Document -verify_return_error option.

(cherry picked from commit 4e6c12f308)
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2014-04-07 13:02:10 +01:00
parent f396e9f4fc
commit a4896327e3

View file

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ s_client - SSL/TLS client program
B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-connect host:port>]
[B<-verify depth>]
[B<-verify_return_error>]
[B<-cert filename>]
[B<-certform DER|PEM>]
[B<-key filename>]
@ -93,6 +94,11 @@ Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems
with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection
will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.
=item B<-verify_return_error>
Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically
abort the handshake with a fatal error.
=item B<-CApath directory>
The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory
@ -305,6 +311,13 @@ Since the SSLv23 client hello cannot include compression methods or extensions
these will only be supported if its use is disabled, for example by using the
B<-no_sslv2> option.
The B<s_client> utility is a test tool and is designed to continue the
handshake after any certificate verification errors. As a result it will
accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer. None test
applications should B<not> do this as it makes them vulnerable to a MITM
attack. This behaviour can be changed by with the B<-verify_return_error>
option: any verify errors are then returned aborting the handshake.
=head1 BUGS
Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of
@ -312,9 +325,6 @@ the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s_client is rather
hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical
SSL client program would be much simpler.
The B<-verify> option should really exit if the server verification
fails.
The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report
information whenever a session is renegotiated.