Improve recent option help string additions

Make these more correct, concise and less tautological.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Dukhovni 2016-02-09 14:18:15 -05:00
parent d33def6624
commit 5e136d7abf

View file

@ -194,46 +194,49 @@ void wait_for_async(SSL *s);
# define OPT_V_OPTIONS \
{ "policy", OPT_V_POLICY, 's', "adds policy to the acceptable policy set"}, \
{ "purpose", OPT_V_PURPOSE, 's', \
"Set the acceptable purpose of the certificate chain"}, \
{ "verify_name", OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME, 's', "verify name"}, \
"certificate chain purpose"}, \
{ "verify_name", OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME, 's', "verification policy name"}, \
{ "verify_depth", OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH, 'p', \
"Limit the maximum depth of the certificate chain"}, \
{ "attime", OPT_V_ATTIME, 'M', "Set the verification time" }, \
"chain depth limit"}, \
{ "attime", OPT_V_ATTIME, 'M', "verification epoch time" }, \
{ "verify_hostname", OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME, 's', \
"check peer certificate matches \"host\"" }, \
"expected peer hostname" }, \
{ "verify_email", OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL, 's', \
"check peer certificate matches \"email\"" }, \
"expected peer email" }, \
{ "verify_ip", OPT_V_VERIFY_IP, 's', \
"check peer certificate matches \"ipaddr\"" }, \
"expected peer IP address" }, \
{ "ignore_critical", OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL, '-', \
"Disable critical extension checking"}, \
"permit unhandled critical extensions"}, \
{ "issuer_checks", OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS, '-', "(deprecated)"}, \
{ "crl_check", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK, '-', "Check that peer cert has not been revoked" }, \
{ "crl_check_all", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL, '-', "Also check all certs in the chain" }, \
{ "policy_check", OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK, '-', "Enable certificate policy checking"}, \
{ "explicit_policy", OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY, '-', "Set the \"require explicit policy\""}, \
{ "inhibit_any", OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY, '-', "Set the \"inhibit any policy\"\""}, \
{ "inhibit_map", OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP, '-', "Set the \"inhibit policy mapping\"" }, \
{ "crl_check", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK, '-', "check leaf certificate revocation" }, \
{ "crl_check_all", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL, '-', "check full chain revocation" }, \
{ "policy_check", OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK, '-', "perform rfc5280 policy checks"}, \
{ "explicit_policy", OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY, '-', \
"set policy variable require-explicit-policy"}, \
{ "inhibit_any", OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY, '-', \
"set policy variable inihibit-any-policy"}, \
{ "inhibit_map", OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP, '-', \
"set policy variable inihibit-policy-mapping"}, \
{ "x509_strict", OPT_V_X509_STRICT, '-', \
"Strictly apply X509 rules in verification"}, \
"disable certificate compatibility work-arounds"}, \
{ "extended_crl", OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL, '-', \
"Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs, alternate CRL signing keys"}, \
"enable extended CRL features"}, \
{ "use_deltas", OPT_V_USE_DELTAS, '-', \
"Enable indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by different keys"}, \
{ "policy_print", OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT, '-', "Notify callback that policy is OK"}, \
"use delta CRLs"}, \
{ "policy_print", OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT, '-', \
"print policy processing diagnostics"}, \
{ "check_ss_sig", OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG, '-', \
"Enable checking of the root CA self signed certificate signature"}, \
"check root CA self-signatures"}, \
{ "trusted_first", OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST, '-', \
"Use locally-trusted CA's first in building chain (enabled by default)" }, \
{ "suiteB_128_only", OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY, '-', "Suite B 128 bit only mode"}, \
"search trust store first (default)" }, \
{ "suiteB_128_only", OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY, '-', "Suite B 128-bit-only mode"}, \
{ "suiteB_128", OPT_V_SUITEB_128, '-', \
"Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms"}, \
{ "suiteB_192", OPT_V_SUITEB_192, '-', "Suite B 192 bit only mode" }, \
"Suite B 128-bit mode allowing 192-bit algorithms"}, \
{ "suiteB_192", OPT_V_SUITEB_192, '-', "Suite B 192-bit-only mode" }, \
{ "partial_chain", OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN, '-', \
"verification succeeds even if a complete chain cannot be built, "}, \
{OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0, "provided a chain to a trusted certificate can be constructed"}, \
{ "no_alt_chains", OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS, '-', "Only use the first cert chain found" }, \
{ "no_check_time", OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME, '-', "Do not check validity against current time" }
"accept chains anchored by intermediate trust-store CAs"}, \
{ "no_alt_chains", OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS, '-', "(deprecated)" }, \
{ "no_check_time", OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME, '-', "ignore certificate validity time" }
# define OPT_V_CASES \
OPT_V__FIRST: case OPT_V__LAST: break; \