Update CHANGES and NEWS
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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CHANGES
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CHANGES
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@ -17,6 +17,52 @@
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Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow
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TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to
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a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL
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crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS.
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team)
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(CVE-2016-7054)
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[Richard Levitte]
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*) CMS Null dereference
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Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer
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dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE
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type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the
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structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings.
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Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are
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affected.
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure.
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(CVE-2016-7053)
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[Stephen Henson]
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*) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
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There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
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multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
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longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
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and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
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question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
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of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
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transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
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erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
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Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
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presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
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detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
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multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
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share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
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Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
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This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
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initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
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providing reproducible case.
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(CVE-2016-7055)
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[Andy Polyakov]
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*) Removed automatic addition of RPATH in shared libraries and executables,
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as this was a remainder from OpenSSL 1.0.x and isn't needed any more.
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[Richard Levitte]
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3
NEWS
3
NEWS
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@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
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Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0a and OpenSSL 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016]
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o ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054)
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o CMS Null dereference (CVE-2016-7053)
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o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
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o Fix Use After Free for large message sizes (CVE-2016-6309)
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Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016]
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