Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key. CVE-2016-2178 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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1 changed files with 5 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -204,10 +204,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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goto err;
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} while (BN_is_zero(k));
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if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
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BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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}
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if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
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if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
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dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx))
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@ -238,6 +234,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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} else {
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K = k;
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}
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if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
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BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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}
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DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
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dsa->method_mont_p);
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if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
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