Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve

Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS
fragments.
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2011-10-27 13:06:34 +00:00
parent da7ae62abd
commit 68b5330040

View file

@ -793,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
/* parse the message fragment header */
dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@ -865,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
/* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
* handshake to fail */
OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
if (i != (int)frag_len)
{
al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
goto f_err;
}
*ok = 1;