fix for CVE-2010-4180
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5 changed files with 15 additions and 12 deletions
5
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@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
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Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
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and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
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Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
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Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
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Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
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1
NEWS
1
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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
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o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
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o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
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@ -78,18 +78,7 @@ this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go.
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=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
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ssl3.netscape.com:443, first a connection is established with RC4-MD5.
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If it is then resumed, we end up using DES-CBC3-SHA. It should be
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RC4-MD5 according to 7.6.1.3, 'cipher_suite'.
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Netscape-Enterprise/2.01 (https://merchant.netscape.com) has this bug.
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It only really shows up when connecting via SSLv2/v3 then reconnecting
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via SSLv3. The cipher list changes....
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NEW INFORMATION. Try connecting with a cipher list of just
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DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5. For some weird reason, each new connection uses
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RC4-MD5, but a re-connect tries to use DES-CBC-SHA. So netscape, when
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doing a re-connect, always takes the first cipher in the cipher list.
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As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.
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=item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
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@ -814,8 +814,11 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
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s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
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if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
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{
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/* Workaround is now obsolete */
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#if 0
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if (!(s->options &
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SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
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#endif
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{
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al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
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@ -927,6 +927,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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break;
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}
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}
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/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
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* attack: CVE-2010-4180.
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*/
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#if 0
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if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
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{
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/* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
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@ -941,6 +945,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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j = 1;
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}
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}
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#endif
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if (j == 0)
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{
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/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
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