Fixed various style issues in the key_share code

Numerous style issues as well as references to TLS1_3_VERSION instead of
SSL_IS_TLS13(s)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2016-11-14 14:53:31 +00:00
parent 5a8e54d9dc
commit 94ed2c6739
7 changed files with 290 additions and 288 deletions

View file

@ -2074,6 +2074,7 @@ int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the SSL functions. */
/* Function codes. */
# define SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT 438
# define SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST 331
# define SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS 345
# define SSL_F_CT_STRICT 349
@ -2105,6 +2106,7 @@ int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION 437
# define SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE 431
# define SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION 418
# define SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT 439
# define SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE 352
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130

View file

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,0,reason)
static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT), "add_client_key_share_ext"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST), "check_suiteb_cipher_list"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS), "ct_move_scts"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CT_STRICT), "ct_strict"},
@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
"ossl_statem_server_construct_message"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION),
"ossl_statem_server_read_transition"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT), "process_key_share_ext"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE), "read_state_machine"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "ssl3_change_cipher_state"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),

View file

@ -112,14 +112,18 @@ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
* we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
*/
/*
* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
* yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
@ -218,9 +222,8 @@ static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
@ -387,16 +390,16 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
* ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
* server.
*
* Return values:
* WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
* WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
* WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
*/
static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
* we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
*/
/*
* Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
* because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
@ -408,18 +411,14 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
: TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
/* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
: TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
@ -435,30 +434,23 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
*
* Return values:
* WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
* WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
* WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
{

View file

@ -73,14 +73,18 @@ static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
* the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
* The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
* we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
*/
/*
* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
* not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
@ -153,9 +157,8 @@ static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
* client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
@ -390,16 +393,16 @@ static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
* ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
* client.
*
* Return values:
* WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
* WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
* WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
*/
static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
* we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
*/
/*
* No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
* TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
@ -415,14 +418,12 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
} else {
if (s->hit)
st->hand_state = s->tlsext_ticket_expected
? TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET : TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
@ -451,11 +452,10 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
}
st->hand_state = s->tlsext_ticket_expected ? TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
: TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
@ -467,9 +467,9 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->hit)
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
@ -479,11 +479,6 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
/*
* ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
* to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
*
* Return values:
* WRITE_TRAN_ERROR - an error occurred
* WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE - Successful transition, more writing to be done
* WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED - Successful transition, no more writing to be done
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
@ -1452,7 +1447,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
/* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
/* No suitable share */
/* TODO(1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
goto f_err;
@ -3123,7 +3118,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
* Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
* message
*/
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;

View file

@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
* handshake has). This will need to be removed later
*/
if ((s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
&& s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
size_t hashlen;
/*

View file

@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
break;
}
}
} else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
} else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
* change if we implement DH key shares
@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
using_ecc = 1;
}
#else
if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Shouldn't happen! */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
@ -1423,57 +1423,57 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
* now, just send one
*/
for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
unsigned int curve_id = 0;
EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
size_t encodedlen;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
unsigned int curve_id = 0;
EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
size_t encodedlen;
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
/* Shouldn't happen! */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
continue;
/* Generate a key for this key_share */
curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
&encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
return 0;
}
/* Create KeyShareEntry */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
encodedlen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
return 0;
}
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
* we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
* For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
*/
s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
sharessent++;
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
/* Shouldn't happen! */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Generate a key for this key_share */
curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
&encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
return 0;
}
/* Create KeyShareEntry */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
return 0;
}
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
* going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
* we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
*/
s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
sharessent++;
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@ -1516,6 +1516,59 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
return 1;
}
/*
* Add the key_share extension.
*
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
/* Generate encoding of server key */
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
/* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
@ -1649,51 +1702,8 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
}
#endif
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
/* Generate encoding of server key */
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
return 0;
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@ -1890,9 +1900,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
* Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
* extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
*
* Returns
* 1 on success
* 0 on failure
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
*/
static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
@ -1926,11 +1934,8 @@ static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
/*
* Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
* and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
* used.
*
* Returns:
* 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is 1)
* 0 otherwise
* used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
* 1) or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
@ -1943,6 +1948,7 @@ static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
if (group_id == share_id
&& (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
@ -1950,11 +1956,130 @@ static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
}
}
if (i == num_groups) {
/* Not in list */
/* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
return i < num_groups;
}
/*
* Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
* If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
const unsigned char *curves;
size_t num_curves;
int group_nid, found = 0;
unsigned int curve_flags;
/* Sanity check */
if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
* rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
*/
if (found)
continue;
/* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
/* Share not suitable */
continue;
}
group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
if (group_nid == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
/* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 0;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
} else {
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
group_nid) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
}
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
found = 1;
}
return 1;
}
@ -2313,120 +2438,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
} else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
&& s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
const unsigned char *curves;
size_t num_curves;
int group_nid, found = 0;
unsigned int curve_flags;
/* Sanity check */
if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
&encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
* rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
*/
if (found)
continue;
/* Check this share is in supported_groups */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* Find a share that we can use */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
/* Share not suitable */
continue;
}
group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
if (group_nid == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
/* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 0;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
} else {
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
group_nid) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
}
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
found = 1;
}
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
&& !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
@ -2717,12 +2731,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
&& s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET encoded_pt;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
@ -2752,8 +2766,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
return 0;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@ -2762,6 +2774,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
return 0;
}
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

View file

@ -57,9 +57,7 @@ setrmextms(0, 0);
$proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_3");
$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
my $numtests = 9;
if (!disabled("tls1_3")) {
$numtests++;
}
$numtests++ if (!disabled("tls1_3"));
plan tests => $numtests;
checkmessages(1, "Default extended master secret test", 1, 1, 1);