Make the anti-replay feature optional
Fixes #6389 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6469)
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5 changed files with 18 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -368,6 +368,12 @@ typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
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*/
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# define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000U
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/*
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* Switches off automatic TLSv1.3 anti-replay protection for early data. This
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* is a server-side option only (no effect on the client).
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*/
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# define SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY 0x01000000U
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# define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000U
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# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000U
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# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0x08000000U
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@ -3381,7 +3381,8 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
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if ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) == 0
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&& (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
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|| !s->server
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|| s->max_early_data > 0
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|| (s->max_early_data > 0
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&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0)
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|| s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL
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|| (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0))
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SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
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@ -1205,6 +1205,9 @@ struct ssl_st {
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# endif
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SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func psk_find_session_cb;
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SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func psk_use_session_cb;
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int (*allow_early_data_cb)(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess);
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SSL_CTX *ctx;
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/* Verified chain of peer */
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STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain;
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@ -1165,7 +1165,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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* is no point in using full stateless tickets.
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*/
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if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
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|| s->max_early_data > 0)
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|| (s->max_early_data > 0
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&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
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ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
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else
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ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
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@ -1189,6 +1190,7 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
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/* Check for replay */
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if (s->max_early_data > 0
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&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
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&& !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
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SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
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sess = NULL;
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@ -4086,8 +4086,10 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
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* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
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* is no point in using full stateless tickets.
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*/
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if (((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 || s->max_early_data > 0)
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&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
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if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
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&& ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
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|| (s->max_early_data > 0
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&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
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if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
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/* SSLfatal() already called */
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goto err;
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