Remove ssl3_check_finished.
The client sends a session ID with the session ticket, and uses
the returned ID to detect resumption, so we do not need to peek
at handshake messages: s->hit tells us explicitly if we're resuming.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
407886f589cf2dbaed82db0a44173036c3bc3317.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 980bc1ec61
)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_clnt.c
ssl/s3_clnt.c
This commit is contained in:
parent
1eaccbef57
commit
b8712b2b9a
3 changed files with 1 additions and 65 deletions
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@ -370,20 +370,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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if (ret == 2)
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{
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s->hit = 1;
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if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
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else
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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}
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#endif
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/* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
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if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
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!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
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@ -313,20 +313,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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if (ret == 2)
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{
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s->hit = 1;
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if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
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else
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s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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}
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#endif
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/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
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/* or PSK */
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if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
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@ -670,11 +656,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
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SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
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if ((sess == NULL) ||
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(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
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#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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!sess->session_id_length ||
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#else
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(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
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#endif
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(sess->not_resumable))
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{
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if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
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@ -3482,40 +3464,9 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
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}
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return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
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}
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}
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#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
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/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
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* case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
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* session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
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{
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int ok;
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long n;
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/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
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if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
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return 1;
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/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
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* message, so permit appropriate message length */
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n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
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SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
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SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
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-1,
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s->max_cert_list,
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&ok);
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if (!ok) return((int)n);
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s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
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if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
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|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
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return 2;
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
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{
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int i = 0;
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@ -1014,7 +1014,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
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int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
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int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
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# endif
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