synchronize with HEAD branch

This commit is contained in:
Bodo Möller 2001-11-12 11:22:45 +00:00
parent fab972b914
commit 3f64d0bf3b

12
CHANGES
View file

@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf.
James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use
encoding paramters and hence was not vulnerable.
encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) BN_sqr() bug fix.
@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
[Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young <AYoung1@NCSUS.JNJ.COM>]
*) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range()
requivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand().
equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand().
[Bodo Moeller]
*) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB).
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and
still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions
of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that
uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the speciel
uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special
configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected
automatically.
[Tim Mooney <mooney@dogbert.cc.ndsu.NoDak.edu> via Richard Levitte]
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
[Lutz Jaenicke]
*) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
explicitely to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be
explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be
done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C
standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH.
[Lutz Jaenicke]
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
*) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
RSA encryption was accidentily removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client
hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against
SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
combination of a flag and a thread ID variable.
Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the
flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying
the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegaly release the lock
the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock
that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock).
[Bodo Moeller]