Don't crash when processing a zero-length, TLS >= 1.1 record.
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681
)
This commit is contained in:
parent
2acc020b77
commit
93cab6b319
5 changed files with 24 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -245,7 +245,6 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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}
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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rec->orig_len = rec->length;
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if ((bs != 1) && !send)
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return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
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}
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@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
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rr->data=rr->input;
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rr->orig_len=rr->length;
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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if (enc_err <= 0)
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11
ssl/s3_enc.c
11
ssl/s3_enc.c
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@ -487,6 +487,15 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
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s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
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}
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/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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*
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* Returns:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
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* short etc).
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* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
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* -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
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* occured.
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*/
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int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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{
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SSL3_RECORD *rec;
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@ -553,8 +562,6 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
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rec->orig_len = rec->length;
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if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
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mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
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if ((bs != 1) && !send)
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@ -401,8 +401,13 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
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/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
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rr->data=rr->input;
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rr->orig_len=rr->length;
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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/* enc_err is:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
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* 1: if the padding is valid
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* -1: if the padding is invalid */
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if (enc_err == 0)
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{
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/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
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13
ssl/t1_enc.c
13
ssl/t1_enc.c
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@ -691,6 +691,15 @@ err:
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return(ret);
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}
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/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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*
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* Returns:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
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* short etc).
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* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
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* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
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* an internal error occured.
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*/
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int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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{
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SSL3_RECORD *rec;
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@ -841,8 +850,6 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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{
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if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
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{
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if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
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return -1;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
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ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
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return 0;
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@ -870,8 +877,6 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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}
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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rec->orig_len = rec->length;
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ret = 1;
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if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
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mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
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