Remove duplicate CHANGES entry

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9844)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2019-09-10 11:51:59 +01:00
parent 08229ad838
commit a95b0815c7
2 changed files with 2 additions and 13 deletions

13
CHANGES
View file

@ -24,18 +24,6 @@
(CVE-2019-1549)
[Matthias St. Pierre]
*) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt(). In situations
where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure
of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of
messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption
key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public
RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not
affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the
CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info
to decrypt.
(CVE-2019-1563)
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
@ -66,6 +54,7 @@
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
(CVE-2019-1563)
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been

2
NEWS
View file

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1c and OpenSSL 1.1.1d [under development]
o Fixed a fork protection issue (CVE-2019-1549)
o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt()
o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
(CVE-2019-1563)
o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
used even when parsing explicit parameters