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Start up DEVRANDOM entropy improvement for older Linux devices.

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Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed.  Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.

This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions.  However, this is no worse than the current situation.

An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence.  Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process.  Even one long running process will prevent this attack.

The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0.  Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)
This commit is contained in:
Pauli 2019-08-20 16:10:49 +10:00
parent cf0932cdd9
commit 3a5777501a
3 changed files with 139 additions and 6 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

9
CHANGES
View file

@ -9,6 +9,15 @@
Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for
/dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom.
The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using
a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier
can be configured by defining OSSL_SHM_SEEDED to the desired value.
The default identifier is 114.
[Paul Dale]
*) Revised BN_generate_prime_ex to not avoid factors 2..17863 in p-1
when primes for RSA keys are computed.
Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys,

107
crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
View file

@ -14,12 +14,16 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#include "internal/rand_int.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/dso.h"
#if defined(__linux)
# include <asm/unistd.h>
# include <sys/ipc.h>
# include <sys/shm.h>
# include <sys/utsname.h>
#endif
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
# include <sys/types.h>
@ -336,6 +340,96 @@ static struct random_device {
} random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)];
static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
# if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT)
static void *shm_addr;
# if !defined(FIPS_MODE)
static void cleanup_shm(void)
{
shmdt(shm_addr);
}
# endif
/*
* Ensure that the system randomness source has been adequately seeded.
* This is done by having the first start of libcrypto, wait until the device
* /dev/random becomes able to supply a byte of entropy. Subsequent starts
* of the library and later reseedings do not need to do this.
*/
static int wait_random_seeded(void)
{
static int seeded = OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID < 0;
static const int kernel_version[] = { DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL };
int kernel[2];
int shm_id, fd, r;
char c, *p;
struct utsname un;
fd_set fds;
if (!seeded) {
/* See if anthing has created the global seeded indication */
if ((shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, 0)) == -1) {
/*
* Check the kernel's version and fail if it is too recent.
*
* Linux kernels from 4.8 onwards do not guarantee that
* /dev/urandom is properly seeded when /dev/random becomes
* readable. However, such kernels support the getentropy(2)
* system call and this should always succeed which renders
* this alternative but essentially identical source moot.
*/
if (uname(&un) == 0) {
kernel[0] = atoi(un.release);
p = strchr(un.release, '.');
kernel[1] = p == NULL ? 0 : atoi(p + 1);
if (kernel[0] > kernel_version[0]
|| (kernel[0] == kernel_version[0]
&& kernel[1] >= kernel_version[1])) {
return 0;
}
}
/* Open /dev/random and wait for it to be readable */
if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
if (DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT) {
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd, &fds);
while ((r = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL)) < 0
&& errno == EINTR);
} else {
while ((r = read(fd, &c, 1)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
}
close(fd);
if (r == 1) {
seeded = 1;
/* Craete the shared memory indicator */
shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1,
IPC_CREAT | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
}
}
}
if (shm_id != -1) {
seeded = 1;
/*
* Map the shared memory to prevent its premature destruction.
* If this call fails, it isn't a big problem.
*/
shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
# ifndef FIPS_MODE
/* TODO 3.0: The FIPS provider doesn't have OPENSSL_atexit */
if (shm_addr != (void *)-1)
OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm);
# endif
}
}
return seeded;
}
# else /* defined __linux */
static int wait_random_seeded(void)
{
return 1;
}
# endif
/*
* Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is
* still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not
@ -497,13 +591,14 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
{
if (wait_random_seeded()) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) {
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths);
i++) {
ssize_t bytes = 0;
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
/* Maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
int attempts = 3;
const int fd = get_random_device(i);
@ -517,7 +612,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
break;
}
@ -525,7 +620,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
close_random_device(i);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
}
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)

29
e_os.h
View file

@ -28,6 +28,35 @@
* default, we will try to read at least one of these files
*/
# define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/hwrng", "/dev/srandom"
# ifdef __linux
# ifndef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
# define DEVRANDOM_WAIT "/dev/random"
# endif
/*
* Linux kernels 4.8 and later changes how their random device works and there
* is no reliable way to tell that /dev/urandom has been seeded -- getentropy(2)
* should be used instead.
*/
# ifndef DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL
# define DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL 4, 8
# endif
/*
* Some operating systems do not permit select(2) on their random devices,
* defining this to zero will force the used of read(2) to extract one byte
* from /dev/random.
*/
# ifndef DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT
# define DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT 1
# endif
/*
* Define the shared memory identifier used to indicate if the operating
* system has properly seeded the DEVRANDOM source.
*/
# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID
# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID 114
# endif
# endif
# endif
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
/*