
if (n > sizeof(BN_ULONG))
if (n > (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG))
return(BN_MASK2);
for (i=a->top-1; i>=0; i--)
{
@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
{
int i,n;
if (bn_expand(a,sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
if (bn_expand(a,(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
n=sizeof(BN_ULONG)/BN_BYTES;
a->neg=0;

9
crypto/des/destest.c
View file

@ -333,7 +333,8 @@ static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i,j,err=0;
int j,err=0;
unsigned int i;
des_cblock in,out,outin,iv3,iv2;
des_key_schedule ks,ks2,ks3;
unsigned char cbc_in[40];
@ -391,7 +392,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,&ks,&ks2,&ks3,&iv3,&iv2,DES_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
{
int n;
unsigned int n;
printf("des_ede3_cbcm_encrypt decrypt error\n");
for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@ -540,7 +541,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
(unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
{
int n;
unsigned int n;
printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,ks,ks2,ks3,&iv3,DES_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
{
int n;
unsigned int n;
printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)

4
crypto/des/set_key.c
View file

@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static const unsigned char odd_parity[256]={
void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
{
int i;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
(*key)[i]=odd_parity[(*key)[i]];
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key)
{
int i;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
{

2
crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
View file

@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
{
i=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
if (i > outl) i=outl;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < sizeof ctx->buf);
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
memcpy(out,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),i);
ret=i;
out+=i;

7
crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
View file

@ -168,16 +168,17 @@ static int rc2_magic_to_meth(int i)
static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
long num=0;
int i=0,l;
int i=0;
int key_bits;
unsigned int l;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
if (type != NULL)
{
l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof iv);
OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(iv));
i=ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(type,&num,iv,l);
if (i != l)
if (i != (int)l)
return(-1);
key_bits =rc2_magic_to_meth((int)num);
if (!key_bits)

4
crypto/evp/encode.c
View file

@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
*outl=0;
if (inl == 0) return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= sizeof ctx->enc_data);
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if ((ctx->num+inl) < ctx->length)
{
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]),in,inl);
@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
/* only save the good data :-) */
if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v))
{
OPENSSL_assert(n < sizeof ctx->enc_data);
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
d[n++]=tmp;
ln++;
}

17
crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
View file

@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ skip_to_init:
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= sizeof ctx->iv);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <=
(int)sizeof(ctx->iv));
if(iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
break;
@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
}
i=ctx->buf_len;
bl=ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= sizeof ctx->buf);
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0)
{
if (i+inl < bl)
@ -320,7 +321,8 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
int i,n,b,bl,ret;
int n,ret;
unsigned int i, b, bl;
b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf);
@ -356,7 +358,8 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int b, fix_len;
int fix_len;
unsigned int b;
if (inl == 0)
{
@ -409,8 +412,8 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
int i,b;
int n;
int i,n;
unsigned int b;
*outl=0;
b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
@ -433,7 +436,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
}
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
n=ctx->final[b-1];
if (n > b)
if (n > (int)b)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return(0);

12
crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
View file

@ -85,14 +85,15 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
int i=0,l;
int i=0;
unsigned int l;
if (type != NULL)
{
l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof c->iv);
OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
i=ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type,c->oiv,l);
if (i != l)
if (i != (int)l)
return(-1);
else if (i > 0)
memcpy(c->iv,c->oiv,l);
@ -102,12 +103,13 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
int i=0,j;
int i=0;
unsigned int j;
if (type != NULL)
{
j=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof c->iv);
OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv));
i=ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type,c->oiv,j);
}
return(i);

2
crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
View file

@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= sizeof md_tmp);
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= (int)sizeof(md_tmp));
memcpy(key, md_tmp, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher));
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) <= 16);
memcpy(iv, md_tmp + (16 - EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)),

5
crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
View file

@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
int en_de)
{
unsigned char *pbuf, *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
int saltlen, keylen, iter, plen;
int saltlen, iter, plen;
unsigned int keylen;
PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
/* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != keylen)){
if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)){
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
goto err;

4
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
View file

@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
{
reset=1;
j=EVP_MD_block_size(md);
OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof ctx->key);
OPENSSL_assert(j <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
if (j < len)
{
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx,md, impl);
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ void HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
}
else
{
OPENSSL_assert(len <= sizeof ctx->key);
OPENSSL_assert(len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
memcpy(ctx->key,key,len);
ctx->key_length=len;
}

2
crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
View file

@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(int (*i2d)(), const char *name, BIO *bp, char *x,
kstr=(unsigned char *)buf;
}
RAND_add(data,i,0);/* put in the RSA key. */
OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= sizeof iv);
OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv));
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv,enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */
goto err;
/* The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is

2
crypto/rand/md_rand.c
View file

@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
* much entropy as fits into md. */
for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
{
md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}

3
crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
View file

@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, unsigned long e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, unsigned long e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
unsigned int i;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();

4
crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
View file

@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
X509_TRUST * X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
{
if(idx < 0) return NULL;
if(idx < X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
if(idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
}
@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
{
int i;
unsigned int i;
for(i = 0; i < X509_TRUST_COUNT; i++) trtable_free(trstandard + i);
sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
trtable = NULL;

4
crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
View file

@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
{
if(idx < 0) return NULL;
if(idx < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
}
@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
{
int i;
unsigned int i;
sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
xptable = NULL;

6
engines/e_4758_cca.c
View file

@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ibm_4758_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char* key_id,
unsigned char exitData[8];
unsigned char ruleArray[8];
unsigned char keyLabel[64];
long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
unsigned char modulus[256];
long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
long modulusLength = 0;
@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ibm_4758_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char* key_id,
unsigned char exitData[8];
unsigned char ruleArray[8];
unsigned char keyLabel[64];
long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
unsigned char modulus[512];
long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
long modulusLength = 0;
@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static int cca_get_random_bytes(unsigned char* buf, int num)
unsigned char form[] = "RANDOM ";
unsigned char rand_buf[8];
while(num >= sizeof(rand_buf))
while(num >= (int)sizeof(rand_buf))
{
randomNumberGenerate(&ret_code, &reason_code, &exit_data_length,
exit_data, form, rand_buf);

6
ssl/s2_clnt.c
View file

@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
sess->master_key_length=i;
if (i > 0)
{
if (i > sizeof sess->master_key)
if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
{
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
else
enc=i;
if (i < enc)
if ((int)i < enc)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
d+=enc;
karg=sess->key_arg_length;
s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
if (karg > sizeof sess->key_arg)
if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

2
ssl/s2_enc.c
View file

@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client)
if (ssl2_generate_key_material(s) <= 0)
return 0;
OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= sizeof s->session->key_arg);
OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(s->session->key_arg));
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ws,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]),
s->session->key_arg);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(rs,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]),

12
ssl/s2_lib.c
View file

@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
static SSL_CIPHER *sorted[SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS];
SSL_CIPHER c,*cp= &c,**cpp;
unsigned long id;
int i;
unsigned int i;
if (init)
{
@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
km=s->s2->key_material;
if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 || s->session->master_key_length > sizeof s->session->master_key)
if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 ||
s->session->master_key_length > (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
@ -445,7 +446,8 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
for (i=0; i<s->s2->key_material_length; i += EVP_MD_size(md5))
{
if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + EVP_MD_size(md5)) > sizeof s->s2->key_material)
if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + EVP_MD_size(md5)) >
(int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material))
{
/* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@ -456,7 +458,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
&& s->session->master_key_length
< sizeof s->session->master_key);
< (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
c++;
@ -495,7 +497,7 @@ void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s)
error=s->error; /* number of bytes left to write */
s->error=0;
OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= sizeof buf);
OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= (int)sizeof(buf));
i=ssl2_write(s,&(buf[3-error]),error);
/* if (i == error) s->rwstate=state; */

2
ssl/s3_clnt.c
View file

@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
*(p++)=i;
if (i != 0)
{
if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;

6
ssl/s3_enc.c
View file

@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
EVP_MD_CTX s1;
unsigned char buf[16],smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char c='A';
int i,j,k;
unsigned int i,j,k;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
c = os_toascii[c]; /*'A' in ASCII */
@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
k=0;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
for (i=0; (int)i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
k++;
if (k > sizeof buf)
@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if ((i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
if ((int)(i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
{
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,smd,NULL);
memcpy(km,smd,(num-i));

2
ssl/s3_lib.c
View file

@ -1914,7 +1914,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
static SSL_CIPHER *sorted[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS];
SSL_CIPHER c,*cp= &c,**cpp;
unsigned long id;
int i;
unsigned int i;
if (init)
{

2
ssl/s3_srvr.c
View file

@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;

6
ssl/ssl_asn1.c
View file

@ -295,11 +295,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, unsigned char **pp,
if (os.length > i)
os.length = i;
if (os.length > sizeof ret->session_id) /* can't happen */
os.length = sizeof ret->session_id;
if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
ret->session_id_length=os.length;
OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= sizeof ret->session_id);
OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
memcpy(ret->session_id,os.data,os.length);
M_ASN1_D2I_get(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);

2
ssl/ssl_cert.c
View file

@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
}
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;

8
ssl/ssltest.c
View file

@ -1350,8 +1350,8 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
{
if (c_write)
{
j=(cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf))
?sizeof(cbuf):(int)cw_num;
j = (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf)) ?
(int)sizeof(cbuf) : (int)cw_num;
i=BIO_write(c_bio,cbuf,j);
if (i < 0)
{
@ -1481,8 +1481,8 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
}
else
{
j=(sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf))?
sizeof(sbuf):(int)sw_num;
j = (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf)) ?
(int)sizeof(sbuf) : (int)sw_num;
i=BIO_write(s_bio,sbuf,j);
if (i < 0)
{