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Re-align some comments after running the reformat script.

Browse source 
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)

This commit is for the 1.0.0 changes

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2015-01-05 11:30:03 +00:00
parent 4bc9913844
commit 3d7a9aca8c
68 changed files with 1100 additions and 1099 deletions
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8
apps/ca.c
View file

@ -600,10 +600,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
if (oid_bio == NULL) {
/*-
BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
*/
/*-
BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
*/
ERR_clear_error();
} else {
OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);

4
apps/gendh.c
View file

@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
outfile = *(++argv);
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-2") == 0)
g = 2;
/*- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-3") == 0)
g=3; */
/*- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-3") == 0)
g=3; */
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-5") == 0)
g = 5;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE

42
apps/openssl.c
View file

@ -227,27 +227,27 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
long errline;
#if defined( OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (__INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64)
/*-
* 2011-03-22 SMS.
* If we have 32-bit pointers everywhere, then we're safe, and
* we bypass this mess, as on non-VMS systems. (See ARGV,
* above.)
* Problem 1: Compaq/HP C before V7.3 always used 32-bit
* pointers for argv[].
* Fix 1: For a 32-bit argv[], when we're using 64-bit pointers
* everywhere else, we always allocate and use a 64-bit
* duplicate of argv[].
* Problem 2: Compaq/HP C V7.3 (Alpha, IA64) before ECO1 failed
* to NULL-terminate a 64-bit argv[]. (As this was written, the
* compiler ECO was available only on IA64.)
* Fix 2: Unless advised not to (VMS_TRUST_ARGV), we test a
* 64-bit argv[argc] for NULL, and, if necessary, use a
* (properly) NULL-terminated (64-bit) duplicate of argv[].
* The same code is used in either case to duplicate argv[].
* Some of these decisions could be handled in preprocessing,
* but the code tends to get even uglier, and the penalty for
* deciding at compile- or run-time is tiny.
*/
/*-
* 2011-03-22 SMS.
* If we have 32-bit pointers everywhere, then we're safe, and
* we bypass this mess, as on non-VMS systems. (See ARGV,
* above.)
* Problem 1: Compaq/HP C before V7.3 always used 32-bit
* pointers for argv[].
* Fix 1: For a 32-bit argv[], when we're using 64-bit pointers
* everywhere else, we always allocate and use a 64-bit
* duplicate of argv[].
* Problem 2: Compaq/HP C V7.3 (Alpha, IA64) before ECO1 failed
* to NULL-terminate a 64-bit argv[]. (As this was written, the
* compiler ECO was available only on IA64.)
* Fix 2: Unless advised not to (VMS_TRUST_ARGV), we test a
* 64-bit argv[argc] for NULL, and, if necessary, use a
* (properly) NULL-terminated (64-bit) duplicate of argv[].
* The same code is used in either case to duplicate argv[].
* Some of these decisions could be handled in preprocessing,
* but the code tends to get even uglier, and the penalty for
* deciding at compile- or run-time is tiny.
*/
char **Argv = NULL;
int free_Argv = 0;

8
apps/req.c
View file

@ -495,10 +495,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
if (oid_bio == NULL) {
/*-
BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
*/
/*-
BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
*/
} else {
OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
BIO_free(oid_bio);

34
apps/s_cb.c
View file

@ -191,10 +191,10 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
{
if (cert_file != NULL) {
/*-
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
*/
/*-
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
*/
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
@ -212,20 +212,20 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
return (0);
}
/*-
In theory this is no longer needed
ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
/*-
In theory this is no longer needed
ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
if (x509 != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,
SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
}
SSL_free(ssl);
*/
if (x509 != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,
SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
}
SSL_free(ssl);
*/
/*
* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from the private

4
apps/s_client.c
View file

@ -1260,8 +1260,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
}
#endif
/*- printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
/*- printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
/*
* Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is

14
apps/s_socket.c
View file

@ -426,13 +426,13 @@ static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host)
}
/*-
ling.l_onoff=1;
ling.l_linger=0;
i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_LINGER,(char *)&ling,sizeof(ling));
if (i < 0) { perror("linger"); return(0); }
i=0;
i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i));
if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
ling.l_onoff=1;
ling.l_linger=0;
i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_LINGER,(char *)&ling,sizeof(ling));
if (i < 0) { perror("linger"); return(0); }
i=0;
i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i));
if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
*/
if (host == NULL)

24
apps/ts.c
View file

@ -1101,19 +1101,19 @@ static X509_STORE *create_cert_store(char *ca_path, char *ca_file)
static int MS_CALLBACK verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
/*-
char buf[256];
/*-
char buf[256];
if (!ok)
{
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
printf("%s\n", buf);
printf("error %d at %d depth lookup: %s\n",
ctx->error, ctx->error_depth,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
}
*/
if (!ok)
{
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
printf("%s\n", buf);
printf("error %d at %d depth lookup: %s\n",
ctx->error, ctx->error_depth,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
}
*/
return ok;
}

14
crypto/bio/b_sock.c
View file

@ -530,13 +530,13 @@ int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg)
i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, (char *)arg);
# else
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
/*-
* 2011-02-18 SMS.
* VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we
* observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *",
* so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use
* that, instead.
*/
/*-
* 2011-02-18 SMS.
* VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we
* observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *",
* so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use
* that, instead.
*/
# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
# define ARG arg_32p
# pragma pointer_size save

10
crypto/bio/bf_null.c
View file

@ -103,11 +103,11 @@ static int nullf_free(BIO *a)
{
if (a == NULL)
return (0);
/*-
a->ptr=NULL;
a->init=0;
a->flags=0;
*/
/*-
a->ptr=NULL;
a->init=0;
a->flags=0;
*/
return (1);
}

18
crypto/bio/bio.h
View file

@ -316,15 +316,15 @@ struct bio_st {
DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct {
/*-
* Buffers are setup like this:
*
* <---------------------- size ----------------------->
* +---------------------------------------------------+
* | consumed | remaining | free space |
* +---------------------------------------------------+
* <-- off --><------- len ------->
*/
/*-
* Buffers are setup like this:
*
* <---------------------- size ----------------------->
* +---------------------------------------------------+
* | consumed | remaining | free space |
* +---------------------------------------------------+
* <-- off --><------- len ------->
*/
/*- BIO *bio; *//*
* this is now in the BIO struct
*/

12
crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
View file

@ -421,12 +421,12 @@ static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = (long)data->bind_mode;
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
/*- dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
if (data->param_hostname)
BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);
BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */
/*- dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
if (data->param_hostname)
BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);
BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */
break;
default:

24
crypto/bn/bn_add.c
View file

@ -69,12 +69,12 @@ int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
/*-
* a + b a+b
* a + -b a-b
* -a + b b-a
* -a + -b -(a+b)
*/
/*-
* a + b a+b
* a + -b a-b
* -a + b b-a
* -a + -b -(a+b)
*/
if (a_neg ^ b->neg) {
/* only one is negative */
if (a_neg) {
@ -265,12 +265,12 @@ int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
/*-
* a - b a-b
* a - -b a+b
* -a - b -(a+b)
* -a - -b b-a
*/
/*-
* a - b a-b
* a - -b a+b
* -a - b -(a+b)
* -a - -b b-a
*/
if (a->neg) {
if (b->neg) {
tmp = a;

60
crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
View file

@ -174,36 +174,36 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
bn_check_top(p);
bn_check_top(m);
/*-
* For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
* a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
* exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
* reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
*
* For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise,
* exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering
* algorithm is used.
*
* (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations a^p mod m
* where a, p, m are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048,
* 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the
* standard algorithm:
*
* BN_mod_exp_mont 33 .. 40 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
* 55 .. 77 % [UltraSparc processor, but
* debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.]
*
* BN_mod_exp_recp 50 .. 70 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
* 62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc]
*
* On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont
* at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was
* slower even than the standard algorithm!
*
* "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations]
* should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code
* has been integrated into OpenSSL.)
*/
/*-
* For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
* a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
* exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
* reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
*
* For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise,
* exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering
* algorithm is used.
*
* (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations a^p mod m
* where a, p, m are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048,
* 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the
* standard algorithm:
*
* BN_mod_exp_mont 33 .. 40 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
* 55 .. 77 % [UltraSparc processor, but
* debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.]
*
* BN_mod_exp_recp 50 .. 70 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
* 62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc]
*
* On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont
* at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was
* slower even than the standard algorithm!
*
* "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations]
* should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code
* has been integrated into OpenSSL.)
*/
#define MONT_MUL_MOD
#define MONT_EXP_WORD

212
crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
View file

@ -267,13 +267,13 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
goto err;
}
sign = -1;
/*-
* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
*
* 0 <= B < A,
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
*/
/*-
* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
*
* 0 <= B < A,
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
*/
if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= (BN_BITS <= 32 ? 450 : 2048))) {
/*
@ -285,12 +285,12 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
int shift;
while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
/*-
* 0 < B < |n|,
* 0 < A <= |n|,
* (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
*/
/*-
* 0 < B < |n|,
* 0 < A <= |n|,
* (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
*/
/*
* Now divide B by the maximum possible power of two in the
@ -336,18 +336,18 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
goto err;
}
/*-
* We still have (1) and (2).
* Both A and B are odd.
* The following computations ensure that
*
* 0 <= B < |n|,
* 0 < A < |n|,
* (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
*
* and that either A or B is even in the next iteration.
*/
/*-
* We still have (1) and (2).
* Both A and B are odd.
* The following computations ensure that
*
* 0 <= B < |n|,
* 0 < A < |n|,
* (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
*
* and that either A or B is even in the next iteration.
*/
if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) {
/* -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A (mod |n|) */
if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y))
@ -376,11 +376,11 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
BIGNUM *tmp;
/*-
* 0 < B < A,
* (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
*/
/*-
* 0 < B < A,
* (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
*/
/* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B)) {
@ -427,12 +427,12 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
goto err;
}
/*-
* Now
* A = D*B + M;
* thus we have
* (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
*/
/*-
* Now
* A = D*B + M;
* thus we have
* (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
*/
tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
* matter */
@ -442,25 +442,25 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
B = M;
/* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */
/*-
* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
* (**) translates into
* sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
* Similarly, (*) translates into
* -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
*
* Thus,
* sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
*/
/*-
* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
* (**) translates into
* sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
* Similarly, (*) translates into
* -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
*
* Thus,
* sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
*/
/*
* most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp :=
@ -497,13 +497,13 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
}
}
/*-
* The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
* A == gcd(a,n);
* we have
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
* where Y is non-negative.
*/
/*-
* The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
* A == gcd(a,n);
* we have
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
* where Y is non-negative.
*/
if (sign < 0) {
if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
@ -587,22 +587,22 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
goto err;
}
sign = -1;
/*-
* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
*
* 0 <= B < A,
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
*/
/*-
* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
*
* 0 <= B < A,
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
*/
while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
BIGNUM *tmp;
/*-
* 0 < B < A,
* (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
*/
/*-
* 0 < B < A,
* (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
*/
/*
* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
@ -615,12 +615,12 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
if (!BN_div(D, M, pA, B, ctx))
goto err;
/*-
* Now
* A = D*B + M;
* thus we have
* (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
*/
/*-
* Now
* A = D*B + M;
* thus we have
* (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
*/
tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
* matter */
@ -630,25 +630,25 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
B = M;
/* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */
/*-
* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
* (**) translates into
* sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
* Similarly, (*) translates into
* -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
*
* Thus,
* sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
*/
/*-
* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
* (**) translates into
* sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
* Similarly, (*) translates into
* -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
*
* Thus,
* sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
*/
if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
goto err;
@ -662,13 +662,13 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
sign = -sign;
}
/*-
* The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
* A == gcd(a,n);
* we have
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
* where Y is non-negative.
*/
/*-
* The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
* A == gcd(a,n);
* we have
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
* where Y is non-negative.
*/
if (sign < 0) {
if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))

14
crypto/bn/bn_kron.c
View file

@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
int ret = -2; /* avoid 'uninitialized' warning */
int err = 0;
BIGNUM *A, *B, *tmp;
/*-
* In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant:
* For any odd BIGNUM n,
* tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7]
* is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation).
* Note that the sign of n does not matter.
*/
/*-
* In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant:
* For any odd BIGNUM n,
* tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7]
* is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation).
* Note that the sign of n does not matter.
*/
static const int tab[8] = { 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1 };
bn_check_top(a);

90
crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
View file

@ -527,11 +527,11 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p);
}
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
*/
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
*/
c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
@ -542,12 +542,12 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
}
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
* c1 holds the carry bits
*/
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
* c1 holds the carry bits
*/
c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
if (c1) {
p = &(r[n + n2]);
@ -689,11 +689,11 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
}
}
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
*/
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
*/
c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
@ -704,12 +704,12 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
}
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
* c1 holds the carry bits
*/
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
* c1 holds the carry bits
*/
c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
if (c1) {
p = &(r[n + n2]);
@ -828,13 +828,13 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
bn_mul_recursive(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2]));
}
/*-
* s0 == low(al*bl)
* s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl)
* We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl)
* high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl))
* high(al*bl) == s1 - (r[0]+l[0]+t[0])
*/
/*-
* s0 == low(al*bl)
* s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl)
* We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl)
* high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl))
* high(al*bl) == s1 - (r[0]+l[0]+t[0])
*/
if (l != NULL) {
lp = &(t[n2 + n]);
c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(r[0]), &(l[0]), n));
@ -859,22 +859,22 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
lp[i] = ((~mp[i]) + 1) & BN_MASK2;
}
/*-
* s[0] = low(al*bl)
* t[3] = high(al*bl)
* t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign
* r[10] = (a[1]*b[1])
*/
/*-
* R[10] = al*bl
* R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
* R[32] = ah*bh
*/
/*-
* R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow)
* R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow)
* R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow)
*/
/*-
* s[0] = low(al*bl)
* t[3] = high(al*bl)
* t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign
* r[10] = (a[1]*b[1])
*/
/*-
* R[10] = al*bl
* R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
* R[32] = ah*bh
*/
/*-
* R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow)
* R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow)
* R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow)
*/
if (l != NULL) {
lp = &(t[n2]);
c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(t[n2 + n]), &(l[0]), n));

12
crypto/bn/bn_print.c
View file

@ -106,12 +106,12 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
BIGNUM *t = NULL;
BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
/*-
* get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
* num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
* <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.1001 + log(2) + 1 (rounding error)
* <= BN_num_bits(a)/10 + BN_num_bits/1000 + 1 + 1
*/
/*-
* get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
* num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
* <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.1001 + log(2) + 1 (rounding error)
* <= BN_num_bits(a)/10 + BN_num_bits/1000 + 1 + 1
*/
i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
bn_data =

22
crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
View file

@ -249,23 +249,23 @@ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t)
bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p);
bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p);
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
*/
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero
* r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
* r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
*/
c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
/* t[32] is negative */
c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1])
* r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0])
* r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1])
* c1 holds the carry bits
*/
/*-
* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1])
* r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0])
* r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1])
* c1 holds the carry bits
*/
c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
if (c1) {
p = &(r[n + n2]);

122
crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
View file

@ -132,14 +132,14 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
/* we'll set q later (if needed) */
if (e == 1) {
/*-
* The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse
* modulo (|p|-1)/2, and square roots can be computed
* directly by modular exponentiation.
* We have
* 2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1 (mod (|p|-1)/2),
* so we can use exponent (|p|+1)/4, i.e. (|p|-3)/4 + 1.
*/
/*-
* The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse
* modulo (|p|-1)/2, and square roots can be computed
* directly by modular exponentiation.
* We have
* 2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1 (mod (|p|-1)/2),
* so we can use exponent (|p|+1)/4, i.e. (|p|-3)/4 + 1.
*/
if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2))
goto end;
q->neg = 0;
@ -152,32 +152,32 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
if (e == 2) {
/*-
* |p| == 5 (mod 8)
*
* In this case 2 is always a non-square since
* Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime.
* So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square.
* Thus for
* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
* i := (2*a)*b^2
* we have
* i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
* = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
* = -1;
* so if we set
* x := a*b*(i-1),
* then
* x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
* = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
* = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
* = a*(-i)*i
* = a.
*
* (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
* <URL: http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=nmbrthry&O=T&P=562>,
* November 1992.)
*/
/*-
* |p| == 5 (mod 8)
*
* In this case 2 is always a non-square since
* Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime.
* So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square.
* Thus for
* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
* i := (2*a)*b^2
* we have
* i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
* = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
* = -1;
* so if we set
* x := a*b*(i-1),
* then
* x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
* = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
* = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
* = a*(-i)*i
* = a.
*
* (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
* <URL: http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=nmbrthry&O=T&P=562>,
* November 1992.)
*/
/* t := 2*a */
if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p))
@ -277,24 +277,24 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
goto end;
}
/*-
* Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer
* k, 0 <= k < 2^e, such that
*
* a^q * y^k == 1 (mod p).
*
* As a^q is a square and y is not, k must be even.
* q+1 is even, too, so there is an element
*
* X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2),
*
* and it satisfies
*
* X^2 = a^q * a * y^k
* = a,
*
* so it is the square root that we are looking for.
*/
/*-
* Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer
* k, 0 <= k < 2^e, such that
*
* a^q * y^k == 1 (mod p).
*
* As a^q is a square and y is not, k must be even.
* q+1 is even, too, so there is an element
*
* X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2),
*
* and it satisfies
*
* X^2 = a^q * a * y^k
* = a,
*
* so it is the square root that we are looking for.
*/
/* t := (q-1)/2 (note that q is odd) */
if (!BN_rshift1(t, q))
@ -333,15 +333,15 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
goto end;
while (1) {
/*-
* Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E
* where E refers to the original value of e, which we
* don't keep in a variable), and x is a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
*
* We have a*b = x^2,
* y^2^(e-1) = -1,
* b^2^(e-1) = 1.
*/
/*-
* Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E
* where E refers to the original value of e, which we
* don't keep in a variable), and x is a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
*
* We have a*b = x^2,
* y^2^(e-1) = -1,
* b^2^(e-1) = 1.
*/
if (BN_is_one(b)) {
if (!BN_copy(ret, x))

6
crypto/cast/casttest.c
View file

@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
};
# endif

20
crypto/conf/conf_def.c
View file

@ -567,16 +567,16 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
}
e++;
}
/*-
* So at this point we have
* np which is the start of the name string which is
* '\0' terminated.
* cp which is the start of the section string which is
* '\0' terminated.
* e is the 'next point after'.
* r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0'
* rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from.
*/
/*-
* So at this point we have
* np which is the start of the name string which is
* '\0' terminated.
* cp which is the start of the section string which is
* '\0' terminated.
* e is the 'next point after'.
* r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0'
* rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from.
*/
p = _CONF_get_string(conf, cp, np);
if (rrp != NULL)
*rrp = rr;

16
crypto/des/des.c
View file

@ -228,14 +228,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (error)
usage();
/*-
* We either
* do checksum or
* do encrypt or
* do decrypt or
* do decrypt then ckecksum or
* do checksum then encrypt
*/
/*-
* We either
* do checksum or
* do encrypt or
* do decrypt or
* do decrypt then ckecksum or
* do checksum then encrypt
*/
if (((eflag + dflag) == 1) || cflag) {
if (eflag)
do_encrypt = DES_ENCRYPT;

14
crypto/des/destest.c
View file

@ -404,13 +404,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(&cbc_data[16], &cbc_out[16], i - 16, &ks, &ks2,
&ks3, &iv3, &iv2, DES_ENCRYPT);
/*- if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
(unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
{
printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
err=1;
}
*/
/*- if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
(unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
{
printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
err=1;
}
*/
memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
memset(iv2, '\0', sizeof iv2);
DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, i, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, &iv2,

12
crypto/des/enc_read.c
View file

@ -205,12 +205,12 @@ int DES_enc_read(int fd, void *buf, int len, DES_key_schedule *sched,
*/
num = len;
} else {
/*-
* >output is a multiple of 8 byes, if len < rnum
* >we must be careful. The user must be aware that this
* >routine will write more bytes than he asked for.
* >The length of the buffer must be correct.
* FIXED - Should be ok now 18-9-90 - eay */
/*-
* >output is a multiple of 8 byes, if len < rnum
* >we must be careful. The user must be aware that this
* >routine will write more bytes than he asked for.
* >The length of the buffer must be correct.
* FIXED - Should be ok now 18-9-90 - eay */
if (len < rnum) {
if (DES_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE)

4
crypto/des/ofb64ede.c
View file

@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(register const unsigned char *in,
n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
}
if (save) {
/*- v0=ti[0];
v1=ti[1];*/
/*- v0=ti[0];
v1=ti[1];*/
iv = &(*ivec)[0];
l2c(v0, iv);
l2c(v1, iv);

10
crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
View file

@ -200,11 +200,11 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
goto decerr;
if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2)
goto decerr;
/*-
* Handle Two broken types:
* SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
* SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
*/
/*-
* Handle Two broken types:
* SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
* SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
*/
t1 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 0);
t2 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 1);

34
crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
View file

@ -178,23 +178,23 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso)
goto err;
}
/*-
* A file specification may look like this:
*
* node::dev:[dir-spec]name.type;ver
*
* or (for compatibility with TOPS-20):
*
* node::dev:<dir-spec>name.type;ver
*
* and the dir-spec uses '.' as separator. Also, a dir-spec
* may consist of several parts, with mixed use of [] and <>:
*
* [dir1.]<dir2>
*
* We need to split the file specification into the name and
* the rest (both before and after the name itself).
*/
/*-
* A file specification may look like this:
*
* node::dev:[dir-spec]name.type;ver
*
* or (for compatibility with TOPS-20):
*
* node::dev:<dir-spec>name.type;ver
*
* and the dir-spec uses '.' as separator. Also, a dir-spec
* may consist of several parts, with mixed use of [] and <>:
*
* [dir1.]<dir2>
*
* We need to split the file specification into the name and
* the rest (both before and after the name itself).
*/
/*
* Start with trying to find the end of a dir-spec, and save the position
* of the byte after in sp1

16
crypto/ec/ec.h
View file

@ -116,14 +116,14 @@ typedef enum {
typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD;
typedef struct ec_group_st
/*-
EC_METHOD *meth;
-- field definition
-- curve coefficients
-- optional generator with associated information (order, cofactor)
-- optional extra data (precomputed table for fast computation of multiples of generator)
-- ASN1 stuff
*/
/*-
EC_METHOD *meth;
-- field definition
-- curve coefficients
-- optional generator with associated information (order, cofactor)
-- optional extra data (precomputed table for fast computation of multiples of generator)
-- ASN1 stuff
*/
EC_GROUP;
typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT;

12
crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
View file

@ -950,12 +950,12 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
if (lh == NULL)
goto err;
/*-
* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b.
* <=> x^3 + a*x^2 + x*y + b + y^2 = 0
* <=> ((x + a) * x + y ) * x + b + y^2 = 0
*/
/*-
* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b.
* <=> x^3 + a*x^2 + x*y + b + y^2 = 0
* <=> ((x + a) * x + y ) * x + b + y^2 = 0
*/
if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, &point->X, &group->a))
goto err;
if (!field_mul(group, lh, lh, &point->X, ctx))

16
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
View file

@ -115,14 +115,14 @@ struct ec_method_st {
void (*point_finish) (EC_POINT *);
void (*point_clear_finish) (EC_POINT *);
int (*point_copy) (EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *);
/*-
* used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity,
* EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
* EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
* EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m,
* EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m,
* EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m:
*/
/*-
* used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity,
* EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
* EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
* EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m,
* EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m,
* EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m:
*/
int (*point_set_to_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
int (*point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *,
EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x,

14
crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
View file

@ -602,13 +602,13 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)))
goto err;
/*-
* prepare precomputed values:
* val_sub[i][0] := points[i]
* val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
* val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
* ...
*/
/*-
* prepare precomputed values:
* val_sub[i][0] := points[i]
* val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
* val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
* ...
*/
for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) {
if (i < num) {
if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i]))

70
crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
View file

@ -312,11 +312,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
goto err;
}
/*-
* check the discriminant:
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p)
* 0 =< a, b < p
*/
/*-
* check the discriminant:
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p)
* 0 =< a, b < p
*/
if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
if (BN_is_zero(b))
goto err;
@ -668,11 +668,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
if (y == NULL)
goto err;
/*-
* Recover y. We have a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b,
* so y is one of the square roots of x^3 + a*x + b.
*/
/*-
* Recover y. We have a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b,
* so y is one of the square roots of x^3 + a*x + b.
*/
/* tmp1 := x^3 */
if (!BN_nnmod(x, x_, &group->field, ctx))
@ -1251,10 +1251,10 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p))
goto err;
/*-
* n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
* = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4
*/
/*-
* n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
* = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4
*/
} else {
if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx))
goto err;
@ -1375,15 +1375,15 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
if (Z6 == NULL)
goto err;
/*-
* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
* The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
* where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
* Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation into
* Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
* To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
*/
/*-
* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
* y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
* The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
* where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
* Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation into
* Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
* To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
*/
/* rh := X^2 */
if (!field_sqr(group, rh, &point->X, ctx))
@ -1450,12 +1450,12 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
/*-
* return values:
* -1 error
* 0 equal (in affine coordinates)
* 1 not equal
*/
/*-
* return values:
* -1 error
* 0 equal (in affine coordinates)
* 1 not equal
*/
int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
@ -1494,12 +1494,12 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
if (Zb23 == NULL)
goto end;
/*-
* We have to decide whether
* (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
* or equivalently, whether
* (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
*/
/*-
* We have to decide whether
* (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
* or equivalently, whether
* (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
*/
if (!b->Z_is_one) {
if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx))

6
crypto/idea/ideatest.c
View file

@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
};
static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);

6
crypto/lhash/lhash.c
View file

@ -434,9 +434,9 @@ unsigned long lh_strhash(const char *c)
if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0'))
return (ret);
/*-
unsigned char b[16];
MD5(c,strlen(c),b);
return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24));
unsigned char b[16];
MD5(c,strlen(c),b);
return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24));
*/
n = 0x100;

40
crypto/o_time.c
View file

@ -159,30 +159,30 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
* do it the hard way.
*/
{
/*-
* The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date,
if I remember correctly, which is November 17, 1858.
Furthermore, time is measure in thenths of microseconds
and stored in quadwords (64 bit integers). unix_epoch
below is January 1st 1970 expressed as a VMS time. The
following code was used to get this number:
/*-
* The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date,
if I remember correctly, which is November 17, 1858.
Furthermore, time is measure in thenths of microseconds
and stored in quadwords (64 bit integers). unix_epoch
below is January 1st 1970 expressed as a VMS time. The
following code was used to get this number:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <lib$routines.h>
#include <starlet.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <lib$routines.h>
#include <starlet.h>
main()
{
unsigned long systime[2];
unsigned short epoch_values[7] =
{ 1970, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
main()
{
unsigned long systime[2];
unsigned short epoch_values[7] =
{ 1970, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
lib$cvt_vectim(epoch_values, systime);
lib$cvt_vectim(epoch_values, systime);
printf("%u %u", systime[0], systime[1]);
}
*/
printf("%u %u", systime[0], systime[1]);
}
*/
unsigned long unix_epoch[2] = { 1273708544, 8164711 };
unsigned long deltatime[2];
unsigned long systime[2];

16
crypto/pem/pem.h
View file

@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
struct {
int cipher;
/*-
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
} DEK_info;
PEM_USER *originator;
@ -182,9 +182,9 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
int num_recipient;
PEM_USER **recipient;
/*-
XXX(ben): don#t think this is used!
STACK *x509_chain; / * certificate chain */
/*-
XXX(ben): don#t think this is used!
STACK *x509_chain; / * certificate chain */
EVP_MD *md; /* signature type */
int md_enc; /* is the md encrypted or not? */
@ -194,9 +194,9 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
EVP_CIPHER *dec; /* date encryption cipher */
int key_len; /* key length */
unsigned char *key; /* key */
/*-
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
/*-
unused, and wrong size
unsigned char iv[8]; */
int data_enc; /* is the data encrypted */
int data_len;

8
crypto/rand/randfile.c
View file

@ -110,10 +110,10 @@ static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
{
/*-
* If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
* if bytes == -1, read complete file.
*/
/*-
* If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
* if bytes == -1, read complete file.
*/
MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO

6
crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
View file

@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
};
/*

116
crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
View file

@ -80,36 +80,36 @@ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata,
d = key->data;
#if defined(RC4_CHUNK)
/*-
* The original reason for implementing this(*) was the fact that
* pre-21164a Alpha CPUs don't have byte load/store instructions
* and e.g. a byte store has to be done with 64-bit load, shift,
* and, or and finally 64-bit store. Peaking data and operating
* at natural word size made it possible to reduce amount of
* instructions as well as to perform early read-ahead without
* suffering from RAW (read-after-write) hazard. This resulted
* in ~40%(**) performance improvement on 21064 box with gcc.
* But it's not only Alpha users who win here:-) Thanks to the
* early-n-wide read-ahead this implementation also exhibits
* >40% speed-up on SPARC and 20-30% on 64-bit MIPS (depending
* on sizeof(RC4_INT)).
*
* (*) "this" means code which recognizes the case when input
* and output pointers appear to be aligned at natural CPU
* word boundary
* (**) i.e. according to 'apps/openssl speed rc4' benchmark,
* crypto/rc4/rc4speed.c exhibits almost 70% speed-up...
*
* Cavets.
*
* - RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long long" should be a #1 choice for
* UltraSPARC. Unfortunately gcc generates very slow code
* (2.5-3 times slower than one generated by Sun's WorkShop
* C) and therefore gcc (at least 2.95 and earlier) should
* always be told that RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long".
*
* <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
*/
/*-
* The original reason for implementing this(*) was the fact that
* pre-21164a Alpha CPUs don't have byte load/store instructions
* and e.g. a byte store has to be done with 64-bit load, shift,
* and, or and finally 64-bit store. Peaking data and operating
* at natural word size made it possible to reduce amount of
* instructions as well as to perform early read-ahead without
* suffering from RAW (read-after-write) hazard. This resulted
* in ~40%(**) performance improvement on 21064 box with gcc.
* But it's not only Alpha users who win here:-) Thanks to the
* early-n-wide read-ahead this implementation also exhibits
* >40% speed-up on SPARC and 20-30% on 64-bit MIPS (depending
* on sizeof(RC4_INT)).
*
* (*) "this" means code which recognizes the case when input
* and output pointers appear to be aligned at natural CPU
* word boundary
* (**) i.e. according to 'apps/openssl speed rc4' benchmark,
* crypto/rc4/rc4speed.c exhibits almost 70% speed-up...
*
* Cavets.
*
* - RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long long" should be a #1 choice for
* UltraSPARC. Unfortunately gcc generates very slow code
* (2.5-3 times slower than one generated by Sun's WorkShop
* C) and therefore gcc (at least 2.95 and earlier) should
* always be told that RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long".
*
* <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
*/
# define RC4_STEP ( \
x=(x+1) &0xff, \
@ -131,34 +131,34 @@ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata,
1
};
/*-
* I reckon we can afford to implement both endian
* cases and to decide which way to take at run-time
* because the machine code appears to be very compact
* and redundant 1-2KB is perfectly tolerable (i.e.
* in case the compiler fails to eliminate it:-). By
* suggestion from Terrel Larson <terr@terralogic.net>
* who also stands for the is_endian union:-)
*
* Special notes.
*
* - is_endian is declared automatic as doing otherwise
* (declaring static) prevents gcc from eliminating
* the redundant code;
* - compilers (those I've tried) don't seem to have
* problems eliminating either the operators guarded
* by "if (sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)==8)" or the condition
* expressions themselves so I've got 'em to replace
* corresponding #ifdefs from the previous version;
* - I chose to let the redundant switch cases when
* sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8 be (were also #ifdefed
* before);
* - in case you wonder "&(sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)*8-1)" in
* [LB]ESHFT guards against "shift is out of range"
* warnings when sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8
*
* <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
*/
/*-
* I reckon we can afford to implement both endian
* cases and to decide which way to take at run-time
* because the machine code appears to be very compact
* and redundant 1-2KB is perfectly tolerable (i.e.
* in case the compiler fails to eliminate it:-). By
* suggestion from Terrel Larson <terr@terralogic.net>
* who also stands for the is_endian union:-)
*
* Special notes.
*
* - is_endian is declared automatic as doing otherwise
* (declaring static) prevents gcc from eliminating
* the redundant code;
* - compilers (those I've tried) don't seem to have
* problems eliminating either the operators guarded
* by "if (sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)==8)" or the condition
* expressions themselves so I've got 'em to replace
* corresponding #ifdefs from the previous version;
* - I chose to let the redundant switch cases when
* sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8 be (were also #ifdefed
* before);
* - in case you wonder "&(sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)*8-1)" in
* [LB]ESHFT guards against "shift is out of range"
* warnings when sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8
*
* <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
*/
if (!is_endian.little) { /* BIG-ENDIAN CASE */
# define BESHFT(c) (((sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)-(c)-1)*8)&(sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)*8-1))
for (; len & (0 - sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)); len -= sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)) {

24
crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
View file

@ -86,12 +86,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
if (hLen < 0)
goto err;
/*-
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
* -N reserved
*/
/*-
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
* -N reserved
*/
if (sLen == -1)
sLen = hLen;
else if (sLen == -2)
@ -176,12 +176,12 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
if (hLen < 0)
goto err;
/*-
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is maximized
* -N reserved
*/
/*-
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is maximized
* -N reserved
*/
if (sLen == -1)
sLen = hLen;
else if (sLen == -2)

44
crypto/threads/mttest.c
View file

@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
lh_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
/*- lh_node_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx),stderr);
fprintf(stderr,"-----\n"); */
/*- lh_node_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx),stderr);
fprintf(stderr,"-----\n"); */
lh_node_usage_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
}
@ -369,11 +369,11 @@ int ndoit(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2])
fprintf(stdout, "started thread %lu\n", CRYPTO_thread_id());
for (i = 0; i < number_of_loops; i++) {
/*- fprintf(stderr,"%4d %2d ctx->ref (%3d,%3d)\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),i,
ssl_ctx[0]->references,
ssl_ctx[1]->references); */
/* pthread_delay_np(&tm); */
/*- fprintf(stderr,"%4d %2d ctx->ref (%3d,%3d)\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),i,
ssl_ctx[0]->references,
ssl_ctx[1]->references); */
/* pthread_delay_np(&tm); */
ret = doit(ctx);
if (ret != 0) {
@ -801,23 +801,23 @@ void solaris_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
(type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
# endif
/*-
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
*/
/*-
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
*/
if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
/*-
if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
else
rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
else
rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
lock_count[type]++;
} else {
/* rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
/* rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
}
}
@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ void pthreads_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
(type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
# endif
/*-
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
CRYPTO_thread_id(),
mode,file,line);
*/
if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));

24
crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
View file

@ -131,18 +131,18 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits)
} else /* bit-oriented loop */
#endif
{
/*-
inp
|
+-------+-------+-------
|||||||||||||||||||||
+-------+-------+-------
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
|||||||||||||| c->data
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
|
c->bitoff/8
*/
/*-
inp
|
+-------+-------+-------
|||||||||||||||||||||
+-------+-------+-------
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
|||||||||||||| c->data
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
|
c->bitoff/8
*/
while (bits) {
unsigned int byteoff = bitoff / 8;
unsigned char b;

4
crypto/x509/by_dir.c
View file

@ -424,8 +424,8 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
* If we were going to up the reference count, we would need to
* do it on a perl 'type' basis
*/
/*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/
/*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/
goto finish;
}
}

4
crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
View file

@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name,
return 0;
}
/*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */
/*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */
ret->type = tmp->type;
ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;

4
crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
View file

@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(xi->version, 2))
goto err;
/*- xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
ri->attributes=NULL; */
/*- xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
ri->attributes=NULL; */
}
xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r);

18
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
View file

@ -461,15 +461,15 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int allow_proxy_certs;
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
* -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
* use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
* 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
* used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
* 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
* all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */

20
crypto/x509/x509name.c
View file

@ -162,16 +162,16 @@ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc)
set_prev = ret->set - 1;
set_next = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
/*-
* set_prev is the previous set
* set is the current set
* set_next is the following
* prev 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
* set 1 1 2 2
* next 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
* so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
* re-number down by 1
*/
/*-
* set_prev is the previous set
* set is the current set
* set_next is the following
* prev 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
* set 1 1 2 2
* next 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
* so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
* re-number down by 1
*/
if (set_prev + 1 < set_next)
for (i = loc; i < n; i++)
sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set--;

16
demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.h
View file

@ -106,14 +106,14 @@ extern "C" {
/*
* Functions for Digest (MD5, SHA1) stuff
*/
/* output : output data buffer */
/* input : input data buffer */
/* algo : hash algorithm, MD5 or SHA1 */
/*-
* typedef int t_zencod_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
* typedef int t_zencod_sha_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
*/
/* For now separate this stuff that mad it easier to test */
/* output : output data buffer */
/* input : input data buffer */
/* algo : hash algorithm, MD5 or SHA1 */
/*-
* typedef int t_zencod_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
* typedef int t_zencod_sha_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
*/
/* For now separate this stuff that mad it easier to test */
typedef int t_zencod_md5_init(ZEN_MD_DATA *data);
typedef int t_zencod_md5_update(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, const KEY * input);
typedef int t_zencod_md5_do_final(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, KEY * output);

26
engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
View file

@ -18,20 +18,20 @@ static char *gost_params[GOST_PARAM_MAX + 1] = { NULL };
static const char *gost_envnames[] = { "CRYPT_PARAMS" };
const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN gost_cmds[] = {
/*- { GOST_CTRL_RNG,
"RNG",
"Type of random number generator to use",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
{ GOST_CTRL_RNG_PARAMS,
"RNG_PARAMS",
"Parameter for random number generator",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
/*- { GOST_CTRL_RNG,
"RNG",
"Type of random number generator to use",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
{ GOST_CTRL_RNG_PARAMS,
"RNG_PARAMS",
"Parameter for random number generator",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
},
*/ {GOST_CTRL_CRYPT_PARAMS,
"CRYPT_PARAMS",
"OID of default GOST 28147-89 parameters",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
"CRYPT_PARAMS",
"OID of default GOST 28147-89 parameters",
ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
};

10
engines/e_cswift.c
View file

@ -1037,11 +1037,11 @@ static int cswift_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
while (num >= (int)sizeof(buf32)) {
largenum.value = buf;
largenum.nbytes = sizeof(buf32);
/*-
* tell CryptoSwift how many bytes we want and where we want it.
* Note: - CryptoSwift cannot do more than 4096 bytes at a time.
* - CryptoSwift can only do multiple of 32-bits.
*/
/*-
* tell CryptoSwift how many bytes we want and where we want it.
* Note: - CryptoSwift cannot do more than 4096 bytes at a time.
* - CryptoSwift can only do multiple of 32-bits.
*/
swrc =
p_CSwift_SimpleRequest(hac, SW_CMD_RAND, NULL, 0, &largenum, 1);
if (swrc != SW_OK) {

240
engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
View file

@ -180,32 +180,32 @@ typedef struct {
* be power of 2 */
int mslimbfirst; /* 0 or 1 */
int msbytefirst; /* 0 or 1; -1 = native */
/*-
* All the callback functions should return 0 on success, or a
* nonzero integer (whose value will be visible in the error message
* put in the buffer passed to the call).
*
* If a callback is not available pass a null function pointer.
*
* The callbacks may not call down again into the crypto plugin.
*/
/*-
* For thread-safety. Set everything to 0 if you promise only to be
* singlethreaded. maxsimultaneous is the number of calls to
* ModExp[Crt]/RSAImmed{Priv,Pub}/RSA. If you don't know what to
* put there then say 0 and the hook library will use a default.
*
* maxmutexes is a small limit on the number of simultaneous mutexes
* which will be requested by the library. If there is no small
* limit, set it to 0. If the crypto plugin cannot create the
* advertised number of mutexes the calls to its functions may fail.
* If a low number of mutexes is advertised the plugin will try to
* do the best it can. Making larger numbers of mutexes available
* may improve performance and parallelism by reducing contention
* over critical sections. Unavailability of any mutexes, implying
* single-threaded operation, should be indicated by the setting
* mutex_init et al to 0.
*/
/*-
* All the callback functions should return 0 on success, or a
* nonzero integer (whose value will be visible in the error message
* put in the buffer passed to the call).
*
* If a callback is not available pass a null function pointer.
*
* The callbacks may not call down again into the crypto plugin.
*/
/*-
* For thread-safety. Set everything to 0 if you promise only to be
* singlethreaded. maxsimultaneous is the number of calls to
* ModExp[Crt]/RSAImmed{Priv,Pub}/RSA. If you don't know what to
* put there then say 0 and the hook library will use a default.
*
* maxmutexes is a small limit on the number of simultaneous mutexes
* which will be requested by the library. If there is no small
* limit, set it to 0. If the crypto plugin cannot create the
* advertised number of mutexes the calls to its functions may fail.
* If a low number of mutexes is advertised the plugin will try to
* do the best it can. Making larger numbers of mutexes available
* may improve performance and parallelism by reducing contention
* over critical sections. Unavailability of any mutexes, implying
* single-threaded operation, should be indicated by the setting
* mutex_init et al to 0.
*/
int maxmutexes;
int maxsimultaneous;
size_t mutexsize;
@ -214,12 +214,12 @@ typedef struct {
int (*mutex_acquire) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
void (*mutex_release) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
void (*mutex_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
/*-
* For greater efficiency, can use condition vars internally for
* synchronisation. In this case maxsimultaneous is ignored, but
* the other mutex stuff must be available. In singlethreaded
* programs, set everything to 0.
*/
/*-
* For greater efficiency, can use condition vars internally for
* synchronisation. In this case maxsimultaneous is ignored, but
* the other mutex stuff must be available. In singlethreaded
* programs, set everything to 0.
*/
size_t condvarsize;
int (*condvar_init) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *,
HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
@ -227,103 +227,103 @@ typedef struct {
void (*condvar_signal) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
void (*condvar_broadcast) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
void (*condvar_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
/*-
* The semantics of acquiring and releasing mutexes and broadcasting
* and waiting on condition variables are expected to be those from
* POSIX threads (pthreads). The mutexes may be (in pthread-speak)
* fast mutexes, recursive mutexes, or nonrecursive ones.
*
* The _release/_signal/_broadcast and _destroy functions must
* always succeed when given a valid argument; if they are given an
* invalid argument then the program (crypto plugin + application)
* has an internal error, and they should abort the program.
*/
/*-
* The semantics of acquiring and releasing mutexes and broadcasting
* and waiting on condition variables are expected to be those from
* POSIX threads (pthreads). The mutexes may be (in pthread-speak)
* fast mutexes, recursive mutexes, or nonrecursive ones.
*
* The _release/_signal/_broadcast and _destroy functions must
* always succeed when given a valid argument; if they are given an
* invalid argument then the program (crypto plugin + application)
* has an internal error, and they should abort the program.
*/
int (*getpassphrase) (const char *prompt_info,
int *len_io, char *buf,
HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
/*-
* Passphrases and the prompt_info, if they contain high-bit-set
* characters, are UTF-8. The prompt_info may be a null pointer if
* no prompt information is available (it should not be an empty
* string). It will not contain text like `enter passphrase';
* instead it might say something like `Operator Card for John
* Smith' or `SmartCard in nFast Module #1, Slot #1'.
*
* buf points to a buffer in which to return the passphrase; on
* entry *len_io is the length of the buffer. It should be updated
* by the callback. The returned passphrase should not be
* null-terminated by the callback.
*/
/*-
* Passphrases and the prompt_info, if they contain high-bit-set
* characters, are UTF-8. The prompt_info may be a null pointer if
* no prompt information is available (it should not be an empty
* string). It will not contain text like `enter passphrase';
* instead it might say something like `Operator Card for John
* Smith' or `SmartCard in nFast Module #1, Slot #1'.
*
* buf points to a buffer in which to return the passphrase; on
* entry *len_io is the length of the buffer. It should be updated
* by the callback. The returned passphrase should not be
* null-terminated by the callback.
*/
int (*getphystoken) (const char *prompt_info,
const char *wrong_info,
HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
/*-
* Requests that the human user physically insert a different
* smartcard, DataKey, etc. The plugin should check whether the
* currently inserted token(s) are appropriate, and if they are it
* should not make this call.
*
* prompt_info is as before. wrong_info is a description of the
* currently inserted token(s) so that the user is told what
* something is. wrong_info, like prompt_info, may be null, but
* should not be an empty string. Its contents should be
* syntactically similar to that of prompt_info.
*/
/*-
* Note that a single LoadKey operation might cause several calls to
* getpassphrase and/or requestphystoken. If requestphystoken is
* not provided (ie, a null pointer is passed) then the plugin may
* not support loading keys for which authorisation by several cards
* is required. If getpassphrase is not provided then cards with
* passphrases may not be supported.
*
* getpassphrase and getphystoken do not need to check that the
* passphrase has been entered correctly or the correct token
* inserted; the crypto plugin will do that. If this is not the
* case then the crypto plugin is responsible for calling these
* routines again as appropriate until the correct token(s) and
* passphrase(s) are supplied as required, or until any retry limits
* implemented by the crypto plugin are reached.
*
* In either case, the application must allow the user to say `no'
* or `cancel' to indicate that they do not know the passphrase or
* have the appropriate token; this should cause the callback to
* return nonzero indicating error.
*/
/*-
* Requests that the human user physically insert a different
* smartcard, DataKey, etc. The plugin should check whether the
* currently inserted token(s) are appropriate, and if they are it
* should not make this call.
*
* prompt_info is as before. wrong_info is a description of the
* currently inserted token(s) so that the user is told what
* something is. wrong_info, like prompt_info, may be null, but
* should not be an empty string. Its contents should be
* syntactically similar to that of prompt_info.
*/
/*-
* Note that a single LoadKey operation might cause several calls to
* getpassphrase and/or requestphystoken. If requestphystoken is
* not provided (ie, a null pointer is passed) then the plugin may
* not support loading keys for which authorisation by several cards
* is required. If getpassphrase is not provided then cards with
* passphrases may not be supported.
*
* getpassphrase and getphystoken do not need to check that the
* passphrase has been entered correctly or the correct token
* inserted; the crypto plugin will do that. If this is not the
* case then the crypto plugin is responsible for calling these
* routines again as appropriate until the correct token(s) and
* passphrase(s) are supplied as required, or until any retry limits
* implemented by the crypto plugin are reached.
*
* In either case, the application must allow the user to say `no'
* or `cancel' to indicate that they do not know the passphrase or
* have the appropriate token; this should cause the callback to
* return nonzero indicating error.
*/
void (*logmessage) (void *logstream, const char *message);
/*-
* A log message will be generated at least every time something goes
* wrong and an ErrMsgBuf is filled in (or would be if one was
* provided). Other diagnostic information may be written there too,
* including more detailed reasons for errors which are reported in an
* ErrMsgBuf.
*
* When a log message is generated, this callback is called. It
* should write a message to the relevant logging arrangements.
*
* The message string passed will be null-terminated and may be of arbitrary
* length. It will not be prefixed by the time and date, nor by the
* name of the library that is generating it - if this is required,
* the logmessage callback must do it. The message will not have a
* trailing newline (though it may contain internal newlines).
*
* If a null pointer is passed for logmessage a default function is
* used. The default function treats logstream as a FILE* which has
* been converted to a void*. If logstream is 0 it does nothing.
* Otherwise it prepends the date and time and library name and
* writes the message to logstream. Each line will be prefixed by a
* descriptive string containing the date, time and identity of the
* crypto plugin. Errors on the logstream are not reported
* anywhere, and the default function doesn't flush the stream, so
* the application must set the buffering how it wants it.
*
* The crypto plugin may also provide a facility to have copies of
* log messages sent elsewhere, and or for adjusting the verbosity
* of the log messages; any such facilities will be configured by
* external means.
*/
/*-
* A log message will be generated at least every time something goes
* wrong and an ErrMsgBuf is filled in (or would be if one was
* provided). Other diagnostic information may be written there too,
* including more detailed reasons for errors which are reported in an
* ErrMsgBuf.
*
* When a log message is generated, this callback is called. It
* should write a message to the relevant logging arrangements.
*
* The message string passed will be null-terminated and may be of arbitrary
* length. It will not be prefixed by the time and date, nor by the
* name of the library that is generating it - if this is required,
* the logmessage callback must do it. The message will not have a
* trailing newline (though it may contain internal newlines).
*
* If a null pointer is passed for logmessage a default function is
* used. The default function treats logstream as a FILE* which has
* been converted to a void*. If logstream is 0 it does nothing.
* Otherwise it prepends the date and time and library name and
* writes the message to logstream. Each line will be prefixed by a
* descriptive string containing the date, time and identity of the
* crypto plugin. Errors on the logstream are not reported
* anywhere, and the default function doesn't flush the stream, so
* the application must set the buffering how it wants it.
*
* The crypto plugin may also provide a facility to have copies of
* log messages sent elsewhere, and or for adjusting the verbosity
* of the log messages; any such facilities will be configured by
* external means.
*/
} HWCryptoHook_InitInfo;
typedef

20
ssl/d1_both.c
View file

@ -569,12 +569,12 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
{
/*-
* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so:
* (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
* (2) update s->init_num
*/
/*-
* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so:
* (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
* (2) update s->init_num
*/
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
int al;
@ -1284,10 +1284,10 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
/*-
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
*/
/*-
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
*/
/* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));

64
ssl/d1_clnt.c
View file

@ -922,25 +922,25 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
/*-
* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
**
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
** Example:
** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
** optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/*-
* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
**
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
** Example:
** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
** optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
@ -966,13 +966,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
goto err;
/*-
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
* kssl_ctx->length);
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
/*-
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
* kssl_ctx->length);
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
@ -1326,12 +1326,12 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
/*-
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n,d);
l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
*/
/*-
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n,d);
l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
*/
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
/* number of bytes to write */

50
ssl/d1_pkt.c
View file

@ -422,12 +422,12 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
rr->data = rr->input;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
if (enc_err == 0) {
/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
rr->length = 0;
@ -530,14 +530,14 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
}
rr->off = 0;
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length = 0;
@ -791,12 +791,12 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
/*
@ -971,11 +971,11 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
}
}
/*-
* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/*-
* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&

26
ssl/kssl.c
View file

@ -1387,20 +1387,20 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
}
}
/*- Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
* o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
* unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
* o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
* o send "0" msg if all OK
*/
/*- Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
* o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
* unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
* o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
* o send "0" msg if all OK
*/
/*-
* 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
*
* if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
* &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
* &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error }
*/
/*-
* 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
*
* if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
* &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
* &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error }
*/
p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *)d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,

26
ssl/s23_srvr.c
View file

@ -385,19 +385,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. It's format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length
* 2 msg_type
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. It's format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length
* 2 msg_type
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
n = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
if (n > (1024 * 4)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);

30
ssl/s2_pkt.c
View file

@ -535,19 +535,19 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
s->s2->three_byte_header = 0;
p = 0;
} else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape)) {
/*-
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
*/
/*-
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
*/
s->s2->three_byte_header = 0;
p = 0;
} else { /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */
/*-
* If s->s2->escape is not set, then
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER.
*/
/*-
* If s->s2->escape is not set, then
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER.
*/
p = (j % bs);
p = (p == 0) ? 0 : (bs - p);
if (s->s2->escape) {
@ -559,12 +559,12 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
}
}
/*-
* Now
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
* holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
*/
/*-
* Now
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
* holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
*/
/*
* mac_size is the number of MAC bytes len is the number of data bytes we

92
ssl/s3_clnt.c
View file

@ -2130,25 +2130,25 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
/*-
* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
* in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
*
* Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
* n = krb5_ap_req.length;
* memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
* if (krb5_ap_req.data)
* kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
*
* Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
* (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
* Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
* with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
* Example:
* KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
* Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
* optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/*-
* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
* in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
*
* Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
* n = krb5_ap_req.length;
* memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
* if (krb5_ap_req.data)
* kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
*
* Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
* (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
* Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
* with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
* Example:
* KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
* Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
* optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
@ -2176,13 +2176,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
/*-
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
* kssl_ctx->length);
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
/*-
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
* kssl_ctx->length);
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
@ -2300,26 +2300,26 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
/*-
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
/*-
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {

15
ssl/s3_enc.c
View file

@ -726,13 +726,14 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/*-
* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
*
* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
* total size. */
/*-
* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
*
* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
* total size.
*/
unsigned char header[75];
unsigned j = 0;
memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);

50
ssl/s3_pkt.c
View file

@ -413,12 +413,12 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
rr->data = rr->input;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
if (enc_err == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
@ -526,14 +526,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
}
rr->off = 0;
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length = 0;
@ -993,12 +993,12 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
/* get new packet if necessary */
@ -1104,11 +1104,11 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
}
}
/*-
* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/*-
* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
* s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
if ((!s->server) &&

60
ssl/s3_srvr.c
View file

@ -1261,17 +1261,17 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
@ -2331,11 +2331,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
}
/*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
* but it caused problems for apache.
* kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
* if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
/*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
* but it caused problems for apache.
* kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
* if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
@ -3010,14 +3010,14 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
*/
if (slen > 0xFF00)
return -1;
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
* bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
* bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
@ -3098,12 +3098,12 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
unsigned char *p;
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
return -1;

16
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
View file

@ -1740,14 +1740,14 @@ int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
return 1;
/*-
* According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
* compression number ranges should be the following:
*
* 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF
* 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA
* 193 to 255: reserved for private use
*/
/*-
* According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
* compression number ranges should be the following:
*
* 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF
* 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA
* 193 to 255: reserved for private use
*/
if (id < 193 || id > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);

10
ssl/ssl_lib.c
View file

@ -1571,12 +1571,12 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
ret->references = 1;
ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/*-
ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
ret->key_arg=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
ret->key_arg=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->info_callback = NULL;

4
ssl/ssl_task.c
View file

@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ int doit(io_channel chan, SSL_CTX *s_ctx)
if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
goto err;
/*- original, DRM 24-SEP-1997
BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan );
BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan );
BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan );
BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan );
*/
BIO_set_fd(c_to_s, 0, chan);
BIO_set_fd(s_to_c, 0, chan);

84
ssl/ssltest.c
View file

@ -1019,40 +1019,40 @@ int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
(void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
do {
/*-
* c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be
* relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
* test program, we're the server, too:
*
* server_io: server's SSL communication
*
* server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
* client + client_io, server + server_io.
* BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar
* to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
* be handled by the same thread).
* [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
* of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
* suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
*
* Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
*
* BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now
* BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil
* other side's read attempt
* BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now
*
* ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
* it depends on the application which one you should use.
*/
/*-
* c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be
* relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
* test program, we're the server, too:
*
* server_io: server's SSL communication
*
* server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
*
* s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
*
* The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
* client + client_io, server + server_io.
* BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar
* to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
* be handled by the same thread).
* [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
* of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
* suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
*
* Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
*
* BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now
* BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil
* other side's read attempt
* BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now
*
* ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
* it depends on the application which one you should use.
*/
/*
* We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
@ -1418,10 +1418,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
/*-
else if (s_write)
printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
else if (s_write)
printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
}
if (do_client && debug) {
@ -1429,10 +1429,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
/*-
else if (c_write)
printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
else if (c_write)
printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
else
printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
}
if (!do_client && !do_server) {

16
ssl/t1_lib.c
View file

@ -290,14 +290,14 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
unsigned long size_str;
long lenmax;
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 for the servername type and entension length
* 2 for servernamelist length
* 1 for the hostname type
* 2 for hostname length
* + hostname length
*/
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 for the servername type and entension length
* 2 for servernamelist length
* 1 for the hostname type
* 2 for hostname length
* + hostname length
*/
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
|| (size_str =

12
test/methtest.c
View file

@ -86,13 +86,13 @@ char *argv[];
METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/usr/local/ssl/certs");
METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp2);
/*- tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
/*- tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary);
METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem");
METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
*/
METH_init(top);