Various doc fixes from GH pull requests
Thanks folks: 348 Benjamin Kaduk 317 Christian Brueffer 254 Erik Tews 253 Erik Tews 219 Carl Mehner 155 (ghost) 95 mancha 51 DominikNeubauer Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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9 changed files with 18 additions and 20 deletions
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@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
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[mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
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*) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
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in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
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in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
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[mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
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*) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
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2
README
2
README
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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OpenSSL 1.1.0-dev
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Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
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Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
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Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
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All rights reserved.
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@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
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"SRP username into second ClientHello message"},
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{"srp_moregroups", OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, '-',
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"Tolerate other than the known g N values."},
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{"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal mength in bits for N"},
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{"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal length in bits for N"},
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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{"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's',
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@ -40,9 +40,8 @@ consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
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3. To generate a DSA key
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A DSA key can be used for signing only. This is important to keep
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in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with a
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DSA key can really be used for.
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A DSA key can be used for signing only. It is important to
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know what a certificate request with a DSA key can really be used for.
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Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process. First,
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you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key:
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@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ key is encrypted using triple DES and the certificate using 40 bit RC2.
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these options allow the algorithm used to encrypt the private key and
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certificates to be selected. Any PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 PBE algorithm name
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can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a a cipher name
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can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a cipher name
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(as output by the B<list-cipher-algorithms> command is specified then it
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is used with PKCS#5 v2.0. For interoperability reasons it is advisable to only
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use PKCS#12 algorithms.
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@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ B<openssl> B<req>
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[B<-keygen_engine id>]
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[B<-[digest]>]
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[B<-config filename>]
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[B<-subj arg>]
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[B<-multivalue-rdn>]
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[B<-x509>]
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[B<-days n>]
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@ -506,16 +505,16 @@ Examine and verify certificate request:
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Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:
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openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024
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openssl genrsa -out key.pem 2048
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openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
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The same but just using req:
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openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
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openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
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Generate a self signed root certificate:
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openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
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openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
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Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option:
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@ -531,7 +530,7 @@ expansion:
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Sample configuration file prompting for field values:
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[ req ]
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default_bits = 1024
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default_bits = 2048
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default_keyfile = privkey.pem
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distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
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attributes = req_attributes
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@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ Sample configuration containing all field values:
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RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd
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[ req ]
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default_bits = 1024
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default_bits = 2048
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default_keyfile = keyfile.pem
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distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
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attributes = req_attributes
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@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() initializes cipher contex B<ctx>.
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EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
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with cipher B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized
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before calling this function. B<type> is normally supplied
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by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
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by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
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default implementation is used. B<key> is the symmetric key to use
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and B<iv> is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes
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used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ encrypted using this key.
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EVP_SealInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
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with cipher B<type> using a random secret key and IV. B<type> is normally
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supplied by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
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supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
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using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be
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decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. B<ek> is an array of
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buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer
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@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee
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that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released.
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However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is
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initiliased and able to use any of its cryptographic
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initialised and able to use any of its cryptographic
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implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not
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initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to
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support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a
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@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference
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implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid
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difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two
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kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an
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ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised ready to
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perform cryptographic operations and will remain uninitialised
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ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised and
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is ready to perform cryptographic operations, and will remain initialised
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until after you have released your reference.
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I<Structural references>
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@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ I<Using a specific ENGINE implementation>
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Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin
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to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of
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OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be
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used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operation, otherwise
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used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operations, otherwise
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OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code
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illustrates how to approach this;
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@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ I<Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations>
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Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations
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bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by
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OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialise,
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OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised,
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it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work;
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/* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */
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