Re-revert (re-insert?) temporary change that made renegotiation work again
and add a proper fix: specifically if it is a new session don't send the old TLS ticket, send a zero length ticket to request a new session.
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d99a35f275
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a1dc0336dd
2 changed files with 23 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -1744,7 +1744,28 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
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}
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memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
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s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
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/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
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* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
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* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
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* client session ID matching to work and we know much
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* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
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*
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* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
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* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
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* session resumption.
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*
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* We choose the former approach because this fits in with
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* assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
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* to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
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* ticket.
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*/
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EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
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s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
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EVP_sha256(), NULL);
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#else
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EVP_sha1(), NULL);
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#endif
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ret=1;
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return(ret);
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f_err:
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@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
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if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
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{
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int ticklen;
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if (s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
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if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
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ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
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else
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ticklen = 0;
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