Don't return 0 from ssl2_read when a packet with empty payload is received.

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PR:
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Bodo Möller 1999-04-22 14:28:38 +00:00
parent 6cda1005f8
commit 85f48f7e93
2 changed files with 25 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3
*) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return
0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Fix some race conditions.
[Bodo Moeller]

View file

@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ int ssl2_read(SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
int i;
unsigned int mac_size=0;
ssl2_read_again:
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
{
n=s->handshake_func(s);
@ -231,6 +232,25 @@ int ssl2_read(SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
INC32(s->s2->read_sequence); /* expect next number */
/* s->s2->ract_data is now available for processing */
#if 1
/* How should we react when a packet containing 0
* bytes is received? (Note that SSLeay/OpenSSL itself
* never sends such packets; see ssl2_write.)
* Returning 0 would be interpreted by the caller as
* indicating EOF, so it's not a good idea.
* Instead, we just continue reading. Note that using
* select() for blocking sockets *never* guarantees
* that the next SSL_read will not block -- the available
* data may contain incomplete packets, and except for SSL 2
* renegotiation can confuse things even more. */
goto ssl2_read_again; /* This should really be
* "return ssl2_read(s,buf,len)",
* but that would allow for
* denial-of-service attacks if a
* C compiler is used that does not
* recognize end-recursion. */
#else
/* If a 0 byte packet was sent, return 0, otherwise
* we play havoc with people using select with
* blocking sockets. Let them handle a packet at a time,
@ -238,6 +258,7 @@ int ssl2_read(SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
if (s->s2->ract_data_length == 0)
return(0);
return(ssl2_read(s,buf,len));
#endif
}
else
{