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Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' of openssl.net:openssl into OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable

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This commit is contained in:
Bodo Moeller 2013-09-17 09:59:14 +02:00
commit 8b9722a3c0
8 changed files with 134 additions and 25 deletions
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8
CHANGES
View file

@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
[Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
*) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
[Steve Henson]

5
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
View file

@ -88,9 +88,10 @@ As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.
...
=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
=item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect.
Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.
=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG

4
ssl/s23_clnt.c
View file

@ -340,7 +340,9 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0 || s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
ssl2_compat = 0;
#endif
if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
ssl2_compat = 0;
if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count != 0)
ssl2_compat = 0;
}
#endif

12
ssl/s3_lib.c
View file

@ -3066,7 +3066,10 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
}
s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
@ -4129,6 +4132,13 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
if (ii >= 0)
{
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari)
{
if (!ret) ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
continue;
}
#endif
ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
break;
}

2
ssl/ssl.h
View file

@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st
#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L
#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L
#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L
#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x00000040L /* no effect since 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b */
#define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L
#define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L
#define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L
#define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L

10
ssl/ssl3.h
View file

@ -580,7 +580,15 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
* as the types were received in the client hello. */
unsigned short *tlsext_custom_types;
size_t tlsext_custom_types_count; /* how many tlsext_custom_types */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
* running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
* on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
char is_probably_safari;
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
} SSL3_STATE;
#endif

21
ssl/ssl_rsa.c
View file

@ -463,23 +463,6 @@ static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
c->pkeys[i].x509=x;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Free the old authz data, if it exists. */
if (c->pkeys[i].authz != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(c->pkeys[i].authz);
c->pkeys[i].authz = NULL;
c->pkeys[i].authz_length = 0;
}
/* Free the old serverinfo data, if it exists. */
if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(c->pkeys[i].serverinfo);
c->pkeys[i].serverinfo = NULL;
c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = 0;
}
#endif
c->key= &(c->pkeys[i]);
c->valid=0;
@ -1083,7 +1066,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo,
if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(serverinfo, serverinfo_length, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO,SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA);
return(0);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
{
@ -1110,7 +1093,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo,
if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(serverinfo, serverinfo_length, ctx))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO,SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA);
return(0);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}

97
ssl/t1_lib.c
View file

@ -1762,6 +1762,89 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* ec_point_formats
*
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
unsigned short type, size;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
};
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
if (data >= (d+n-2))
return;
data += 2;
if (data > (d+n-4))
return;
n2s(data,type);
n2s(data,size);
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
if (data+size > d+n)
return;
data += size;
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
return;
}
else
{
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
if (data + len != d+n)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
}
s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
@ -1777,10 +1860,24 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
/* Clear observed custom extensions */
s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
{