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Switch from ossl_rand to DRBG rand

Browse source 
If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that
does the wrap-around.

Re-order seeding and stop after first success.

Add RAND_poll_ex()

Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED.  Also, for child DRBG's,
mix in the address as the personalization bits.

Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib.
(Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.)
Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion.

Various code cleanups:
    -Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls.
    -Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea)
    -Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library
    -Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc.
    -Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the
     implementation of NIST DRBG.
    -Remove blocklength

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)
This commit is contained in:
Rich Salz 2017-08-03 09:23:28 -04:00
parent 67dc995eaf
commit 75e2c87765
34 changed files with 830 additions and 1411 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

14
apps/speed.c
View file

@ -247,11 +247,6 @@ static double ecdsa_results[EC_NUM][2];
static double ecdh_results[EC_NUM][1];
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
#endif
#ifdef SIGALRM
# if defined(__STDC__) || defined(sgi) || defined(_AIX)
# define SIGRETTYPE void
@ -2397,9 +2392,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (RAND_status() != 1) {
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
}
for (testnum = 0; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++) {
int st = 0;
if (!dsa_doit[testnum])
@ -2467,9 +2459,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (RAND_status() != 1) {
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
}
for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) {
int st = 1;
@ -2554,9 +2543,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
if (RAND_status() != 1) {
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
}
for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) {
int ecdh_checks = 1;

4
crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
View file

@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ static int bnrand(int testing, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
{
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
time_t tim;
if (bits == 0) {
if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)
@ -40,9 +39,6 @@ static int bnrand(int testing, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
/* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */
time(&tim);
RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0);
if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
goto err;

2
crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
View file

@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa)
{
DSA_SIG *s;
RAND_seed(dgst, dlen);
s = DSA_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
if (s == NULL) {
*siglen = 0;

2
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
View file

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
ECDSA_SIG *s;
RAND_seed(dgst, dlen);
s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, kinv, r, eckey);
if (s == NULL) {
*siglen = 0;

1
crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c
View file

@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM);
goto error;
}
RAND_add(p8->pkey->data, p8->pkey->length, 0.0);
return p8;
error:
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);

1
crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
View file

@ -361,7 +361,6 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
#endif
kstr = (unsigned char *)buf;
}
RAND_add(data, i, 0); /* put in the RSA key. */
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) <= (int)sizeof(iv));
if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc)) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */
goto err;

2
crypto/rand/build.info
View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
ossl_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_rand.c

445
crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
View file

@ -15,53 +15,28 @@
/*
* Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
*/
/*
* Get entropy from the existing callback. This is mainly used for KATs.
*/
static size_t get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
if (dctx->get_entropy != NULL)
return dctx->get_entropy(dctx, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len);
/* TODO: Get from parent if it exists. */
return 0;
}
/*
* Cleanup entropy.
*/
static void cleanup_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
if (dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
dctx->cleanup_entropy(dctx, out, olen);
}
/*
* The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG.
*
* The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
* does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
* instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
* lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
* DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
*
* The DRBG_CTX is OpenSSL's opaque pointer to an instance of the
* DRBG.
*/
/*
* Set/initialize |dctx| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
* Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
* Return -2 if the type is not supported, 1 on success and -1 on
* failure.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int nid, unsigned int flags)
int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = 1;
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
dctx->flags = flags;
dctx->nid = nid;
drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
drbg->flags = flags;
drbg->nid = nid;
switch (nid) {
default:
@ -73,7 +48,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int nid, unsigned int flags)
case NID_aes_128_ctr:
case NID_aes_192_ctr:
case NID_aes_256_ctr:
ret = ctr_init(dctx);
ret = ctr_init(drbg);
break;
}
@ -84,169 +59,176 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int nid, unsigned int flags)
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not
* NULL, will be used to auto-seed this DRBG_CTX as needed.
* NULL, will be used to auto-seed this RAND_DRBG as needed.
*/
DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, DRBG_CTX *parent)
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx));
RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
unsigned char *ucp = OPENSSL_zalloc(RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
if (dctx == NULL) {
if (drbg == NULL || ucp == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
drbg->size = RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
drbg->randomness = ucp;
drbg->parent = parent;
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) < 0)
goto err;
if (parent != NULL) {
if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, drbg_entropy_from_parent,
drbg_release_entropy,
NULL, NULL)
/*
* Add in our address. Note we are adding the pointer
* itself, not its contents!
*/
|| !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
(unsigned char*)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)))
goto err;
}
dctx->parent = parent;
if (RAND_DRBG_set(dctx, type, flags) < 0) {
OPENSSL_free(dctx);
return NULL;
}
return dctx;
return drbg;
err:
OPENSSL_free(ucp);
OPENSSL_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Uninstantiate |dctx| and free all memory.
* Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
*/
void RAND_DRBG_free(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
if (dctx == NULL)
/* The global DRBG is free'd by rand_cleanup_int() */
if (drbg == NULL || drbg == &rand_drbg)
return;
ctr_uninstantiate(dctx);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, dctx, &dctx->ex_data);
/* Don't free up default DRBG */
if (dctx == RAND_DRBG_get_default()) {
memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(DRBG_CTX));
dctx->nid = 0;
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
} else {
OPENSSL_cleanse(&dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
OPENSSL_free(dctx);
}
ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg->randomness, drbg->size);
OPENSSL_free(drbg->randomness);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
}
/*
* Instantiate |dctx|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
* Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
* |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
{
size_t entlen = 0, noncelen = 0;
unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
int r = 0;
size_t noncelen = 0, entlen = 0;
if (perslen > dctx->max_pers) {
r = RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG;
if (perslen > drbg->max_pers) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED) {
r = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
: RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED;
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
: RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
goto end;
}
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
entlen = get_entropy(dctx, &entropy, dctx->strength,
dctx->min_entropy, dctx->max_entropy);
if (entlen < dctx->min_entropy || entlen > dctx->max_entropy) {
r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY;
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
entlen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropy, drbg->max_entropy);
if (entlen < drbg->min_entropy || entlen > drbg->max_entropy) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
if (dctx->max_nonce > 0 && dctx->get_nonce != NULL) {
noncelen = dctx->get_nonce(dctx, &nonce,
dctx->strength / 2,
dctx->min_nonce, dctx->max_nonce);
if (noncelen < dctx->min_nonce || noncelen > dctx->max_nonce) {
r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE;
if (drbg->max_nonce > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
drbg->min_nonce, drbg->max_nonce);
if (noncelen < drbg->min_nonce || noncelen > drbg->max_nonce) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
goto end;
}
}
if (!ctr_instantiate(dctx, entropy, entlen,
if (!ctr_instantiate(drbg, entropy, entlen,
nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
r = RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG;
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
goto end;
}
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_READY;
dctx->reseed_counter = 1;
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
end:
if (entropy != NULL && dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
dctx->cleanup_entropy(dctx, entropy, entlen);
if (nonce != NULL && dctx->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
dctx->cleanup_nonce(dctx, nonce, noncelen);
if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY)
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy);
if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce);
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
return 1;
if (r)
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, r);
return 0;
}
/*
* Uninstantiate |dctx|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
* Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
int ret = ctr_uninstantiate(dctx);
int ret = ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
return ret;
}
/*
* Mix in the specified data to reseed |dctx|.
* Mix in the specified data to reseed |drbg|.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
size_t entlen = 0;
int r = 0;
if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_READY
&& dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_RESEED) {
if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR)
r = RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE;
else if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
r = RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED;
goto end;
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
return 0;
}
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
return 0;
}
if (adin == NULL)
adinlen = 0;
else if (adinlen > dctx->max_adin) {
r = RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
entlen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropy, drbg->max_entropy);
if (entlen < drbg->min_entropy || entlen > drbg->max_entropy) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
entlen = get_entropy(dctx, &entropy, dctx->strength,
dctx->min_entropy, dctx->max_entropy);
if (entlen < dctx->min_entropy || entlen > dctx->max_entropy) {
r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY;
if (!ctr_reseed(drbg, entropy, entlen, adin, adinlen))
goto end;
}
if (!ctr_reseed(dctx, entropy, entlen, adin, adinlen))
goto end;
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_READY;
dctx->reseed_counter = 1;
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
end:
if (entropy != NULL && dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
cleanup_entropy(dctx, entropy, entlen);
if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY)
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy);
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
return 1;
if (r)
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, r);
return 0;
}
@ -255,98 +237,183 @@ end:
* to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
* sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
int r = 0;
if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_READY
&& dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_RESEED) {
if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR)
r = RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE;
else if(dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
r = RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED;
goto end;
}
if (outlen > dctx->max_request) {
r = RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG;
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
return 0;
}
if (adinlen > dctx->max_adin) {
r = RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
goto end;
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
return 0;
}
if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
return 0;
}
if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (dctx->reseed_counter >= dctx->reseed_interval)
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
if (drbg->reseed_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
drbg->state = DRBG_RESEED;
if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_RESEED || prediction_resistance) {
if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, adin, adinlen)) {
r = RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR;
goto end;
if (drbg->state == DRBG_RESEED || prediction_resistance) {
if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
return 0;
}
adin = NULL;
adinlen = 0;
}
if (!ctr_generate(dctx, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
r = RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR;
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
goto end;
}
if (dctx->reseed_counter >= dctx->reseed_interval)
dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
else
dctx->reseed_counter++;
return 1;
end:
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, r);
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the callbacks for entropy and nonce. Used mainly for the KATs
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
size_t (*cb_get_entropy)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len),
void (*cb_cleanup_entropy)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen),
size_t (*cb_get_nonce)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len),
void (*cb_cleanup_nonce)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen))
{
if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
if (!ctr_generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
return 0;
dctx->get_entropy = cb_get_entropy;
dctx->cleanup_entropy = cb_cleanup_entropy;
dctx->get_nonce = cb_get_nonce;
dctx->cleanup_nonce = cb_cleanup_nonce;
}
if (drbg->reseed_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
drbg->state = DRBG_RESEED;
else
drbg->reseed_counter++;
return 1;
}
/*
* Set the reseed interval. Used mainly for the KATs.
* Set the callbacks for entropy and nonce. We currently don't use
* the nonce; that's mainly for the KATs
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int interval)
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn cb_get_entropy,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cb_cleanup_entropy,
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn cb_get_nonce,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cb_cleanup_nonce)
{
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
return 0;
drbg->get_entropy = cb_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = cb_cleanup_entropy;
drbg->get_nonce = cb_get_nonce;
drbg->cleanup_nonce = cb_cleanup_nonce;
return 1;
}
/*
* Set the reseed interval.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int interval)
{
if (interval < 0 || interval > MAX_RESEED)
return 0;
dctx->reseed_interval = interval;
drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
return 1;
}
/*
* Get and set the EXDATA
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx, void *arg)
int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&dctx->ex_data, idx, arg);
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx)
void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&dctx->ex_data, idx);
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
}
/*
* The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
* global DRBG. They lock.
*/
static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t chunk;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
if (rand_drbg.state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED
&& RAND_DRBG_instantiate(&rand_drbg, NULL, 0) == 0)
goto err;
for ( ; count > 0; count -= chunk, out += chunk) {
chunk = count;
if (chunk > rand_drbg.max_request)
chunk = rand_drbg.max_request;
ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(&rand_drbg, out, chunk, 0, NULL, 0);
if (!ret)
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
return ret;
}
static void drbg_cleanup(void)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(&rand_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
}
static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
{
unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)buf;
unsigned char *out, *end;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes.lock);
out = &rand_bytes.buff[rand_bytes.curr];
end = &rand_bytes.buff[rand_bytes.size];
/* Copy whatever fits into the end of the buffer. */
for ( ; --num >= 0 && out < end; rand_bytes.curr++)
*out++ = *in++;
/* XOR any the leftover. */
while (num > 0) {
for (out = rand_bytes.buff; --num >= 0 && out < end; )
*out++ ^= *in++;
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes.lock);
return 1;
}
static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
}
static int drbg_status(void)
{
int ret;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
ret = rand_drbg.state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
return ret;
}
RAND_DRBG rand_drbg; /* The default global DRBG. */
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
drbg_seed,
drbg_bytes,
drbg_cleanup,
drbg_add,
drbg_bytes,
drbg_status
};
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
return &rand_meth;
}

322
crypto/rand/drbg_rand.c
View file

@ -16,37 +16,14 @@
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
/*
* Mapping of NIST SP 800-90A DRBG to OpenSSL RAND_METHOD.
* Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
*/
/*
* The default global DRBG and its auto-init/auto-cleanup.
*/
static DRBG_CTX ossl_drbg;
static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_drbg_init)
{
int st = 1;
ossl_drbg.lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
st &= ossl_drbg.lock != NULL;
st &= RAND_DRBG_set(&ossl_drbg, NID_aes_128_ctr, 0) == 1;
return st;
}
void rand_drbg_cleanup(void)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ossl_drbg.lock);
}
static void inc_128(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
int i;
unsigned char c;
unsigned char *p = &cctx->V[15];
unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15];
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) {
c = *p;
@ -59,7 +36,7 @@ static void inc_128(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
}
}
static void ctr_XOR(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
size_t i, n;
@ -70,81 +47,81 @@ static void ctr_XOR(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
* Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we
* are XORing. So just process however much input we have.
*/
n = inlen < cctx->keylen ? inlen : cctx->keylen;
n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
cctx->K[i] ^= in[i];
if (inlen <= cctx->keylen)
ctr->K[i] ^= in[i];
if (inlen <= ctr->keylen)
return;
n = inlen - cctx->keylen;
n = inlen - ctr->keylen;
if (n > 16) {
/* Should never happen */
n = 16;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
cctx->V[i] ^= in[i + cctx->keylen];
ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen];
}
/*
* Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
*/
static void ctr_BCC_block(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, unsigned char *out,
static void ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
out[i] ^= in[i];
AES_encrypt(out, out, &cctx->df_ks);
AES_encrypt(out, out, &ctr->df_ks);
}
/*
* Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X
*/
static void ctr_BCC_blocks(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, const unsigned char *in)
static void ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
{
ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX, in);
ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 16, in);
if (cctx->keylen != 16)
ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 32, in);
ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in);
ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in);
if (ctr->keylen != 16)
ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in);
}
/*
* Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions:
* see 10.3.1 stage 7.
*/
static void ctr_BCC_init(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
static void ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
memset(cctx->KX, 0, 48);
memset(cctx->bltmp, 0, 16);
ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX, cctx->bltmp);
cctx->bltmp[3] = 1;
ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 16, cctx->bltmp);
if (cctx->keylen != 16) {
cctx->bltmp[3] = 2;
ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 32, cctx->bltmp);
memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16);
ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp);
ctr->bltmp[3] = 1;
ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp);
if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
ctr->bltmp[3] = 2;
ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp);
}
}
/*
* Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial
*/
static void ctr_BCC_update(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
static void ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
return;
/* If we have partial block handle it first */
if (cctx->bltmp_pos) {
size_t left = 16 - cctx->bltmp_pos;
if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos;
/* If we now have a complete block process it */
if (inlen >= left) {
memcpy(cctx->bltmp + cctx->bltmp_pos, in, left);
ctr_BCC_blocks(cctx, cctx->bltmp);
cctx->bltmp_pos = 0;
memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left);
ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
ctr->bltmp_pos = 0;
inlen -= left;
in += left;
}
@ -152,34 +129,34 @@ static void ctr_BCC_update(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
/* Process zero or more complete blocks */
for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) {
ctr_BCC_blocks(cctx, in);
ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in);
}
/* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */
if (inlen > 0) {
memcpy(cctx->bltmp + cctx->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
cctx->bltmp_pos += inlen;
memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen;
}
}
static void ctr_BCC_final(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
static void ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
if (cctx->bltmp_pos) {
memset(cctx->bltmp + cctx->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - cctx->bltmp_pos);
ctr_BCC_blocks(cctx, cctx->bltmp);
if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos);
ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
}
}
static void ctr_df(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
static void ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
{
static unsigned char c80 = 0x80;
size_t inlen;
unsigned char *p = cctx->bltmp;
unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp;
ctr_BCC_init(cctx);
ctr_BCC_init(ctr);
if (in1 == NULL)
in1len = 0;
if (in2 == NULL)
@ -197,100 +174,100 @@ static void ctr_df(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
*p = (unsigned char)((cctx->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
cctx->bltmp_pos = 8;
ctr_BCC_update(cctx, in1, in1len);
ctr_BCC_update(cctx, in2, in2len);
ctr_BCC_update(cctx, in3, in3len);
ctr_BCC_update(cctx, &c80, 1);
ctr_BCC_final(cctx);
*p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
ctr->bltmp_pos = 8;
ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len);
ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len);
ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len);
ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1);
ctr_BCC_final(ctr);
/* Set up key K */
AES_set_encrypt_key(cctx->KX, cctx->keylen * 8, &cctx->df_kxks);
AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->KX, ctr->keylen * 8, &ctr->df_kxks);
/* X follows key K */
AES_encrypt(cctx->KX + cctx->keylen, cctx->KX, &cctx->df_kxks);
AES_encrypt(cctx->KX, cctx->KX + 16, &cctx->df_kxks);
if (cctx->keylen != 16)
AES_encrypt(cctx->KX + 16, cctx->KX + 32, &cctx->df_kxks);
AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, ctr->KX, &ctr->df_kxks);
AES_encrypt(ctr->KX, ctr->KX + 16, &ctr->df_kxks);
if (ctr->keylen != 16)
AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + 16, ctr->KX + 32, &ctr->df_kxks);
}
/*
* NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length
* of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with
* zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together,
* handle both cases in this function instead.
* so we handle both cases in this function instead.
*/
static void ctr_update(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
static void ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen)
{
DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
/* ks is already setup for correct key */
inc_128(cctx);
AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->K, &cctx->ks);
inc_128(ctr);
AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
/* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */
if (cctx->keylen != 16) {
inc_128(cctx);
AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->K + 16, &cctx->ks);
if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
inc_128(ctr);
AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K + 16, &ctr->ks);
}
inc_128(cctx);
AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->V, &cctx->ks);
inc_128(ctr);
AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->V, &ctr->ks);
/* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */
if (cctx->keylen == 24) {
memcpy(cctx->V + 8, cctx->V, 8);
memcpy(cctx->V, cctx->K + 24, 8);
if (ctr->keylen == 24) {
memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8);
memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8);
}
if (dctx->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
/* If no input reuse existing derived value */
if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL)
ctr_df(cctx, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len);
ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len);
/* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */
if (in1len)
ctr_XOR(cctx, cctx->KX, dctx->seedlen);
ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen);
} else {
ctr_XOR(cctx, in1, in1len);
ctr_XOR(cctx, in2, in2len);
ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len);
ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
}
AES_set_encrypt_key(cctx->K, dctx->strength, &cctx->ks);
AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
}
int ctr_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
{
DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
memset(cctx->K, 0, sizeof(cctx->K));
memset(cctx->V, 0, sizeof(cctx->V));
AES_set_encrypt_key(cctx->K, dctx->strength, &cctx->ks);
ctr_update(dctx, ent, entlen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen);
memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
ctr_update(drbg, ent, entlen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen);
return 1;
}
int ctr_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
ctr_update(dctx, ent, entlen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
ctr_update(drbg, ent, entlen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
int ctr_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
ctr_update(dctx, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
/* This means we reuse derived value */
if (dctx->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
adin = NULL;
adinlen = 1;
}
@ -299,36 +276,36 @@ int ctr_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
}
for ( ; ; ) {
inc_128(cctx);
inc_128(ctr);
if (outlen < 16) {
/* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */
AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->K, &cctx->ks);
memcpy(out, cctx->K, outlen);
AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen);
break;
}
AES_encrypt(cctx->V, out, &cctx->ks);
AES_encrypt(ctr->V, out, &ctr->ks);
out += 16;
outlen -= 16;
if (outlen == 0)
break;
}
ctr_update(dctx, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
int ctr_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
int ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
memset(&dctx->ctr, 0, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
memset(&drbg->ctr, 0, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
return 1;
}
int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
int ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
size_t keylen;
switch (dctx->nid) {
switch (drbg->nid) {
default:
/* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */
return -1;
@ -343,12 +320,11 @@ int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
break;
}
cctx->keylen = keylen;
dctx->strength = keylen * 8;
dctx->blocklength = 16;
dctx->seedlen = keylen + 16;
ctr->keylen = keylen;
drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
if (dctx->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
/* df initialisation */
static unsigned char df_key[32] = {
0x00,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07,
@ -357,97 +333,25 @@ int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
0x18,0x19,0x1a,0x1b,0x1c,0x1d,0x1e,0x1f
};
/* Set key schedule for df_key */
AES_set_encrypt_key(df_key, dctx->strength, &cctx->df_ks);
AES_set_encrypt_key(df_key, drbg->strength, &ctr->df_ks);
dctx->min_entropy = cctx->keylen;
dctx->max_entropy = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
dctx->min_nonce = dctx->min_entropy / 2;
dctx->max_nonce = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
dctx->max_pers = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
dctx->max_adin = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->min_entropy = ctr->keylen;
drbg->max_entropy = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->min_nonce = drbg->min_entropy / 2;
drbg->max_nonce = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->max_pers = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->max_adin = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
} else {
dctx->min_entropy = dctx->seedlen;
dctx->max_entropy = dctx->seedlen;
drbg->min_entropy = drbg->seedlen;
drbg->max_entropy = drbg->seedlen;
/* Nonce not used */
dctx->min_nonce = 0;
dctx->max_nonce = 0;
dctx->max_pers = dctx->seedlen;
dctx->max_adin = dctx->seedlen;
drbg->min_nonce = 0;
drbg->max_nonce = 0;
drbg->max_pers = drbg->seedlen;
drbg->max_adin = drbg->seedlen;
}
dctx->max_request = 1 << 16;
dctx->reseed_interval = MAX_RESEED;
drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
drbg->reseed_interval = MAX_RESEED;
return 1;
}
/*
* The following function tie the DRBG code into the RAND_METHOD
*/
DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_get_default(void)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_drbg_init, do_ossl_drbg_init))
return NULL;
return &ossl_drbg;
}
static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = RAND_DRBG_get_default();
int ret = 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dctx->lock);
do {
size_t rcnt;
if (count > (int)dctx->max_request)
rcnt = dctx->max_request;
else
rcnt = count;
ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, out, rcnt, 0, NULL, 0);
if (!ret)
goto err;
out += rcnt;
count -= rcnt;
} while (count);
ret = 1;
err:
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dctx->lock);
return ret;
}
static int drbg_status(void)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = RAND_DRBG_get_default();
int ret;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dctx->lock);
ret = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY ? 1 : 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dctx->lock);
return ret;
}
static void drbg_cleanup(void)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = RAND_DRBG_get_default();
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dctx->lock);
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(dctx);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dctx->lock);
}
static const RAND_METHOD rand_drbg_meth =
{
NULL,
drbg_bytes,
drbg_cleanup,
NULL,
drbg_bytes,
drbg_status
};
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_drbg(void)
{
return &rand_drbg_meth;
}

592
crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
View file

@ -1,592 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "e_os.h"
#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS))
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
# include <time.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/async.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <internal/thread_once.h>
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#define STATE_SIZE 1023
typedef struct ossl_rand_state_st OSSL_RAND_STATE;
struct ossl_rand_state_st {
size_t num;
size_t index;
unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
long md_count[2];
};
static OSSL_RAND_STATE global_state;
static double randomness = 0;
static int initialized = 0;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL;
static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key;
/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */
static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0;
/*
* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock;
* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set
*/
static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid;
static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
static void rand_thread_cleanup(void *arg)
{
OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = arg;
OPENSSL_clear_free(sp, sizeof(*sp));
}
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_rand_init)
{
int ret = 1;
OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_lock != NULL;
rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, rand_thread_cleanup) == 1;
return ret;
}
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
return &openssl_rand_meth;
}
static void rand_cleanup(void)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(&global_state, sizeof(global_state));
randomness = 0;
initialized = 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock);
}
static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
int i, j, k, st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX *m;
int do_not_lock;
int rv = 0;
OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
if (!num)
return 1;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
*
* The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
* the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
* function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
* is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
* (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
* the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
* (which is incremented after each use).
* The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
* 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
* hash function.
*/
m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (m == NULL)
goto err;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
goto err;
/* check if we already have the lock */
if (crypto_lock_rand) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
} else
do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
st_idx = sp->index;
/*
* use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
* seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
* _some_ difference
*/
md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md));
/* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
sp->index += num;
if (sp->index >= STATE_SIZE) {
sp->index %= STATE_SIZE;
sp->num = STATE_SIZE;
} else if (sp->num < STATE_SIZE) {
if (sp->index > sp->num)
sp->num = sp->index;
}
/* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
/*
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
* will use now, but other threads may use them as well
*/
sp->md_count[1] += (num / SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
for (i = 0; i < num; i += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
j = (num - i);
j = (j > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
if (k > 0) {
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j - k))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
goto err;
} else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j))
goto err;
/* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO EVP_DigestUpdate()! */
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, buf, j))
goto err;
/*
* We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
* to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not,
* it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get
* really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
* insecure keys.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
goto err;
md_c[1]++;
buf = (const char *)buf + j;
for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
/*
* Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
* of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
* local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
* could hurt performance more than necessary given that
* conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
* random state.
*/
sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
st_idx = 0;
}
}
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
* thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
* counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much randomness as fits into
* md.
*/
for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(sp->md); k++) {
sp->md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
if (randomness < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
randomness += add;
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
rv = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
return rv;
}
static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i, j, k;
size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX *m;
OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
int do_stir_pool = 0;
/* time value for various platforms */
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
FILETIME tv;
# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
SYSTEMTIME t;
GetSystemTime(&t);
SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
# else
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
# endif
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
struct timespec tv;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)
unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
#else
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
if (num <= 0)
return 1;
m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (m == NULL)
goto err_mem;
/* round upwards to multiple of SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
num_ceil =
(1 + (num - 1) / (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
*
* For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
*
* Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
* the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
* be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
* (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
* in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
* bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
*
* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
* caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
* are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
* global 'md'.
*/
if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
goto err_mem;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure
* we don't pause and cause a deadlock
*/
ASYNC_block_pause();
/* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
if (!initialized) {
RAND_poll();
initialized = 1;
}
if (!stirred_pool)
do_stir_pool = 1;
ok = (randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
if (!ok) {
/*
* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
* output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
* to decrease the randomness estimate. Once we've had enough initial
* seeding we don't bother to adjust the randomness count, though,
* because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
* randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
* we have enough randomness. Randomness should be collected in a
* separate input pool and be transferred to the output pool only
* when the randomness limit has been reached.
*/
randomness -= num;
if (randomness < 0)
randomness = 0;
}
if (do_stir_pool) {
/*
* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
* better make sure that the required randomness gets 'evenly
* distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
* function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
* suitable for this purpose.
*/
int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
while (n > 0) {
#if SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
#endif
#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH */
/*
* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
* rand_add expects to have something to hash.
*/
rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
n -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
if (ok)
stirred_pool = 1;
}
st_idx = sp->index;
st_num = sp->num;
md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof sp->md);
sp->index += num_ceil;
if (sp->index > sp->num)
sp->index %= sp->num;
/*
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
* ours (but other threads may use them too)
*/
sp->md_count[0] += 1;
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
while (num > 0) {
/* num_ceil -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 */
j = (num >= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
num -= j;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
goto err;
curr_time = 0;
if (!rand_hw_seed(m))
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
goto err;
k = (st_idx + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
if (k > 0) {
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
goto err;
} else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
/* may compete with other threads */
sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
if (st_idx >= st_num)
st_idx = 0;
if (i < j)
*(buf++) = local_md[i + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
}
}
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
*/
ASYNC_block_pause();
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md))
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, sp->md, NULL)) {
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
goto err;
}
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
if (ok)
return (1);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
"https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
return (0);
err:
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
return 0;
err_mem:
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
return 0;
}
static int rand_status(void)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
int ret;
int do_not_lock;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
return 0;
cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
/*
* check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
* implementation calls RAND_status())
*/
if (crypto_lock_rand) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
} else
do_not_lock = 0;
if (!do_not_lock) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine
*/
ASYNC_block_pause();
/*
* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
*/
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
locking_threadid = cur;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
}
if (!initialized) {
RAND_poll();
initialized = 1;
}
ret = randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
if (!do_not_lock) {
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
ASYNC_unblock_pause();
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
* currently supports rdrand.
*/
#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND)
# define RDRAND_CALLS 4
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) {
size_t rnd;
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
if (rnd == 0)
return 1;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#else
static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
return 1;
}
#endif
RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth = {
rand_seed,
rand_bytes,
rand_cleanup,
rand_add,
rand_bytes,
rand_status
};

13
crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
View file

@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
int RAND_egd(const char *path)
{
return (-1);
return -1;
}
int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
{
return (-1);
return -1;
}
# else
@ -72,12 +72,13 @@ int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
return (-1);
return -1;
strcpy(addr.sun_path, path);
i = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path);
fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd == -1 || (fp = fdopen(fd, "r+")) == NULL)
return (-1);
return -1;
setbuf(fp, NULL);
/* Try to connect */
for ( ; ; ) {
@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
goto err;
ret = numbytes;
if (mybuffer)
RAND_seed(tempbuf, i);
RAND_add(tempbuf, i, i);
err:
if (fp != NULL)
@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
int RAND_egd(const char *path)
{
return (RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255));
return RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255);
}
# endif

118
crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
View file

@ -17,25 +17,55 @@
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# include "internal/rand.h"
/* Amount of randomness (in bytes) we want for initial seeding. */
# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED (128 / 8)
/*
* Amount of randomness (in bytes) we want for initial seeding.
* This is based on the fact that we use AES-128 as the CRBG, and
* that we use the derivation function. If either of those changes,
* (see rand_init() in rand_lib.c), change this.
*/
# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED 16
/* Maximum amount of randomness to hold in RAND_BYTES_BUFFER. */
# define MAX_RANDOMNESS_HELD (4 * RANDOMNESS_NEEDED)
/* Maximum count allowed in reseeding */
#define MAX_RESEED (1 << 24)
# define MAX_RESEED (1 << 24)
/* DRBG status values */
# define DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED 0
# define DRBG_STATUS_READY 1
# define DRBG_STATUS_RESEED 2
# define DRBG_STATUS_ERROR 3
/* How often we call RAND_poll() in drbg_entropy_from_system */
# define RAND_POLL_RETRIES 8
/* A default maximum length: larger than any reasonable value used in pratice */
/* Max size of entropy, addin, etc. Larger than any reasonable value */
# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH 0x7ffffff0
/* DRBG status values */
typedef enum drbg_status_e {
DRBG_UNINITIALISED,
DRBG_READY,
DRBG_RESEED,
DRBG_ERROR
} DRBG_STATUS;
/*
* The context for DRBG AES-CTR
* A buffer of random bytes to be fed as "entropy" into the DRBG. RAND_add()
* adds data to the buffer, and the drbg_entropy_from_system() pulls data from
* the buffer. We have a separate data structure because of the way the
* API is defined; otherwise we'd run into deadlocks (RAND_bytes ->
* RAND_DRBG_generate* -> drbg_entropy_from_system -> RAND_poll -> RAND_add ->
* drbg_add*; the functions with an asterisk lock).
*/
typedef struct drbg_ctr_ctx_st {
typedef struct rand_bytes_buffer_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
size_t size;
size_t curr;
unsigned char *buff;
} RAND_BYTES_BUFFER;
/*
* The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
*/
typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
AES_KEY ks;
size_t keylen;
unsigned char K[32];
@ -47,21 +77,28 @@ typedef struct drbg_ctr_ctx_st {
unsigned char bltmp[16];
size_t bltmp_pos;
unsigned char KX[48];
} DRBG_CTR_CTX;
} RAND_DRBG_CTR;
/*
* The context for all DRBG's
* The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode
* right now.
*/
struct drbg_ctx_st {
struct rand_drbg_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
DRBG_CTX *parent;
int nid; /* the NID of the underlying algorithm */
unsigned int flags; /* various external flags */
RAND_DRBG *parent;
int nid; /* the underlying algorithm */
unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */
unsigned short filled;
/*
* This is a fixed-size buffer, but we malloc to make it a little
* harder to find; a classic security/performance trade-off.
*/
int size;
unsigned char *randomness;
/* The following parameters are setup by mechanism drbg_init() call */
/* These parameters are setup by the per-type "init" function. */
int strength;
size_t blocklength;
size_t max_request;
size_t min_entropy, max_entropy;
size_t min_nonce, max_nonce;
@ -69,43 +106,50 @@ struct drbg_ctx_st {
unsigned int reseed_counter;
unsigned int reseed_interval;
size_t seedlen;
int status;
DRBG_STATUS state;
/* Application data: typically (only?) used by test get_entropy */
/* Application data, mainly used in the KATs. */
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
/* Implementation specific structures */
DRBG_CTR_CTX ctr;
/* Implementation specific structures; was a union, but inline for now */
RAND_DRBG_CTR ctr;
/* entropy gathering function */
/* Callback functions. See comments in rand_lib.c */
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy;
/* Indicates we have finished with entropy buffer */
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy;
/* nonce gathering function */
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce;
/* Indicates we have finished with nonce buffer */
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce;
};
extern RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth;
void rand_drbg_cleanup(void);
/* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */
extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth;
extern RAND_BYTES_BUFFER rand_bytes;
extern RAND_DRBG rand_drbg;
/* Hardware-based seeding functions. */
void rand_rdtsc(void);
int rand_rdcpu(void);
void rand_read_tsc(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
int rand_read_cpu(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
/* DRBG entropy callbacks. */
void drbg_release_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out);
size_t drbg_entropy_from_parent(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
size_t drbg_entropy_from_system(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
/* DRBG functions implementing AES-CTR */
int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
int ctr_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
int ctr_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
int ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
int ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen);
int ctr_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
int ctr_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);

136
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
View file

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
RAND_BYTES_BUFFER rand_bytes;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
@ -40,14 +41,14 @@ static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
* it's not sufficient to indicate whether or not the seeding was
* done.
*/
void rand_rdtsc(void)
void rand_read_tsc(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
unsigned char c;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
RAND_add(&c, 1, 0.5);
cb(arg, &c, 1, 0.5);
}
}
#endif
@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
int rand_rdcpu(void)
int rand_read_cpu(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
size_t i, s;
@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ int rand_rdcpu(void)
s = OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed();
if (s == 0)
break;
RAND_add(&s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
cb(arg, &s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
}
if (i >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED)
return 1;
@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ int rand_rdcpu(void)
s = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
if (s == 0)
break;
RAND_add(&s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
cb(arg, &s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
}
if (i >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED)
return 1;
@ -90,15 +91,117 @@ int rand_rdcpu(void)
}
#endif
/*
* DRBG has two sets of callbacks; we only discuss the "entropy" one
* here. When the DRBG needs additional randomness bits (called entropy
* in the NIST document), it calls the get_entropy callback which fills in
* a pointer and returns the number of bytes. When the DRBG is finished with
* the buffer, it calls the cleanup_entropy callback, with the value of
* the buffer that the get_entropy callback filled in.
*
* Get entropy from the system, via RAND_poll if needed. The |entropy|
* is the bits of randomness required, and is expected to fit into a buffer
* of |min_len|..|max__len| size. We assume we're getting high-quality
* randomness from the system, and that |min_len| bytes will do.
*/
size_t drbg_entropy_from_system(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
int i;
if (min_len > (size_t)drbg->size) {
/* Should not happen. See comment near RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. */
min_len = drbg->size;
}
if (rand_drbg.filled) {
/* Re-use what we have. */
*pout = drbg->randomness;
return drbg->size;
}
/* If we don't have enough, try to get more. */
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes.lock);
for (i = RAND_POLL_RETRIES; rand_bytes.curr < min_len && --i >= 0; ) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes.lock);
RAND_poll();
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes.lock);
}
/* Get desired amount, but no more than we have. */
if (min_len > rand_bytes.curr)
min_len = rand_bytes.curr;
if (min_len != 0) {
memcpy(drbg->randomness, rand_bytes.buff, min_len);
rand_drbg.filled = 1;
/* Update amount left and shift it down. */
rand_bytes.curr -= min_len;
if (rand_bytes.curr != 0)
memmove(rand_bytes.buff, &rand_bytes.buff[min_len], rand_bytes.curr);
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes.lock);
return min_len;
}
size_t drbg_entropy_from_parent(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
int st;
if (min_len > (size_t)drbg->size) {
/* Should not happen. See comment near RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. */
min_len = drbg->size;
}
/* Get random from parent, include our state as additional input. */
st = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent, drbg->randomness, min_len, 0,
(unsigned char *)drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
if (st == 0)
return 0;
drbg->filled = 1;
return min_len;
}
void drbg_release_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out)
{
drbg->filled = 0;
OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg->randomness, sizeof(drbg->randomness));
}
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
int ret = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL;
#endif
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL;
rand_bytes.lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_bytes.lock != NULL;
rand_bytes.curr = 0;
rand_bytes.size = MAX_RANDOMNESS_HELD;
/* TODO: Should this be secure malloc? */
rand_bytes.buff = malloc(rand_bytes.size);
ret &= rand_bytes.buff != NULL;
rand_drbg.lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_drbg.lock != NULL;
rand_drbg.size = RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
rand_drbg.randomness = OPENSSL_malloc(rand_drbg.size);
ret &= rand_drbg.randomness != NULL;
/* If you change these parameters, see RANDOMNESS_NEEDED */
ret &= RAND_DRBG_set(&rand_drbg,
NID_aes_128_ctr, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) == 1;
ret &= RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(&rand_drbg, drbg_entropy_from_system,
drbg_release_entropy,
NULL, NULL) == 1;
return ret;
}
@ -113,7 +216,24 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_drbg_cleanup();
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_bytes.lock);
OPENSSL_clear_free(rand_drbg.randomness, rand_drbg.size);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_drbg.lock);
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(&rand_drbg);
}
/*
* RAND_poll_ex() gets a function pointer to call when it has random bytes.
* RAND_poll() sets the function pointer to be a wrapper that calls RAND_add().
*/
static void call_rand_add(void* arg, const void *buf, int num, double r)
{
RAND_add(buf, num, r);
}
int RAND_poll(void)
{
return RAND_poll_ex(call_rand_add, NULL);
}
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
@ -150,10 +270,10 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
} else {
ENGINE_finish(e);
default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
}
#else
default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
#endif
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;

104
crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
View file

@ -41,17 +41,16 @@
* uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
* interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
* relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
* it can be read.
* it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
* is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
* clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
* would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy
* platforms.
*
* If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is more
* constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the clock can be
* read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results would be far
* more predictable.
*
* As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of seed
* As a precaution, we generate four times the required amount of seed
* data.
*/
int RAND_poll(void)
int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
short int code;
gid_t curr_gid;
@ -73,11 +72,11 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
* different processes.
*/
curr_gid = getgid();
RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 0);
cb(arg, &curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 0);
curr_pid = getpid();
RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 0);
cb(arg, &curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 0);
curr_uid = getuid();
RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 0);
cb(arg, &curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 0);
for (i = 0; i < (RANDOMNESS_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
/*
@ -100,7 +99,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
/* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
RAND_add(&v, sizeof v, 1);
cb(arg, &v, sizeof v, 1);
}
return 1;
}
@ -128,39 +127,36 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
# error "librandom not (yet) supported"
# endif
int RAND_poll(void)
/*
* Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when succesful.
*/
int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
return 0;
# else
int ok = 0;
int ok = 1;
char temp[RANDOMNESS_NEEDED];
# define TEMPSIZE (int)sizeof(temp)
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
rand_rdtsc();
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
if (rand_rdcpu())
ok++;
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
{
static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
int i;
int i = getrandom(temp, TEMPSIZE, 0);
for (i = 0; paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i], temp, TEMPSIZE) == TEMPSIZE) {
RAND_add(temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
ok++;
break;
}
if (i >= 0) {
cb(arg, temp, i, i);
if (i == TEMPSIZE)
goto done;
}
}
# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
{
/* Not yet implemented. */
}
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
{
static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM, NULL };
@ -172,29 +168,43 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
continue;
setbuf(fp, NULL);
if (fread(temp, 1, TEMPSIZE, fp) == TEMPSIZE) {
RAND_add(temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
ok++;
cb(arg, temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
fclose(fp);
break;
goto done;
}
fclose(fp);
}
}
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
rand_read_tsc(cb, arg);
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
if (rand_read_cpu(cb, arg))
goto done;
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
{
static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
int i;
for (i = 0; paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i], temp, TEMPSIZE) == TEMPSIZE) {
cb(arg, temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
goto done;
}
}
}
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
{
int i = getrandom(temp, TEMPSIZE, 0);
if (i >= 0) {
RAND_add(temp, i, i);
if (i == TEMPSIZE)
ok++;
}
}
# endif
ok = 0;
done:
OPENSSL_cleanse(temp, TEMPSIZE);
return ok > 0 ? 1 : 0;
return ok;
# endif
}
# endif

4
crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
View file

@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static struct items_data_st {
{0, 0}
};
int RAND_poll(void)
int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
/* determine the number of items in the JPI array */
struct items_data_st item_entry;
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
/* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
RAND_add((PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2);
cb(arg, (PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2);
return 1;
}

12
crypto/rand/rand_win.c
View file

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
# endif
int RAND_poll(void)
int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
int ok = 0;
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
rand_rdtsc();
rand_read_tsc(cb, arg);
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
if (rand_rdcpu())
if (rand_read_cpu(cb, arg))
ok++;
# endif
@ -60,14 +60,14 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buf, (ULONG)sizeof(buf),
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
return 0;
RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
cb(arg, buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
return 1;
# else
/* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
cb(arg, buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
ok++;
}
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
cb(arg, buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
ok++;
}
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);

10
crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
View file

@ -136,16 +136,6 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
} else
e = rsa->e;
if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL
&& bn_get_words(rsa->d) != NULL) {
/*
* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as
* unpredictable seed
*/
RAND_add(bn_get_words(rsa->d), bn_get_dmax(rsa->d) * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
0.0);
}
{
BIGNUM *n = BN_new();

24
doc/man3/RAND_add.pod
View file

@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
=head1 NAME
RAND_add, RAND_poll, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen
RAND_add, RAND_poll, RAND_poll_ex, RAND_poll_fn,
RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen
- add randomness to the PRNG or get its status
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@ -10,7 +11,11 @@ RAND_add, RAND_poll, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int RAND_status(void);
int RAND_poll()
typedef void (*RAND_poll_fn)(void *arg,
const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
int RAND_poll();
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
@ -35,11 +40,16 @@ and network packet timings, can be reasonable sources of seeding material.
RAND_status() indicates whether or not the CSPRNG has been sufficiently
seeded. If not, functions such as RAND_bytes(3) will fail.
RAND_poll() uses the current capabilities to seed the CSPRNG. The
exact features used depends on how OpenSSL was configured, and can
be displayed with the OpenSSL L<version(1)> command. This function is
normally called automatically during OpenSSL initialization, but
can be called by the application to reseed the CSPRNG.
RAND_poll_ex() uses the system's capabilities to obtain a buffer
containing random bits which can then be used to seed a CSPRNG. The
exact features used depends on how OpenSSL was configured, and a summary
can be displayed with the OpenSSL L<version(1)> command. This function
is normally called as needed by the CSPRNG. The B<arg> parameter is an
arbitrary pointer which will be passed as an argument to the callback.
The B<cb> function is called each time there is data to add.
RAND_poll() invokes RAND_poll_ex() with B<cb> and B<arg> set so that it
will call RAND_add(), to add the randomness to the global CSPRNG.
RAND_add() mixes the B<num> bytes at B<buf> into the PRNG state.
The B<randomness> argument is an estimate of how much randomness is

64
include/internal/rand.h
View file

@ -10,49 +10,55 @@
#ifndef HEADER_DRBG_RAND_H
# define HEADER_DRBG_RAND_H
/* Flag for CTR mode only: use derivation function ctr_df */
/* In CTR mode, use derivation function ctr_df */
#define RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF 0x2
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_drbg(void);
int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags);
DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, DRBG_CTX *parent);
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
/*
* Object lifetime functions.
*/
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent);
int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags);
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen);
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
int RAND_DRBG_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
/*
* Object "use" functions.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
void RAND_DRBG_free(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int interval);
typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
/*
* EXDATA
*/
#define RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *dctx, int idx, void *arg);
void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *dctx, int idx);
/*
* Callback functions. See comments in drbg_lib.c
*/
typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len,
size_t max_len);
typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
size_t olen);
typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
unsigned char *out);
typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len,
size_t max_len);
typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
size_t olen);
typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char *out);
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *dctx,
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy,
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce);
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int interval);
#define RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx, void *arg);
void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx);
DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_get_default(void);
#endif

2
include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
View file

@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
typedef struct ec_key_method_st EC_KEY_METHOD;
typedef struct rand_meth_st RAND_METHOD;
typedef struct drbg_ctx_st DRBG_CTX;
typedef struct rand_drbg_st RAND_DRBG;
typedef struct ssl_dane_st SSL_DANE;
typedef struct x509_st X509;

10
include/openssl/rand.h
View file

@ -33,27 +33,37 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine);
# endif
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void);
# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
# define RAND_cleanup() while(0) continue
# endif
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num))
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
# if defined(__ANDROID__) && defined(__NDK_FPABI__)
__NDK_FPABI__ /* __attribute__((pcs("aapcs"))) on ARM */
# endif
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long max_bytes);
int RAND_write_file(const char *file);
const char *RAND_file_name(char *file, size_t num);
int RAND_status(void);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD
int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes);
int RAND_egd(const char *path);
int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes);
# endif
typedef void (*RAND_poll_fn)(void *arg,
const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
int RAND_poll(void);
int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
# if defined(_WIN32) && (defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H))
/* application has to include <windows.h> in order to use these */

2
ssl/statem/statem.c
View file

@ -272,7 +272,6 @@ static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s)
static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret = -1;
@ -283,7 +282,6 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server)
return -1;
}
RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();

3
test/bntest.c
View file

@ -2035,11 +2035,8 @@ static int run_file_tests(int i)
int setup_tests(void)
{
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"If not seeded, BN_generate_prime might fail";
int n = test_get_argument_count();
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = BN_CTX_new()))
return 0;

6
test/build.info
View file

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /INCLUDE=MAIN
hmactest \
rc2test rc4test rc5test \
destest mdc2test \
randtest dhtest enginetest casttest \
dhtest enginetest casttest \
bftest ssltest_old dsatest exptest rsa_test \
evp_test evp_extra_test igetest v3nametest v3ext \
crltest danetest bad_dtls_test lhash_test \
@ -119,10 +119,6 @@ INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /INCLUDE=MAIN
INCLUDE[mdc2test]=../include
DEPEND[mdc2test]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
SOURCE[randtest]=randtest.c
INCLUDE[randtest]=../include
DEPEND[randtest]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
SOURCE[dhtest]=dhtest.c
INCLUDE[dhtest]=.. ../include
DEPEND[dhtest]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a

5
test/dhtest.c
View file

@ -24,9 +24,6 @@
static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg);
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
static int dh_test(void)
{
BN_GENCB *_cb = NULL;
@ -40,8 +37,6 @@ static int dh_test(void)
int i, alen, blen, aout, bout;
int ret = 0;
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
if (!TEST_ptr(_cb = BN_GENCB_new()))
goto err;
BN_GENCB_set(_cb, &cb, NULL);

206
test/drbgtest.c
View file

@ -92,18 +92,18 @@ typedef struct drbg_selftest_data_st {
make_drbg_test_data(nid, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF, pr, p)
static DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA drbg_test[] = {
make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_128_ctr, aes_128_use_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_192_ctr, aes_192_use_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_256_ctr, aes_256_use_df, 1),
make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_128_ctr, 0, aes_128_no_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_192_ctr, 0, aes_192_no_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_256_ctr, 0, aes_256_no_df, 1),
make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_128_ctr, aes_128_use_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_192_ctr, aes_192_use_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_256_ctr, aes_256_use_df, 1),
};
static int app_data_index;
/*
* Test context data, attached as appdata to the DRBG_CTX
* Test context data, attached as EXDATA to the RAND_DRBG
*/
typedef struct test_ctx_st {
const unsigned char *ent;
@ -114,29 +114,29 @@ typedef struct test_ctx_st {
int noncecnt;
} TEST_CTX;
static size_t kat_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char **pout,
static size_t kat_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index);
TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
t->entcnt++;
*pout = (unsigned char *)t->ent;
return t->entlen;
}
static size_t kat_nonce(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char **pout,
static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index);
TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
t->noncecnt++;
*pout = (unsigned char *)t->nonce;
return t->noncelen;
}
static int uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
static int uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
int ret = dctx == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(dctx);
int ret = drbg == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
ERR_clear_error();
return ret;
@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
*/
static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = NULL;
RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
TEST_CTX t;
int failures = 0;
unsigned char buff[1024];
@ -156,9 +156,9 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
* Test without PR: Instantiate DRBG with test entropy, nonce and
* personalisation string.
*/
if (!TEST_ptr(dctx = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
return 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(dctx, kat_entropy, NULL,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
kat_nonce, NULL))) {
failures++;
goto err;
@ -168,10 +168,10 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
t.entlen = td->entlen;
t.nonce = td->nonce;
t.noncelen = td->noncelen;
RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index, &t);
RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->expected, td->exlen, buff, td->exlen))
failures++;
@ -179,29 +179,29 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
/* Reseed DRBG with test entropy and additional input */
t.ent = td->entreseed;
t.entlen = td->entreseedlen;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen)
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->kat2len, 0,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen)
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len, 0,
td->adin2, td->adin2len))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat2, td->kat2len, buff, td->kat2len)))
failures++;
uninstantiate(dctx);
uninstantiate(drbg);
/*
* Now test with PR: Instantiate DRBG with test entropy, nonce and
* personalisation string.
*/
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(dctx, td->nid, td->flags))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(dctx, kat_entropy, NULL,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, td->nid, td->flags))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
kat_nonce, NULL)))
failures++;
RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index, &t);
RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
t.ent = td->ent_pr;
t.entlen = td->entlen_pr;
t.nonce = td->nonce_pr;
t.noncelen = td->noncelen_pr;
t.entcnt = 0;
t.noncecnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers_pr, td->perslen_pr)))
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers_pr, td->perslen_pr)))
failures++;
/*
@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
t.ent = td->entpr_pr;
t.entlen = td->entprlen_pr;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->katlen_pr, 1,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->katlen_pr, 1,
td->adin_pr, td->adinlen_pr))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat_pr, td->katlen_pr, buff, td->katlen_pr))
failures++;
@ -221,28 +221,28 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
t.ent = td->entg_pr;
t.entlen = td->entglen_pr;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->kat2len_pr, 1,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len_pr, 1,
td->ading_pr, td->adinglen_pr))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat2_pr, td->kat2len_pr,
buff, td->kat2len_pr))
failures++;
err:
uninstantiate(dctx);
RAND_DRBG_free(dctx);
uninstantiate(drbg);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return failures == 0;
}
/*
* Initialise a DRBG based on selftest data
*/
static int init(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td, TEST_CTX *t)
static int init(RAND_DRBG *drbg, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td, TEST_CTX *t)
{
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(dctx, td->nid, td->flags))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(dctx, kat_entropy, NULL,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, td->nid, td->flags))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
kat_nonce, NULL)))
return 0;
RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index, t);
RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, t);
t->ent = td->ent;
t->entlen = td->entlen;
t->nonce = td->nonce;
@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ static int init(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td, TEST_CTX *t)
/*
* Initialise and instantiate DRBG based on selftest data
*/
static int instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td,
static int instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td,
TEST_CTX *t)
{
if (!TEST_true(init(dctx, td, t))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen)))
if (!TEST_true(init(drbg, td, t))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
@ -270,14 +270,14 @@ static int instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td,
*/
static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
{
static char zero[sizeof(DRBG_CTX)];
DRBG_CTX *dctx = NULL;
static char zero[sizeof(RAND_DRBG)];
RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
TEST_CTX t;
unsigned char buff[1024];
unsigned int reseed_counter_tmp;
int ret = 0;
if (!TEST_ptr(dctx = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
goto err;
/*
@ -285,8 +285,8 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
/* Test detection of too large personlisation string */
if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, dctx->max_pers + 1) > 0)
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_pers + 1) > 0)
goto err;
/*
@ -295,27 +295,27 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
/* Test entropy source failure detecion: i.e. returns no data */
t.entlen = 0;
if (TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen), 0))
if (TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen), 0))
goto err;
/* Try to generate output from uninstantiated DRBG */
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test insufficient entropy */
t.entlen = dctx->min_entropy - 1;
if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
t.entlen = drbg->min_entropy - 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test too much entropy */
t.entlen = dctx->max_entropy + 1;
if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
t.entlen = drbg->max_entropy + 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
@ -323,37 +323,37 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
/* Test too small nonce */
if (dctx->min_nonce) {
t.noncelen = dctx->min_nonce - 1;
if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
if (drbg->min_nonce) {
t.noncelen = drbg->min_nonce - 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
}
/* Test too large nonce */
if (dctx->max_nonce) {
t.noncelen = dctx->max_nonce + 1;
if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
if (drbg->max_nonce) {
t.noncelen = drbg->max_nonce + 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
}
/* Instantiate with valid data, Check generation is now OK */
if (!instantiate(dctx, td, &t)
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen)))
goto err;
/* Request too much data for one request */
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, dctx->max_request + 1, 0,
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, drbg->max_request + 1, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen)))
goto err;
/* Try too large additional input */
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, dctx->max_adin + 1)))
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, drbg->max_adin + 1)))
goto err;
/*
@ -361,24 +361,24 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
* failure.
*/
t.entlen = 0;
if (TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 1,
if (TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Instantiate again with valid data */
if (!instantiate(dctx, td, &t))
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
reseed_counter_tmp = dctx->reseed_counter;
dctx->reseed_counter = dctx->reseed_interval;
reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_counter;
drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
t.entcnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_int_eq(t.entcnt, 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(dctx->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
|| !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
@ -386,24 +386,24 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
* failure.
*/
t.entlen = 0;
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 1,
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test reseed counter works */
if (!instantiate(dctx, td, &t))
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
reseed_counter_tmp = dctx->reseed_counter;
dctx->reseed_counter = dctx->reseed_interval;
reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_counter;
drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
t.entcnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_int_eq(t.entcnt, 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(dctx->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
|| !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
@ -411,41 +411,41 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
/* Test explicit reseed with too large additional input */
if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, dctx->max_adin + 1) > 0)
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adin + 1) > 0)
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with entropy source failure */
t.entlen = 0;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too much entropy */
if (!init(dctx, td, &t))
if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
t.entlen = dctx->max_entropy + 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
t.entlen = drbg->max_entropy + 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too little entropy */
if (!init(dctx, td, &t))
if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
t.entlen = dctx->min_entropy - 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(dctx))
t.entlen = drbg->min_entropy - 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Standard says we have to check uninstantiate really zeroes */
if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(dctx->ctr), &dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr)))
if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(drbg->ctr), &drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr)))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
uninstantiate(dctx);
RAND_DRBG_free(dctx);
uninstantiate(drbg);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return ret;
}
@ -475,6 +475,19 @@ err:
return rv;
}
#define RAND_ADD_SIZE 500
static int test_rand_add()
{
char *p;
if (!TEST_ptr(p = malloc(RAND_ADD_SIZE)))
return 0;
RAND_add(p, RAND_ADD_SIZE, RAND_ADD_SIZE);
free(p);
return 1;
}
int setup_tests(void)
{
@ -482,5 +495,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_kats, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_error_checks, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test));
ADD_TEST(test_rand_add);
return 1;
}

5
test/dsatest.c
View file

@ -63,9 +63,6 @@ static unsigned char out_g[] = {
static const unsigned char str1[] = "12345678901234567890";
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
static int dsa_test(void)
{
BN_GENCB *cb;
@ -77,8 +74,6 @@ static int dsa_test(void)
unsigned int siglen;
const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
if (!TEST_ptr(cb = BN_GENCB_new()))
goto end;

6
test/ecdsatest.c
View file

@ -28,10 +28,6 @@
# include <openssl/err.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
/* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */
static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
@ -401,8 +397,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
TEST_note("Elliptic curves are disabled.");
#else
/* initialize the prng */
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
ADD_TEST(x9_62_tests);
ADD_TEST(test_builtin);
#endif

5
test/ectest.c
View file

@ -1425,9 +1425,6 @@ static int parameter_test(void)
ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparameters);
return r;
}
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
#endif
int setup_tests(void)
@ -1438,8 +1435,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
|| !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)))
return 0;
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
ADD_TEST(parameter_test);
ADD_TEST(prime_field_tests);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M

110
test/randtest.c
View file

@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "testutil.h"
/* some FIPS 140-1 random number test */
/* some simple tests */
static int fips_random_tests(void)
{
unsigned char buf[2500];
int i, j, k, s, sign, nsign, ret = 1;
unsigned long n1;
unsigned long n2[16];
unsigned long runs[2][34];
long d;
if (!TEST_int_ge(RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)), 0))
return 0;
n1 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
n2[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 34; i++)
runs[0][i] = runs[1][i] = 0;
/* test 1 and 2 */
sign = 0;
nsign = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 2500; i++) {
j = buf[i];
n2[j & 0x0f]++;
n2[(j >> 4) & 0x0f]++;
for (k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
s = (j & 0x01);
if (s == sign)
nsign++;
else {
if (nsign > 34)
nsign = 34;
if (nsign != 0) {
runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
if (nsign > 6)
runs[sign][5]++;
}
sign = s;
nsign = 1;
}
if (s)
n1++;
j >>= 1;
}
}
if (nsign > 34)
nsign = 34;
if (nsign != 0)
runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
/* test 1 */
if (!TEST_true(9654 < n1 && n1 < 10346)) {
TEST_info("test 1 failed, X=%lu", n1);
ret = 0;
}
/* test 2 */
d = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
d += n2[i] * n2[i];
d = (d * 8) / 25 - 500000;
if (!TEST_true(103 < d && d < 5740)) {
TEST_info("test 2 failed, X=%ld.%02ld", d / 100L, d % 100L);
ret = 0;
}
/* test 3 */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (!TEST_true(2267 < runs[i][0] && runs[i][0] < 2733)
|| !TEST_true(1079 < runs[i][1] && runs[i][1] < 1421)
|| !TEST_true(502 < runs[i][2] && runs[i][2] < 748)
|| !TEST_true(223 < runs[i][3] && runs[i][3] < 402)
|| !TEST_true(90 < runs[i][4] && runs[i][4] < 223)
|| !TEST_true(90 < runs[i][5] && runs[i][5] < 223)) {
TEST_info("During run %d", i);
ret = 0;
}
}
/* test 4 */
if (!TEST_int_eq(runs[0][33], 0)
|| !TEST_int_eq(runs[1][33], 0))
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
int setup_tests(void)
{
ADD_TEST(fips_random_tests);
return 1;
}

3
test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
View file

@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ use strict;
use warnings;
use OpenSSL::Test;
plan tests => 2;
plan tests => 1;
setup("test_rand");
ok(run(test(["randtest"])));
ok(run(test(["drbgtest"])));

4
test/ssltest_old.c
View file

@ -613,8 +613,6 @@ static int custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
static char *cipher = NULL;
static int verbose = 0;
static int debug = 0;
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
int doit_localhost(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, int family,
long bytes, clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time);
@ -928,8 +926,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
s_cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();

3
util/libcrypto.num
View file

@ -4345,10 +4345,8 @@ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_get0_engine 4287 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_fork_prepare 4288 1_1_1 EXIST:UNIX:FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_fork_parent 4289 1_1_1 EXIST:UNIX:FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_fork_child 4290 1_1_1 EXIST:UNIX:FUNCTION:
RAND_drbg 4291 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_instantiate 4292 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate 4293 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_get_default 4294 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_set 4295 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks 4296 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_new 4297 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@ -4373,3 +4371,4 @@ SCRYPT_PARAMS_it 4314 1_1_1 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:
CRYPTO_secure_clear_free 4315 1_1_0g EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_get0 4316 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count 4317 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_poll_ex 4318 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:

1
util/private.num
View file

@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ OSSL_STORE_error_fn datatype
OSSL_STORE_load_fn datatype
OSSL_STORE_open_fn datatype
OSSL_STORE_post_process_info_fn datatype
RAND_poll_fn datatype
SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func datatype
SSL_early_cb_fn datatype
SSL_psk_client_cb_func datatype