make sure RSA blinding works when the PRNG is not properly seeded;
enable it automatically only for the built-in engine
This commit is contained in:
parent
5250725ba5
commit
84b1e84af1
4 changed files with 39 additions and 19 deletions
14
CHANGES
14
CHANGES
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@ -4,12 +4,18 @@
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Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [xx XXX 2003]
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*) Turn on RSA blinding by default, to avoid a timing attack. Applications
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that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off(). They would be ill-advised
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to do so in most cases. The automatic enabling can also be turned off
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by defining OPENSSL_FORCE_NO_RSA_BLINDING at compile-time.
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*) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation
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to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call
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RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING.
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They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases.
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[Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe]
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*) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not
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seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as
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an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there
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is no point in blinding anyway).
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[Bodo Moeller]
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*) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an
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ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of
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the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications
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@ -158,6 +158,11 @@ struct rsa_st
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#define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC 0x02
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#define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE 0x04
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#define RSA_FLAG_BLINDING 0x08
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#define RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING 0x80 /* new with 0.9.7b; the built-in RSA
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* implementation now uses blinding by
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* default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING),
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* but other engines might not need it
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*/
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#define RSA_FLAG_THREAD_SAFE 0x10
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/* This flag means the private key operations will be handled by rsa_mod_exp
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* and that they do not depend on the private key components being present:
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@ -170,6 +175,8 @@ struct rsa_st
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*/
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#define RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER 0x40
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#define RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING 0x80
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#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
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#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
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#define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
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@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
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#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
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do { \
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if(((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && \
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if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
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((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
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!rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
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err_instr \
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@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
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if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
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@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
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}
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
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if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
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@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
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if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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/* do the decrypt */
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@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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goto err;
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}
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if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
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if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
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if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
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p=buf;
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@ -74,10 +74,6 @@ RSA *RSA_new(void)
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{
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RSA *r=RSA_new_method(NULL);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING
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r->flags|=RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
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#endif
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return r;
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}
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@ -313,7 +309,8 @@ void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa)
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BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding);
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rsa->blinding=NULL;
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}
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rsa->flags&= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
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rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
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rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
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}
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int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *p_ctx)
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@ -334,13 +331,23 @@ int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *p_ctx)
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
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{
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/* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
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RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
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if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
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}
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else
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{
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if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
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}
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if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
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if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
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goto err;
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rsa->blinding=BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
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rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
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rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
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rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
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BN_free(Ai);
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ret=1;
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err:
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