wbrawner/openssl
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

Add blinding to a DSA signature

Browse source 
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too.

This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC
Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA.

Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates:

s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order

In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.

As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:

s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order

Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.

This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is
only removed at the last possible step.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6522)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2018-06-19 15:07:02 +01:00
parent 95aec8641f
commit 7f9822a482
3 changed files with 58 additions and 26 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

4
CHANGES
View file

@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
chosen point SCA attacks.
[Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Billy Bob Brumley]
*) Add blinding to an ECDSA signature to protect against side channel attacks
discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
*) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
[Matt Caswell]
*) Enforce checking in the pkeyutl command line app to ensure that the input

66
crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
View file

@ -59,19 +59,13 @@ const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
{
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL;
BIGNUM *m;
BIGNUM *xr;
BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
int rv = 0;
m = BN_new();
xr = BN_new();
if (m == NULL || xr == NULL)
goto err;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
goto err;
}
@ -87,6 +81,13 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
redo:
if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dlen))
goto err;
@ -101,17 +102,50 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
goto err;
/* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(xr, dsa->priv_key, ret->r, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err; /* s = xr */
if (!BN_add(ret->s, xr, m))
goto err; /* s = m + xr */
if (BN_cmp(ret->s, dsa->q) > 0)
if (!BN_sub(ret->s, ret->s, dsa->q))
/*
* The normal signature calculation is:
*
* s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q
*
* We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
*
* s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q
*/
/* Generate a blinding value */
do {
if (!BN_priv_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1,
BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
goto err;
} while (BN_is_zero(blind));
BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* blindm := blind * m mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(ret->s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q))
goto err;
/* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, blind, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/*
* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
* unlikely.
@ -128,8 +162,6 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
ret = NULL;
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(m);
BN_clear_free(xr);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
}

14
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
View file

@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
*
* We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
*
* s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
* s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
*/
/* Generate a blinding value */
@ -323,6 +323,12 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
goto err;
}
/* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@ -333,12 +339,6 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
goto err;
}
/* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
/*
* if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller, don't