Create the Finished message payload

The previous commit had a dummy payload for the Finished data. This commit
fills it in with a real value.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2016-11-11 00:20:19 +00:00
parent 92760c21e6
commit 6484776f17
2 changed files with 46 additions and 12 deletions

View file

@ -955,6 +955,8 @@ struct ssl_st {
*/
unsigned char early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char handshake_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char client_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char server_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */
COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */

View file

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
/*
* Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and a |hash| of the
@ -126,6 +127,13 @@ int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *iv,
iv, ivlen);
}
static int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret,
unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
{
return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, secret, finishedlabel,
sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, fin, finlen);
}
/*
* Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
* length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
@ -222,18 +230,34 @@ int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
unsigned char *out)
{
size_t hashlen;
const EVP_MD *md;
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t hashlen, ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): This is a dummy implementation for now. We need to come
* back and fill this in.
*/
md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
memset(out, 0, hashlen);
if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen))
goto err;
return hashlen;
if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label)
key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
else
key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);
if (key == NULL
|| ctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, key) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, hash, hashlen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0)
goto err;
ret = hashlen;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
/*
@ -276,9 +300,10 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *insecret;
unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;;
size_t ivlen, keylen;
size_t ivlen, keylen, finsecretlen;
const unsigned char *label;
size_t labellen;
@ -314,6 +339,8 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
|| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
finsecretlen = sizeof(s->client_finished_secret);
label = client_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
} else {
@ -324,6 +351,8 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
} else {
if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
finsecretlen = sizeof(s->server_finished_secret);
label = server_handshake_traffic;
labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
} else {
@ -349,7 +378,10 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph);
if (!tls13_derive_key(s, secret, key, keylen)
|| !tls13_derive_iv(s, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
|| !tls13_derive_iv(s, secret, iv, ivlen)
|| (finsecret != NULL && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, secret,
finsecret,
finsecretlen))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}