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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2015-01-17 00:06:54 +00:00
parent 50e735f9e5
commit 35a1cc90bc
41 changed files with 403 additions and 398 deletions
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4
apps/gendh.c
View file

@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
outfile = *(++argv);
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-2") == 0)
g = 2;
/*- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-3") == 0)
g=3; */
/*- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-3") == 0)
g=3; */
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-5") == 0)
g = 5;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE

8
apps/s_cb.c
View file

@ -200,10 +200,10 @@ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
{
if (cert_file != NULL) {
/*-
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
*/
/*-
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
*/
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {

4
apps/s_client.c
View file

@ -1749,8 +1749,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
}
#endif
/*- printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
/*- printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
/*
* Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is

14
crypto/bio/b_sock.c
View file

@ -529,13 +529,13 @@ int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg)
i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, (char *)arg);
# else
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
/*-
* 2011-02-18 SMS.
* VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we
* observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *",
* so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use
* that, instead.
*/
/*-
* 2011-02-18 SMS.
* VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we
* observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *",
* so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use
* that, instead.
*/
# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
# define ARG arg_32p
# pragma pointer_size save

10
crypto/bio/bf_null.c
View file

@ -103,11 +103,11 @@ static int nullf_free(BIO *a)
{
if (a == NULL)
return (0);
/*-
a->ptr=NULL;
a->init=0;
a->flags=0;
*/
/*-
a->ptr=NULL;
a->init=0;
a->flags=0;
*/
return (1);
}

12
crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
View file

@ -415,12 +415,12 @@ static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = (long)data->bind_mode;
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
/*- dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
if (data->param_hostname)
BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);
BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */
/*- dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
if (data->param_hostname)
BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);
BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */
break;
default:

14
crypto/bn/bn_kron.c
View file

@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
int ret = -2; /* avoid 'uninitialized' warning */
int err = 0;
BIGNUM *A, *B, *tmp;
/*-
* In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant:
* For any odd BIGNUM n,
* tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7]
* is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation).
* Note that the sign of n does not matter.
*/
/*-
* In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant:
* For any odd BIGNUM n,
* tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7]
* is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation).
* Note that the sign of n does not matter.
*/
static const int tab[8] = { 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1 };
bn_check_top(a);

12
crypto/bn/bn_print.c
View file

@ -106,12 +106,12 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
BIGNUM *t = NULL;
BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
/*-
* get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
* num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
* <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.1001 + log(2) + 1 (rounding error)
* <= BN_num_bits(a)/10 + BN_num_bits/1000 + 1 + 1
*/
/*-
* get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
* num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
* <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.1001 + log(2) + 1 (rounding error)
* <= BN_num_bits(a)/10 + BN_num_bits/1000 + 1 + 1
*/
i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
bn_data =

52
crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
View file

@ -152,32 +152,32 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
if (e == 2) {
/*-
* |p| == 5 (mod 8)
*
* In this case 2 is always a non-square since
* Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime.
* So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square.
* Thus for
* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
* i := (2*a)*b^2
* we have
* i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
* = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
* = -1;
* so if we set
* x := a*b*(i-1),
* then
* x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
* = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
* = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
* = a*(-i)*i
* = a.
*
* (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
* <URL: http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=nmbrthry&O=T&P=562>,
* November 1992.)
*/
/*-
* |p| == 5 (mod 8)
*
* In this case 2 is always a non-square since
* Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime.
* So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square.
* Thus for
* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
* i := (2*a)*b^2
* we have
* i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
* = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
* = -1;
* so if we set
* x := a*b*(i-1),
* then
* x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
* = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
* = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
* = a*(-i)*i
* = a.
*
* (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
* <URL: http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=nmbrthry&O=T&P=562>,
* November 1992.)
*/
/* t := 2*a */
if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p))

6
crypto/cast/casttest.c
View file

@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
};
# endif

2
crypto/des/destest.c
View file

@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(&cbc_data[16], &cbc_out[16], i - 16, &ks, &ks2,
&ks3, &iv3, &iv2, DES_ENCRYPT);
/*- if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
/*- if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
(unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
{
printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");

12
crypto/des/enc_read.c
View file

@ -205,12 +205,12 @@ int DES_enc_read(int fd, void *buf, int len, DES_key_schedule *sched,
*/
num = len;
} else {
/*-
* >output is a multiple of 8 byes, if len < rnum
* >we must be careful. The user must be aware that this
* >routine will write more bytes than he asked for.
* >The length of the buffer must be correct.
* FIXED - Should be ok now 18-9-90 - eay */
/*-
* >output is a multiple of 8 byes, if len < rnum
* >we must be careful. The user must be aware that this
* >routine will write more bytes than he asked for.
* >The length of the buffer must be correct.
* FIXED - Should be ok now 18-9-90 - eay */
if (len < rnum) {
if (DES_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE)

4
crypto/des/ofb64ede.c
View file

@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(register const unsigned char *in,
n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
}
if (save) {
/*- v0=ti[0];
v1=ti[1];*/
/*- v0=ti[0];
v1=ti[1];*/
iv = &(*ivec)[0];
l2c(v0, iv);
l2c(v1, iv);

77
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
View file

@ -432,25 +432,25 @@ static void felem_shrink(smallfelem out, const felem in)
/* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */
high <<= 63;
high >>= 63;
/*-
* high is:
* all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
* all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */
/*-
* high is:
* all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
* all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */
low = tmp[3];
mask = low >> 63;
/*-
* mask is:
* all ones if the MSB of low is 1
* all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */
/*-
* mask is:
* all ones if the MSB of low is 1
* all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */
low &= bottom63bits;
low -= kPrime3Test;
/* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */
low = ~low;
low >>= 63;
/*-
* low is:
* all ones if low was > kPrime3Test
* all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */
/*-
* low is:
* all ones if low was > kPrime3Test
* all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */
mask = (mask & low) | high;
tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0];
tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1];
@ -790,17 +790,17 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const longfelem in)
felem_reduce_(out, in);
/*-
* out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0
* out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0
* out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0
* out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0
*
* out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101
* out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101
* out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101
* out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101
*/
/*-
* out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0
* out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0
* out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0
* out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0
*
* out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101
* out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101
* out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101
* out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101
*/
}
/*-
@ -819,17 +819,17 @@ static void felem_reduce_zero105(felem out, const longfelem in)
felem_reduce_(out, in);
/*-
* out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
* out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
* out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
* out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0
*
* out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
* out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
* out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
* out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106
*/
/*-
* out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
* out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
* out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
* out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0
*
* out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
* out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
* out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
* out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106
*/
}
/*
@ -1094,7 +1094,8 @@ static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in)
*
* Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the
* elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian
* coordinates */
* coordinates
*/
/*-
* point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)
@ -1103,7 +1104,8 @@ static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in)
* http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
*
* Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed.
* while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */
* while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested).
*/
static void
point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in)
@ -1234,7 +1236,8 @@ static void copy_small_conditional(felem out, const smallfelem in, limb mask)
* This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points
* are equal, (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never
* happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for
* ECDH or ECDSA signing. */
* ECDH or ECDSA signing.
*/
static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
const int mixed, const smallfelem x2,

45
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
View file

@ -414,15 +414,16 @@ static void felem_square(largefelem out, const felem in)
felem_scalar(inx2, in, 2);
felem_scalar(inx4, in, 4);
/*-
* We have many cases were we want to do
* in[x] * in[y] +
* in[y] * in[x]
* This is obviously just
* 2 * in[x] * in[y]
* However, rather than do the doubling on the 128 bit result, we
* double one of the inputs to the multiplication by reading from
* |inx2| */
/*-
* We have many cases were we want to do
* in[x] * in[y] +
* in[y] * in[x]
* This is obviously just
* 2 * in[x] * in[y]
* However, rather than do the doubling on the 128 bit result, we
* double one of the inputs to the multiplication by reading from
* |inx2|
*/
out[0] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * in[0];
out[1] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[1];
@ -610,10 +611,10 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
out[1] += ((limb) in[0]) >> 58;
out[1] += (((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
/*-
* out[1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58
* = 2^59 + 2^6
*/
/*-
* out[1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58
* = 2^59 + 2^6
*/
out[2] += ((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) >> 52;
out[2] += ((limb) in[1]) >> 58;
@ -642,10 +643,10 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
out[8] += ((limb) in[7]) >> 58;
out[8] += (((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
/*-
* out[x > 1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58 + 2^12
* < 2^59 + 2^13
*/
/*-
* out[x > 1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58 + 2^12
* < 2^59 + 2^13
*/
overflow1 = ((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) >> 52;
overflow1 += ((limb) in[8]) >> 58;
@ -660,11 +661,11 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
out[1] += out[0] >> 58;
out[0] &= bottom58bits;
/*-
* out[0] < 2^58
* out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 + 2^2
* < 2^59 + 2^14
*/
/*-
* out[0] < 2^58
* out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 + 2^2
* < 2^59 + 2^14
*/
}
static void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)

10
crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
View file

@ -96,11 +96,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
if (y == NULL)
goto err;
/*-
* Recover y. We have a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b,
* so y is one of the square roots of x^3 + a*x + b.
*/
/*-
* Recover y. We have a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b,
* so y is one of the square roots of x^3 + a*x + b.
*/
/* tmp1 := x^3 */
if (!BN_nnmod(x, x_, group->field, ctx))

50
crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
View file

@ -909,10 +909,10 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p))
goto err;
/*-
* n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
* = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4
*/
/*-
* n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
* = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4
*/
} else {
if (!field_sqr(group, n0, a->X, ctx))
goto err;
@ -1033,15 +1033,15 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
if (Z6 == NULL)
goto err;
/*-
* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
* The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
* where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
* Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation into
* Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
* To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
*/
/*-
* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
* The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
* where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
* Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation into
* Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
* To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
*/
/* rh := X^2 */
if (!field_sqr(group, rh, point->X, ctx))
@ -1108,12 +1108,12 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
/*-
* return values:
* -1 error
* 0 equal (in affine coordinates)
* 1 not equal
*/
/*-
* return values:
* -1 error
* 0 equal (in affine coordinates)
* 1 not equal
*/
int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
@ -1151,12 +1151,12 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
if (Zb23 == NULL)
goto end;
/*-
* We have to decide whether
* (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
* or equivalently, whether
* (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
*/
/*-
* We have to decide whether
* (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
* or equivalently, whether
* (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
*/
if (!b->Z_is_one) {
if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, b->Z, ctx))

6
crypto/idea/ideatest.c
View file

@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
};
static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);

6
crypto/lhash/lhash.c
View file

@ -434,9 +434,9 @@ unsigned long lh_strhash(const char *c)
if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0'))
return (ret);
/*-
unsigned char b[16];
MD5(c,strlen(c),b);
return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24));
unsigned char b[16];
MD5(c,strlen(c),b);
return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24));
*/
n = 0x100;

10
crypto/pem/pem.h
View file

@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
struct {
int cipher;
/*-
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
} DEK_info;
PEM_USER *originator;
@ -195,9 +195,9 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
EVP_CIPHER *dec; /* date encryption cipher */
int key_len; /* key length */
unsigned char *key; /* key */
/*-
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
/*-
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
int data_enc; /* is the data encrypted */
int data_len;

8
crypto/rand/randfile.c
View file

@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
{
/*-
* If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
* if bytes == -1, read complete file.
*/
/*-
* If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
* if bytes == -1, read complete file.
*/
MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO

6
crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
View file

@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
};
/*

30
crypto/threads/mttest.c
View file

@ -798,23 +798,23 @@ void solaris_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
(type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
# endif
/*-
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
*/
/*-
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
*/
if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
/*-
if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
else
rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
else
rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
lock_count[type]++;
} else {
/* rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
/* rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
}
}
@ -984,10 +984,10 @@ void pthreads_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
(type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
# endif
/*-
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
*/
if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));

4
crypto/x509/by_dir.c
View file

@ -430,8 +430,8 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
* If we were going to up the reference count, we would need to
* do it on a perl 'type' basis
*/
/*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/
/*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/
goto finish;
}
}

4
crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
View file

@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name,
return 0;
}
/*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */
/*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */
ret->type = tmp->type;
ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;

4
crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
View file

@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(xi->version, 2))
goto err;
/*- xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
ri->attributes=NULL; */
/*- xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
ri->attributes=NULL; */
}
xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r);

18
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
View file

@ -549,15 +549,15 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int allow_proxy_certs;
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */

20
crypto/x509/x509name.c
View file

@ -162,16 +162,16 @@ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc)
set_prev = ret->set - 1;
set_next = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
/*-
* set_prev is the previous set
* set is the current set
* set_next is the following
* prev 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
* set 1 1 2 2
* next 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
* so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
* re-number down by 1
*/
/*-
* set_prev is the previous set
* set is the current set
* set_next is the following
* prev 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
* set 1 1 2 2
* next 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
* so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
* re-number down by 1
*/
if (set_prev + 1 < set_next)
for (i = loc; i < n; i++)
sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set--;

10
crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
View file

@ -808,11 +808,11 @@ static const unsigned char *valid_star(const unsigned char *p, size_t len,
if (p[i] == '*') {
int atstart = (state & LABEL_START);
int atend = (i == len - 1 || p[i + i] == '.');
/*-
* At most one wildcard per pattern.
* No wildcards in IDNA labels.
* No wildcards after the first label.
*/
/*-
* At most one wildcard per pattern.
* No wildcards in IDNA labels.
* No wildcards after the first label.
*/
if (star != NULL || (state & LABEL_IDNA) != 0 || dots)
return NULL;
/* Only full-label '*.example.com' wildcards? */

16
demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.h
View file

@ -106,14 +106,14 @@ extern "C" {
/*
* Functions for Digest (MD5, SHA1) stuff
*/
/* output : output data buffer */
/* input : input data buffer */
/* algo : hash algorithm, MD5 or SHA1 */
/*-
* typedef int t_zencod_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
* typedef int t_zencod_sha_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
*/
/* For now separate this stuff that mad it easier to test */
/* output : output data buffer */
/* input : input data buffer */
/* algo : hash algorithm, MD5 or SHA1 */
/*-
* typedef int t_zencod_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
* typedef int t_zencod_sha_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
*/
/* For now separate this stuff that mad it easier to test */
typedef int t_zencod_md5_init(ZEN_MD_DATA *data);
typedef int t_zencod_md5_update(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, const KEY * input);
typedef int t_zencod_md5_do_final(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, KEY * output);

26
engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
View file

@ -18,20 +18,20 @@ static char *gost_params[GOST_PARAM_MAX + 1] = { NULL };
static const char *gost_envnames[] = { "CRYPT_PARAMS" };
const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN gost_cmds[] = {
/*- { GOST_CTRL_RNG,
"RNG",
"Type of random number generator to use",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
{ GOST_CTRL_RNG_PARAMS,
"RNG_PARAMS",
"Parameter for random number generator",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
/*- { GOST_CTRL_RNG,
"RNG",
"Type of random number generator to use",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
{ GOST_CTRL_RNG_PARAMS,
"RNG_PARAMS",
"Parameter for random number generator",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
*/ {GOST_CTRL_CRYPT_PARAMS,
"CRYPT_PARAMS",
"OID of default GOST 28147-89 parameters",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
"CRYPT_PARAMS",
"OID of default GOST 28147-89 parameters",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
};

10
engines/e_cswift.c
View file

@ -1037,11 +1037,11 @@ static int cswift_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
while (num >= (int)sizeof(buf32)) {
largenum.value = buf;
largenum.nbytes = sizeof(buf32);
/*-
* tell CryptoSwift how many bytes we want and where we want it.
* Note: - CryptoSwift cannot do more than 4096 bytes at a time.
* - CryptoSwift can only do multiple of 32-bits.
*/
/*-
* tell CryptoSwift how many bytes we want and where we want it.
* Note: - CryptoSwift cannot do more than 4096 bytes at a time.
* - CryptoSwift can only do multiple of 32-bits.
*/
swrc =
p_CSwift_SimpleRequest(hac, SW_CMD_RAND, NULL, 0, &largenum, 1);
if (swrc != SW_OK) {

22
ssl/d1_pkt.c
View file

@ -433,12 +433,12 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
rr->orig_len = rr->length;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
if (enc_err == 0) {
/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
rr->length = 0;
@ -1046,11 +1046,11 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
}
}
/*-
* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/*-
* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&

38
ssl/s3_cbc.c
View file

@ -754,25 +754,25 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
return;
block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
/*-
* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
* digests and TLS to deal with.
* Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
* otherwise.
* Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
* processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
* block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
* So we have:
* blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
* equivalently:
* blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
* HMAC adds a constant overhead.
* We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
* blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
* for SHA384/SHA512 and
* blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
* otherwise.
*/
/*-
* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
* digests and TLS to deal with.
* Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
* otherwise.
* Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
* processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
* block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
* So we have:
* blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
* equivalently:
* blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
* HMAC adds a constant overhead.
* We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
* blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
* for SHA384/SHA512 and
* blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
* otherwise.
*/
digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;

74
ssl/s3_clnt.c
View file

@ -725,36 +725,36 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
#if 0
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
@ -2514,13 +2514,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
/*-
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
* kssl_ctx->length);
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
/*-
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
* kssl_ctx->length);
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);

15
ssl/s3_enc.c
View file

@ -748,13 +748,14 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/*-
* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
*
* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
* total size. */
/*-
* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
*
* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
* total size.
*/
unsigned char header[75];
unsigned j = 0;
memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);

8
ssl/ssl_lib.c
View file

@ -1913,11 +1913,11 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
ret->references = 1;
ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/*-
ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->info_callback = NULL;

30
ssl/ssl_sess.c
View file

@ -325,21 +325,21 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*-
* If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
* Note that:
* (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
* ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
* When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
* ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
* At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
* however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
* whether a ticket is expected or not.
*
* (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
* ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
* ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
*/
/*-
* If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
* Note that:
* (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
* ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
* When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
* ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
* At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
* however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
* whether a ticket is expected or not.
*
* (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
* ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
* ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
*/
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
goto sess_id_done;

4
ssl/ssl_task.c
View file

@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ int doit(io_channel chan, SSL_CTX *s_ctx)
if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
goto err;
/*- original, DRM 24-SEP-1997
BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan );
BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan );
BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan );
BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan );
*/
BIO_set_fd(c_to_s, 0, chan);
BIO_set_fd(s_to_c, 0, chan);

84
ssl/ssltest.c
View file

@ -1845,40 +1845,40 @@ int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
(void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
do {
/*-
* c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be
* relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
* test program, we're the server, too:
*
* server_io: server's SSL communication
*
* server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
* client + client_io, server + server_io.
* BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar
* to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
* be handled by the same thread).
* [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
* of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
* suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
*
* Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
*
* BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now
* BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil
* other side's read attempt
* BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now
*
* ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
* it depends on the application which one you should use.
*/
/*-
* c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be
* relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
* test program, we're the server, too:
*
* server_io: server's SSL communication
*
* server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
* client + client_io, server + server_io.
* BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar
* to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
* be handled by the same thread).
* [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
* of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
* suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
*
* Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
*
* BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now
* BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil
* other side's read attempt
* BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now
*
* ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
* it depends on the application which one you should use.
*/
/*
* We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
@ -2266,10 +2266,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
/*-
else if (s_write)
printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
else if (s_write)
printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
}
if (do_client && debug) {
@ -2277,10 +2277,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
/*-
else if (c_write)
printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
else if (c_write)
printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
}
if (!do_client && !do_server) {

12
test/methtest.c
View file

@ -86,13 +86,13 @@ char *argv[];
METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/usr/local/ssl/certs");
METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp2);
/*- tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
/*- tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
*/
METH_init(top);