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DTLS fixes from 0.9.8-stable.

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This commit is contained in:
Andy Polyakov 2007-10-13 10:57:02 +00:00
parent 0d89e45690
commit 90acf770b5
3 changed files with 230 additions and 303 deletions
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531
ssl/d1_both.c
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@ -11,31 +11,31 @@
* are met: * are met:
* *
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* *
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution. * distribution.
* *
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment: * software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
* *
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org. * openssl-core@openssl.org.
* *
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project. * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
* *
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment: * acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
* *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@ -81,19 +81,19 @@
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met: * are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement: * must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-). * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
* *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s); static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
long max, int *ok); long max, int *ok);
static void dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len);
static hm_fragment * static hm_fragment *
dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len) dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
@ -151,14 +150,17 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
if ( frag == NULL) if ( frag == NULL)
return NULL; return NULL;
buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len if (frag_len)
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
if ( buf == NULL)
{ {
OPENSSL_free(frag); buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
return NULL; if ( buf == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(frag);
return NULL;
}
} }
/* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
frag->fragment = buf; frag->fragment = buf;
return frag; return frag;
@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
static void static void
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
{ {
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag); OPENSSL_free(frag);
} }
@ -289,15 +291,37 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
* message got sent. but why would this happen? */ * message got sent. but why would this happen? */
OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting) if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
{
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */ * we'll ignore the result anyway */
ssl3_finish_mac(s, unsigned char *p = &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off + const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); int len;
if (frag_off == 0)
{
/* reconstruct message header is if it
* is being sent in single fragment */
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
l2n3(0,p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
len = ret;
}
else
{
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
len = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, len);
}
if (ret == s->init_num) if (ret == s->init_num)
{ {
if (s->msg_callback) if (s->msg_callback)
@ -307,7 +331,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0; s->init_num = 0;
return(1); return(1);
} }
s->init_off+=ret; s->init_off+=ret;
@ -327,6 +351,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
{ {
int i, al; int i, al;
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
* by the absence of an optional handshake message */ * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
@ -345,12 +370,13 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
return s->init_num; return s->init_num;
} }
msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
do do
{ {
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0)
{ {
/* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */ /* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */
memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
} }
i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok); i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
@ -360,9 +386,38 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok) else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
return i; return i;
if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) /* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing
* up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to
* handshake packet length, we assume we have got all
* the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause
* premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps.
* Well, handling overlaps would require something more
* drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to
* tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was
* the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control
* the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
{ {
memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data;
unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
/* reconstruct message header as if it was
* sent in single fragment */
*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_len,p);
s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
l2n3(0,p);
l2n3(msg_len,p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
p, msg_len,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
/* we just read a handshake message from the other side: /* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
@ -380,10 +435,10 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
return s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; return s->init_num;
} }
else else
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off = i; msg_hdr->frag_off = i;
} while(1) ; } while(1) ;
f_err: f_err:
@ -393,8 +448,57 @@ f_err:
} }
static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
{
size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
/* sanity checking */
if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
{
/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
* against max above */
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
}
else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
{
/* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
* upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
return 0; /* no error */
}
static int static int
dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied) dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
{ {
/* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so: * if so:
@ -403,34 +507,41 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied)
*/ */
pitem *item; pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag; hm_fragment *frag;
unsigned long overlap; int al;
unsigned char *p;
*ok = 0;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
if ( item == NULL) if ( item == NULL)
return 0; return 0;
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq && if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
frag->msg_header.frag_off <= (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{ {
pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
overlap = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- frag->msg_header.frag_off;
p = frag->fragment; al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
memcpy(&s->init_buf->data[s->init_num], if (al==0) /* no alert */
p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap, {
frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap); unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
OPENSSL_free(frag); }
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item); pitem_free(item);
*copied = frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap; if (al==0)
return *copied; {
*ok = 1;
return frag->msg_header.frag_len;
}
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
s->init_num = 0;
*ok = 0;
return -1;
} }
else else
return 0; return 0;
@ -438,21 +549,46 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied)
static int static int
dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr) dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{ {
int i=-1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL; hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL; pitem *item = NULL;
unsigned char seq64be[8]; unsigned char seq64be[8];
unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->frag_len); if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
{
unsigned char devnull [256];
while (frag_len)
{
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
devnull,
frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
if (i<=0) goto err;
frag_len -= i;
}
}
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
if ( frag == NULL) if ( frag == NULL)
goto err; goto err;
memcpy(frag->fragment, &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
if (frag_len)
{
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
goto err;
}
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
@ -462,91 +598,33 @@ dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr)
goto err; goto err;
pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
return 1; return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err: err:
if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
return 0;
}
static void
dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len)
{
unsigned char *p;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
ssl3_finish_mac(s, &p[s->init_num - frag_len], frag_len);
}
static int
dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
int i;
unsigned char *p;
/* make sure there's enough room to read this fragment */
if ( (int)msg_hdr->frag_len && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
(int)msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
if ( msg_hdr->frag_len > 0)
{
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
&p[s->init_num],
msg_hdr->frag_len,0);
if (i <= 0)
{
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
}
if ( msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, msg_hdr);
else
OPENSSL_assert(msg_hdr->seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq);
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
*ok = 0; *ok = 0;
return -1; return i;
} }
static long static long
dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
{ {
unsigned char *p; unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len; unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len;
int i,al; int i,al;
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
unsigned long overlap;
/* see if we have the required fragment already */ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
if (dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &l)) if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
{ {
/* compute MAC, remove fragment headers */ if (*ok) s->init_num += frag_len;
dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, l); return frag_len;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; }
s->state = stn;
return 1;
}
/* get a handshake fragment from the record layer */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* read handshake message header */ /* read handshake message header */
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num], i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */ if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
{ {
@ -554,13 +632,10 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
*ok = 0; *ok = 0;
return i; return i;
} }
OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
p += s->init_num;
/* parse the message fragment header */ /* parse the message fragment header */
dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
dtls1_get_message_header(p, &msg_hdr);
/* /*
* if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
@ -573,26 +648,18 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
/* sanity checking */
if ( frag_off + frag_len > l)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
{ {
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
* if their format is correct. Does not count for * if their format is correct. Does not count for
* 'Finished' MAC. */ * 'Finished' MAC. */
if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0) if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
{ {
if (s->msg_callback) if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
p, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg); s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_num = 0; s->init_num = 0;
@ -607,76 +674,18 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
} }
} }
/* XDTLS: do a sanity check on the fragment */ if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
s->init_num += i;
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
{
/* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
if (l > (INT_MAX-DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Only do this test when we're reading the expected message.
* Stale messages will be dropped and future messages will be buffered */
if ( l > (unsigned long)max)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
}
if ( frag_len > (unsigned long)max)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err; goto f_err;
}
if ( frag_len + s->init_num > (INT_MAX - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
if ( frag_len & !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
{
s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr.type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr.type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = l;
/* s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = seq_num; */
}
/* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */ /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
s->state=stn; s->state=stn;
/* next state (stn) */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if ( frag_len > 0) if ( frag_len > 0)
{ {
unsigned char *p=s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
&p[s->init_num], &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
frag_len,0);
/* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */ /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
if (i <= 0) if (i <= 0)
{ {
@ -692,66 +701,19 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
* handshake to fail */ * handshake to fail */
OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len); OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
#if 0 *ok = 1;
/* Successfully read a fragment.
* It may be (1) out of order, or
* (2) it's a repeat, in which case we dump it
* (3) the one we are expecting next (maybe with overlap)
* If it is next one, it may overlap with previously read bytes
*/
/* case (1): buffer the future fragment /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
* (we can treat fragments from a future message the same * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
* as future fragments from the message being currently read, since * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
* they are sematically simply out of order. * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
*/ s->init_num += frag_len;
if ( msg_hdr.seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq || return frag_len;
frag_off > s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, &msg_hdr);
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
}
/* case (2): drop the entire fragment, and try again */
if ( msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
frag_off + frag_len < s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->init_num -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
}
#endif
/* case (3): received a immediately useful fragment. Determine the
* possible overlap and copy the fragment.
*/
overlap = (s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - frag_off;
/* retain the header for the first fragment */
if ( s->init_num > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
memmove(&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap]),
frag_len - overlap);
s->init_num += frag_len - overlap;
}
else
s->init_num += frag_len;
dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, frag_len - overlap);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)s->init_num, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
*ok=1;
return s->init_num;
f_err: f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
s->init_num = 0; s->init_num = 0;
err:
*ok=0; *ok=0;
return(-1); return(-1);
} }
@ -857,7 +819,7 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
for (;;) for (;;)
{ {
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3))) if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
{ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return(0); return(0);
@ -887,7 +849,7 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
{ {
x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i); x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3))) if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
{ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return(0); return(0);
@ -997,43 +959,6 @@ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
return 1; return 1;
} }
#if 0
static dtls1_message_buffer *
dtls1_message_buffer_new(unsigned int len)
{
dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf;
msg_buf = (dtls1_message_buffer *)
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
if ( msg_buf == NULL)
return NULL;
memset(msg_buf, 0x00, sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
msg_buf->data = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if ( msg_buf->data == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
return NULL;
}
memset(msg_buf->data, 0x00, len);
return msg_buf;
}
#endif
#if 0
static void
dtls1_message_buffer_free(dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf)
{
if (msg_buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(msg_buf->data);
OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
}
}
#endif
int int
dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
{ {

1
ssl/ssl.h
View file

@ -1739,6 +1739,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258

1
ssl/ssl_err.c
View file

@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD), "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD), "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"},