Remove overlapping CHANGES/NEWS entries
Remove entries from CHANGES and NEWS from letter releases that occur *after* the next point release. Without this we get duplicate entries for the same issue appearing multiple times. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
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2 changed files with 0 additions and 348 deletions
279
CHANGES
279
CHANGES
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@ -776,63 +776,6 @@
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Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
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*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
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This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
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Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
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at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
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Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
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Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
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(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
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Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
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(CVE-2013-0169)
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[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
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*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
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This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
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the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
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so it returns the certificate actually sent.
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See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
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(This is a backport)
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[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
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*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
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[NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
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OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
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*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
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to fix DoS attack.
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Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
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fuzzing as a service testing platform.
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(CVE-2012-2333)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
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Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
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*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
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BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
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in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
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Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
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issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
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(CVE-2012-2110)
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[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
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Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
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*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
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@ -1823,228 +1766,6 @@
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*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
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[NTT]
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Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
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*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
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This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
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Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
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at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
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Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
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Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
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(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
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Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
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(CVE-2013-0169)
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[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
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*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
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This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
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the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
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so it returns the certificate actually sent.
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See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
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(This is a backport)
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[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
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*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
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*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
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to fix DoS attack.
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Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
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fuzzing as a service testing platform.
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(CVE-2012-2333)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
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Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
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*) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
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'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
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int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
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rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
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[Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
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Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
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*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
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BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
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in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
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Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
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issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
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(CVE-2012-2110)
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[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
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Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
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*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
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in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
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content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
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needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
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old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
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CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
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an MMA defence is not necessary.
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Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
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this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
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client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
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Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
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*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
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Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
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Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
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preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
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[Antonio Martin]
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Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
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*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
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of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
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which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
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the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
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differences arising during decryption processing. A research
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paper describing this attack can be found at:
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http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
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Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
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Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
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(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
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<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
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for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
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[Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
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*) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
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[Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
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*) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
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(CVE-2011-4576)
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[Adam Langley (Google)]
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*) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
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Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
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Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
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[Adam Langley (Google)]
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*) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
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Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
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and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
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[Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
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*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
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[Adam Langley (Google)]
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*) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
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[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
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*) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
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interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
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[Adam Langley (Google)]
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*) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
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BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
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threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
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This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
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lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
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BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
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the last update always remained unused).
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[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
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*) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
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for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
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[Adam Langley (Google)]
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*) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
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[Bodo Moeller]
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*) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
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by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
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http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
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[Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
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Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
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*) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
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[Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
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*) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
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escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
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ambiguous.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
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*) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
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and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
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Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
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Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
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Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
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[Ben Laurie]
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Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
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*) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
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overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
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be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
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the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
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some broken encodings work correctly.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
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is also one of the inputs.
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[Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
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*) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
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Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
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after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
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etc are non-op.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
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[NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
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OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
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*) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
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access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
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[Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
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*) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
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common in certificates and some applications which only call
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SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) VMS fixes:
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Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
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Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
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Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
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[Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
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Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
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*) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
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69
NEWS
69
NEWS
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@ -107,19 +107,6 @@
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o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
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o SRP support.
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Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]:
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o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
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o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
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Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]:
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o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
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Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]:
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o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
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Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
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o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
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o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
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o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
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o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
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o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
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o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
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o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
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o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
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o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
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o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
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o Various DTLS fixes.
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
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o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
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o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
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o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
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o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
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o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
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o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
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o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
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o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
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o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
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o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
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o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
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o Various DTLS fixes.
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o Recognise SHA2 certificates if only SSL algorithms added.
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o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
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o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
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Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
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o CFB cipher definition fixes.
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Reference in a new issue